Holbrook v. District of Columbia
| Decision Date | 05 February 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A. 03-640(GK).,CIV.A. 03-640(GK). |
| Citation | 305 F.Supp.2d 41 |
| Parties | Darlene HOLBROOK, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Elizabeth T. Jester, James E. Williams, Jester & Willams, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
Edward P. Taptich, Corporation Counsel's Office for DC, Veronica A. Porter, Office of Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
Plaintiffs, minor children and the parents, guardians, and court-appointed advocates of minor children,1 seek to collect attorney's fees and other costs incurred in bringing successful administrative actions under the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq.. Defendant is the Government of the District of Columbia. This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. Upon consideration of the Motion, Opposition, Reply, and the entire record herein, and for the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
IDEA guarantees "all children with disabilities" "a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent living." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). As a condition of receiving funds under the Act, IDEA requires school districts to adopt procedures to ensure appropriate educational placement of disabled students. See 20 U.S.C. § 1413. In addition, school districts must develop comprehensive plans for meeting the special educational needs of disabled students. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(A). These plans are known as "individualized education programs," or IEPs, and must include "a statement of the child's present levels of educational performance, ... a statement of measurable annual goals, [and] a statement of the special education and related services ... to be provided to the child...." 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A).
IDEA also guarantees parents of disabled children an opportunity to participate in the identification, evaluation, and placement process. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(f), 1415(b)(1). Parents who object to their child's "identification, evaluation, or educational placement" are entitled to an "impartial due process hearing," 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6), (f)(1), at which they have a "right to be accompanied and advised by counsel." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(1). Parents "aggrieved by" a hearing officer's findings and decision may bring a civil action in either state or federal court without regard to the amount in controversy. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2).
The case underlying the instant fee litigation was brought by minor children and the parents, guardians, and court-appointed advocates of minor children who claimed that the District of Columbia Public Schools ("DCPS") had failed to provide the children with appropriate special education and related services in violation of IDEA. Each Plaintiff, by virtue of a separate IDEA administrative due process hearing, was found to be entitled to special education and related services.
After winning on the merits of their cases, Plaintiffs filed this action for attorney's fees and other costs under § 1415(i)(3)(B) of the IDEA. This statute gives courts the authority to "award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). See Moore v. District of Columbia, 907 F.2d 165 (D.C.Cir.1990) (en banc) (). Defendants concede that Plaintiffs are "prevailing parties" for the purposes of § 1415(i)(3)(B) and as such are entitled to an award of "reasonable attorneys' fees" under the statute.
Between November 22, 2002 and January 31, 2003, Plaintiffs' counsel, Elizabeth T. Jester, timely submitted to the DCPS nine invoices for attorney's fees and other costs incurred in bringing successful IDEA administrative actions on behalf of each Plaintiff. DCPS reviewed the invoices and "identified specific items for non-payment that it did not deem reasonable." Def.'s Opp'n, at 3.2 See id., Attach. B ("Disputed Items List"). In accordance with this Disputed Items List, DCPS either reduced or denied altogether the amount requested.
The following chart summarizes (1) the invoices for attorney's fees and other costs submitted by Plaintiffs' counsel on behalf of each Plaintiff; (2) any payment made by DCPS; and (3) the amount Plaintiffs claim is still "outstanding."
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Plaintiff Plaintiffs' Invoice DCPS Payment Difference
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Jayvon William $ 4,451.90 $ 2,547.00 $1,904.90
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Andrew Edwards $11,791.81 $10,306.00 $1,485.81
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Gregory Folson $ 4,501.06 $ 2,911.00 $1,590.06
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Shawn Miller $ 5,887.07 $0 $5,887.07
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Shealee Nalle $10,001.01 $ 7,038.00 $2,963.07
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Wahykayl Warren $ 7,590.52 $ 3,344.00 $4,246.52
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Shauntai Wynn $10,676.62 $ 7,103.00 $3,573.62
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See Pls.' Statement of Facts, at 2-6.
On March 10, 2003, Plaintiffs filed the instant action claiming that DCPS improperly reduced or denied their requests for attorney's fees and other costs. Plaintiffs seek to collect (1) $21,651.05 in "outstanding" attorney's fees and other costs incurred in bringing successful IDEA administrative actions3; (2) pre- and post-judgment interest on each award; and (3) attorney's fees and other costs incurred by virtue of the instant fee litigation.
Generally, a "reasonable" attorney's fee is based on the reasonable number of hours expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. See Nat'l Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Sec'y of Def., 675 F.2d 1319 (D.C.Cir.1982); Cobell v. Norton, 231 F.Supp.2d 295, 300 (D.D.C.2002); Blackman v. District of Columbia, 59 F.Supp.2d 37, 42 (D.D.C.1999) (citing to Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)).
Defendant concedes that the hourly rates Plaintiffs seek, i.e., an hourly attorney rate of $280 and an hourly paralegal rate of $90, are reasonable. See Def.'s Opp'n, at 3. Defendant challenges only the number of hours expended on particular tasks and Plaintiffs' claim for other costs.
Defendant charges that the number of hours Plaintiffs' counsel expended on particular tasks was "excessive and duplicative." Def.'s Opp'n, at 7. Specifically, DCPS objected to the 3.4 hours Plaintiffs' counsel spent preparing Plaintiff Gregory Folson's hearing disclosure, and the 10.1 hours she spent preparing for Plaintiff Shealle Nalle's IDEA administrative hearing, as "excessive" and reduced the time to 2 hours and 6 hours, respectively. See Def.'s Opp'n, at 5. DCPS also reduced by half the 8.7 hours that Plaintiffs' counsel spent preparing nine invoices, claiming that it was "overkill." See id. at 7. DCPS also objected to the 3 hours Plaintiffs' counsel spent preparing three referral packages for Plaintiff Shauntai Wynn, and reduced the time to .25 hours for each package. See id. at 6. Defendant claims that this reduction is reasonable because "the task should not have taken an hour to complete each time." Id.
Plaintiffs have the burden of demonstrating that the number of hours expended on particular tasks was reasonable. See Nat'l Ass'n of Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1337 (Tamm, J., concurring); Cobell, 231 F.Supp.2d at 305. This burden is satisfied by submitting an invoice that is sufficiently detailed to "permit the District Court to make an independent determination whether or not the hours claimed are justified." Nat'l Ass'n of Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1327. To be sufficient, the invoice "need not present the exact number of minutes spent nor the precise activity to which each hour was devoted nor the specific attainments of each attorney." Id. (quoting Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C.Cir.1980)). The touchstone inquiry is whether the time expended on particular tasks was reasonable. See Copeland, 641 F.2d at 891. Parties cannot be reimbursed for nonproductive time or duplicative activities. Id.
Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the number of hours expended on particular tasks was reasonable. Plaintiffs' counsel submitted time records that show the specific tasks she performed, the hours she expended on each task (calculated in tenth-hour segments), and the date each task was performed. She also submitted a detailed affidavit explaining the hours claimed for each task identified by DCPS as unreasonable in its Disputed Items List. See Jester Aff..
In addition, Defendant's criticisms are of the "nit-picking" variety which this Circuit has warned against. See Nat'l Ass'n of Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1337-38 (Tamm, J., concurring) (). Moreover, De...
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