Holcomb v. Lee, No. E2005-01451-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. App. 5/23/2006)
| Decision Date | 23 May 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. E2005-01451-COA-R3-CV.,E2005-01451-COA-R3-CV. |
| Parties | HERBERT A. HOLCOMB, JUVENILE COURT JUDGE FOR HAWKINS COUNTY, TENNESSEE v. CROCKETT LEE, COUNTY MAYOR FOR HAWKINS COUNTY, TENNESSEE. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Hawkins County; Nos. 13757, 14317, 14689, 15096, 15422, & 15717; Darryl R. Fansler, Chancellor, by Designation.
Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed; Case Remanded.
R.B. Baird, III, Rogersville, Tennessee, for the Appellant Herbert A. Holcomb, Juvenile Court Judge for Hawkins County, Tennessee.
Thomas L. Kilday, Greeneville, Tennessee, for the Appellee Crockett Lee, County Mayor for Hawkins County, Tennessee.
OPINION
This appeal involves six different lawsuits filed by Hebert A. Holcomb, the Juvenile Court Judge for Hawkins County, Tennessee. In each of these lawsuits, Judge Holcomb sued the Hawkins County Executive/County Mayor seeking additional funding for the salaries of various personnel positions. Each of the six petitions was met with a motion to dismiss claiming Judge Holcomb did not have standing to bring these lawsuits pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101, the statute which authorizes court clerks to bring lawsuits seeking relief of this nature. In response to the motions to dismiss, Judge Holcomb argued he had the inherent power to bring these six lawsuits. The Trial Court disagreed with Judge Holcomb's analysis of the inherent powers doctrine and dismissed the lawsuits. We affirm the dismissal of the six lawsuits, but for reasons other than those set forth by the Trial Court.
This litigation began in July of 1999 when Herbert A. Holcomb, the Juvenile Court Judge for Hawkins County, Tennessee, filed a lawsuit against Heiskell Winstead, the County Executive for Hawkins County. In the complaint, Judge Holcomb sought additional funding for secretarial/clerical personnel and for the positions of Juvenile Services Director and Youth Service Officer. According to Judge Holcomb:
Petitioner avers that due to the work load necessary to carry out his duties and responsibilities as Juvenile Court Judge, it is necessary that he have sufficient and competent secretary/clerical personnel. Petitioner avers that it is essential that he be allowed to establish staff/clerical salaries per annum at a total of $43,562.00 which includes salaries for two (2) full time secretary/clerical personnel. Further, Petitioner avers that due to the work load necessary to carry out his duties and responsibilities as Juvenile Court Judge, it is necessary that he have sufficient and competent Juvenile Services Director and Youth Service Officers. Petitioner avers that it is essential that he be allowed to establish Juvenile Services Director and Youth Service Officer salaries per annum at a total of $74,573.00 which includes salaries for two (2) full time Youth Service Officers and one (1) Juvenile Services Director.
The complaint then referenced other funds allocated to the operation of the Hawkins County Juvenile Court and Judge Holcomb's assessment that the amount of these allocations were appropriate.
The defendant, County Executive Heiskell Winstead, filed a motion to dismiss claiming that pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101, Judge Holcomb was not the proper party plaintiff to bring such a lawsuit as that statute requires such lawsuits be brought by the court clerk.
In June of 2000, the Trial Court issues a memorandum opinion stating that the "primary issue now presented for adjudication is whether Petitioner maintains standing to prosecute the case at bar." The Trial Court explained that Judge Holcomb's argument as to why he had standing was two-fold:
Plaintiff Holcomb first urges that the action should proceed in the nature of quo warranto. Second, Plaintiff asserts that pursuant to the inherent powers of the juvenile court of Hawkins County, Tennessee, he may exercise the authority to seek relief essential to the Court's existence and necessary to the orderly and efficient exercise of its jurisdiction.
The Trial Court concluded that Judge Holcomb was not within the class of county officials permitted to institute salary petitions pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101. The Trial Court also concluded that Judge Holcomb failed to present sufficient evidence for maintaining the action as one in quo warranto. However, the Trial Court went on to hold that Judge Holcomb did have standing to prosecute the case pursuant to his inherent powers as the Hawkins County Juvenile Court Judge.
Although the first lawsuit never officially was resolved, Judge Holcomb continued to file similar lawsuits each successive year. Lawsuits were filed in October of 2000, September of 2001, and August of 2002. The County Executive continued to file motions to dismiss arguing that Judge Holcomb was not the proper party to pursue these lawsuits according to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101. The defendant also argued that the inherent powers doctrine did not give Judge Holcomb standing to prosecute lawsuits of this nature. In September of 2003, the Trial Court denied the several motions to dismiss, again concluding that Judge Holcomb had standing to prosecute the lawsuits through his inherent powers as the Hawkins County Juvenile Court Judge.
The above-referenced cycle continued unabated. In September of 2003, Judge Holcomb filed yet another petition seeking an increase in the salary for the same staff positions addressed in the first petition, although the total amount of funding for the salaries for which Judge Holcomb was seeking an increase often grew with the successive petitions. Judge Holcomb's petition was met with another motion to dismiss based on the same reasons set forth previously. The defendant's motion to dismiss also claimed that the complaint should be dismissed for failure to join indispensable parties, with those indispensable parties being the Hawkins County legislative body. Finally, the defendant also claimed that the lawsuits should be dismissed because, even assuming Judge Holcomb did have the inherent power to bring a lawsuit seeking this relief, the lawsuit had to be filed as a petition for writ of mandamus and brought in the circuit court.
In September of 2004, Chancellor Thomas R. Frierson, II, recused himself from these cases. The cases then were assigned to Chancellor Daryl R. Fansler of Knox County, sitting by designation. Shortly after Chancellor Fansler was assigned to preside over these cases, Judge Holcomb filed another petition in September of 2004, and the defendant filed a corresponding motion to dismiss.1 In this the final petition, Judge Holcomb sought staff/clerical salaries totaling $54,480 for two full-time secretary/clerical personnel, and a total of $109,725 for the salaries of two full-time Youth Service Officers and one Juvenile Services Director.
A hearing was held on April 4, 2005. The Trial Court issued a memorandum opinion following the hearing making several legal conclusions. First, the Trial Court stated:
Chancellor Frierson had previously found that petitioner does not fall within the class of county officials permitted to institute salary petitions pursuant to T.C.A. § 8-20-101. This Court agrees with Chancellor Frierson in that regard, but would note that the Juvenile Court of Hawkins County does apparently have a clerk and, as such, said clerk might have standing to pursue a salary petition under the Act.
With regard to the previous ruling that Judge Holcomb had inherent powers to prosecute these cases, Chancellor Fansler concluded that the doctrine "has been misplaced in its application to the facts of these cases." Specifically, Chancellor Fansler concluded that the doctrine of inherent powers "consists of all powers reasonably required to enable a court to perform officially its judicial functions to protect its dignity, independence and integrity and to make its lawful actions effective." (emphasis in original and citing Anderson County Quarterly Courts v. Judges, 579 S.W.2d 875, 879 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978)). Chancellor Fansler then held:
In this case there has been no exercise of the inherent authority of the Juvenile Court for Hawkins County. In effect, the petitions asked Chancery Court to exercise its inherent powers to order the legislative body of Hawkins County to fund positions and salaries for another court, i.e., the Juvenile Court.
It is this Court's opinion that Chancery is without jurisdiction to do such. Thus, finding no exercise of the inherent power by the Juvenile Court, other than to seek redress in Chancery, this Court can find no claim stated for which relief may be granted and, accordingly, dismisses the actions.
Judge Holcomb appeals claiming the Trial Court erred in dismissing his lawsuits after finding that the Chancery Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the relief sought under the inherent powers doctrine. The defendant argues the Trial Court correctly determined that Judge Holcomb did not have standing through the inherent powers doctrine to pursue this litigation and, even if he did, the lawsuit was properly dismissed for Judge Holcomb's failure to join the Hawkins County legislative body as an indispensable party defendant.
Our standard of review as to the granting of a motion to dismiss is set out in Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714 (Tenn. 1997). In Stein, our Supreme Court explained:
A Rule 12.02(6), Tenn. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted tests only the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the strength of a plaintiff's proof. Such a motion admits the truth of all relevant and material averments contained in the complaint, but asserts that such facts do not constitute a cause of action....
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