Hogan v. Hosp. Auth. of Valdosta & Lowndes Cnty.
| Decision Date | 13 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 7:15-CV-138 (HL) |
| Parties | JOHN LEWIS HOGAN, III, Plaintiff, v. HOSPITAL AUTHORITY OF VALDOSTA AND LOWNDES COUNTY, GEORGIA, d/b/a SOUTH GEORGIA MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia |
Plaintiff John Lewis Hogan, III filed a pro se complaint against his former employer, Defendant Hospital Authority of Valdosta and Lowndes, County, Georgia, d/b/a South Georgia Medical Center ("SGMC"), on July 16, 2015, accusing Defendant generally of race discrimination, retaliation, and failure to promote. Plaintiff subsequently retained counsel and filed his Amended Complaint (Doc. 12) on January 13, 2016.1 In his seven count Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges (1) that Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII"); (2) that Defendant unlawfully retaliated against Plaintiff for exercising his protected civil rights in violation of Title VII; (3) that Defendant's conduct constitutes a pattern and practice of continuing discrimination and retaliation against Plaintiff on the basis of his race in violation of 42 U.C.S. § 1981; (4) that Defendant's conduct amounts to a violation of his constitutional right to be free from race discrimination as guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (5) that Defendant violated Plaintiff's right to due process of law and freedom from racial discrimination as defined by the Georgia Constitution; (6) that Defendant violated Plaintiff's right to employment without due process under Georgia law; and (7) that Defendant violated Plaintiff's rights under the Georgia Whistleblower Act and subjected Plaintiff to intentional infliction of emotional distress. Presently pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Counts Four, Five, Six, and Seven of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (Doc. 14). Upon consideration, Defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff is an African-American man who was employed by Defendant as a dialysis technician at the time of his termination. (Doc. 12, ¶¶ 9, 48). As a dialysis technician, Plaintiff was responsible for arriving in advance of patients' scheduled treatments to disinfect the dialysis machines and water systems and to ensure compliance with infection control policies and procedures. (Id. at ¶ 17). Plaintiff'sdaily start time varied depending on the number of patients requiring dialysis treatment. (Id. at ¶ 18). Either Dr. Arunas Urbonas, the Director of the dialysis department, or one of Defendant's staffers would notify Plaintiff by text message when he should arrive for the day. (Id.).
In January 2013, Darin Melvin, a white man and Administrator of the dialysis department, transferred to Defendant's main campus, leaving the Administrator position vacant. (Id. at 21, 23). Plaintiff expressed interest in the position but was advised that the position did not exist. (Id. at ¶¶ 23-24). In March 2013, Darlene Williams, a white woman, assumed the role of Administrator of the dialysis department. (Id. at ¶ 22). Plaintiff alleges that Williams had no dialysis experience prior to becoming Administrator. (Id.).
Plaintiff contends that throughout his employment with Defendant he was denied the opportunity to advance. For example, Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the absence of a department Administrator in February 2013, Defendant failed to conduct Plaintiff's annual evaluation. (Id. at ¶ 25). Consequently, Plaintiff received no increase in his salary. (Id.). Plaintiff further avers that during his tenure with Defendant, Defendant denied him additional training while affording training to Lisa McCutchin, a white female who worked as a Registered Nurse in the dialysis department. (Id. at ¶¶ 19, 26). Additionally, Plaintiff states that he received less pay than white employees who worked a similar schedule. (Id. at ¶¶ 28-30).
In April 2013, Plaintiff informed Darlene Williams that Lisa McCutchin was not conducting a particular medical procedure pursuant to specifications set forth by the machine's manufacturer. (Id. at ¶¶ 36-37). Williams purportedly instructed Plaintiff not to question McCutchin's actions because she was a nurse and he was not. (Id. at ¶ 38). Sometime thereafter, a patient treated by McCutchin died as a result of a blood clot. (Id. at ¶ 39). Plaintiff consulted with Earl Boyett in Risk Management about McCutchin's improper technique. (Id.). The following day, Dr. Urbonas confronted Plaintiff, advising him that he should not have reported the incident involving McCutchin. (Id. at ¶ 40).
On May 10, 2013, Plaintiff received a disciplinary action report for failure to report to work on time. (Id. at ¶ 41). Defendant suspended Plaintiff for three days. (Id.). Plaintiff had never been subject to disciplinary action prior to questioning McCutchin's competency. (Id. at ¶ 32). Upon returning from his suspension, another employee allegedly reported to Plaintiff that she overheard Dr. Urbonas and Williams discussing Plaintiff's termination. (Id. at ¶ 43). Plaintiff further claims that Dr. Urbonas encouraged another dialysis technician to apply for Plaintiff's position prior to Plaintiff's termination. (Id. at ¶ 44).
After reporting McCutchin, Plaintiff alleges that McCutchin began verbally attacking Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 33). Plaintiff reported McCutchin's "unprofessionalism and the rudeness and verbal attacks" to his white supervisors. (Id. at ¶ 34). McCutchin was not disciplined for her conduct. (Id.). According to Plaintiff,McCutchin's conduct was so offensive as to create a hostile work environment for Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 35).2
On June 5, 2013, Williams conducted Plaintiff's annual evaluation. (Id. at ¶ 45). The evaluation noted numerous deficiencies in Plaintiff's performance, including not working required hours; leaving work; failing to notify his supervisor of absences and late arrivals; inappropriate use of his cell phone; inaccurately documenting disinfection of the machines; and not maintaining the required certification. (Id. at ¶ 46). Plaintiff contends that the evaluation was based on inaccurate documentation and that Defendant's objective in listing the purported deficiencies was to disqualify Plaintiff for a merit increase and to support his eventual termination. (Id. at ¶ 47). As a result of the negative evaluation, Defendant placed Plaintiff on probation for 90 days. (Id. at ¶ 45).
Defendant terminated Plaintiff on July 19, 2013 as a result of the alleged shortcomings in his performance. (Id. at ¶ 48). Plaintiff believes that Defendant discriminated against him based on his race and claims that Defendant terminated him in retaliation for requesting a promotion, engaging in protected expression, and seeking equality in the terms and conditions of his employment. (Id. at ¶ 50). Plaintiff filed a formal Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on October 15, 2014, allegingthat Defendant discriminated and retaliated against him because of his race. (Doc. 12-1).3 The EEOC issued Plaintiff a Notice of Suit Rights on April 29, 2015. (Doc. 1-1). This lawsuit followed.
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court shall accept "all well-pleaded facts . . . as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271,1273 n. 1 (11th Cir. 1999). The court must dismiss the complaint if, "on the basis of a dispositive issue of law, no construction of the factual allegations will support the cause of action." Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cnty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993) (). Accordingly, to avoid dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
Defendant moves the Court to dismiss Counts Four, Five, Six, and Seven of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. According to Defendant, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to sustain any of the claims asserted in these counts. Construing the facts asserted by Plaintiff in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met the pleading requirements to maintain his federal law claims brought under § 1983 in Count Four of his Amended Complaint. However, Plaintiff's state law claims asserted in Counts Five, Six, and Seven must fail as a matter of law.
A. § 1983
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims of race discrimination and disparate treatment under Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983. Defendant now moves to dismiss those claims raised by Plaintiff pursuant to § 1981 in Count Three and § 1983 in Count Four but does not challenge the sufficiency of Plaintiff's factual allegations articulated in support of his Title VII claims.4 Because the law provides that § 1981 and § 1983 claims require the same elements of proof and are reviewed using the same analytical framework as TitleVII claims, and because the Court finds that the facts asserted by Plaintiff, taken as true, effectively set forth a claim under Title VII, the Court additionally concludes that Plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts in support of his § 1981 and § 1983 claims. Defendant's motion to dismiss Counts Three and Four of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is accordingly denied.
To prevail under Title VII, the Plaintiff is required to plead facts "sufficient to create an inference of discrimination." Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555,...
To continue reading
Request your trial