Anderson County Quarterly Court v. Judges of 28th Judicial Circuit

• Decision Date: 12 December 1978
• Citation: 579 S.W.2d 875
• Parties: -Appellant, v. JUDGES OF the 28TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, Respondents-Appellees. 579 S.W.2d 875 Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Eastern Section
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

Page 875

579 S.W.2d 875

ANDERSON COUNTY QUARTERLY COURT, Petitioner-Appellant, v. JUDGES OF the 28TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, Respondents-Appellees.

579 S.W.2d 875

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Eastern Section.

Dec. 12, 1978.

James N. Ramsey and Jan Hicks, Clinton, for petitioner-appellant.

James B. Scott, Jr., Clinton, for respondents-appellees.

OPINION

LEWIS, Judge.

This case arises out of the use of the former Chancery Courtroom in the Anderson County Courthouse. Anderson County was formerly a part of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit and the Second Chancery Division. The Legislature had also previously created a Law and Equity Court for the County. When the present courthouse was constructed, all these courts were housed on the third floor of that building.

In 1974, the Legislature created the Twenty-Eighth Judicial Circuit, composed only of Anderson County. The Law and Equity Court became the Chancery Court and, as a result, Anderson County was removed from the Second Chancery Division. Therefore, because of a general current lack of need, the courtroom formerly used by the Chancery Court fell into infrequent use by the Twenty-Eighth Judicial Circuit.

The appellant, at its meeting of June 20, 1977, entertained a motion to allow the Tennessee Department of Employment Security to have temporary use of the former Chancery Courtroom. On June 24, 1977, Judge Sidney Davis issued an ex parte injunction, enjoining the appellants and "all other officials of Anderson County" from using the Chancery Courtroom for "any purpose except as a witness room and grand jury room".

Appellant filed a motion to dissolve the injunction and, after an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge recognized the inherent power of the Circuit and Chancery Courts to require adequate facilities, found that the space involved was necessary for the operation of the Twenty-Eighth Judicial Circuit, and entered a permanent injunction denying the use of the former Chancery Courtroom by appellant and all other county officials without the approval of one of the Judges of the Twenty-Eighth Judicial Circuit or their designated agents.

From that decision, appellant has appealed and assigns error.

The first and third assignments of error, which we discuss together, are:

1. The Trial Court erred in holding that Circuit and Chancery Judges have an inherent power over allocation of space in a county courthouse.

3. The Trial Court erred in finding that the old Chancery Courtroom was necessary to the operation of the courts of the 28th Judicial Circuit, and that it is used for judicial purposes on an average of three times each week.

Our democracy is based on a constitutional form of government. As such, one of its basic and fundamental features is the vesting of governmental powers in three branches, the executive, legislative and judicial. It is generally acknowledged that these branches are "coordinate, independent, coequal, and potentially coextensive." See generally 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 210 (1964). See also Tenn.Const. art. II, §§ 1-2 (1870).

It has been declared that the division of governmental powers into executive, legislative, and judicial represents probably the most important principle of government declaring and guaranteeing the liberties of the people, and that it is a matter of fundamental necessity, and is essential to the maintenance of a republican form of government. 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 212 (1964).

The three branches of government are independent in exercising their assigned duties, whether they be constitutional in nature, statutory or otherwise. Thus, our Supreme Court has stated:

"It will therefore be observed that the power of the legislature over the judicial branch of the government must conform to the limitations expressed in the Constitution. It should be noted that the Constitution does not reserve to the Legislature all right to deal with any other branch of the government with certain exceptions, but there is an express prohibition of any branch of the government exercising any power properly belonging to another branch except in the cases expressly directed or permitted by the Constitution itself." Moore v. Love, 171 Tenn. 682, 686, 107 S.W.2d 982, 983 (1936), citing Lawyers' Tax Cases, 55 Tenn. (8 Heisk.) 565; The Judges' Cases, 102 Tenn. 509, 629, 53 S.W. 134, 138 (1899).

As it has been aptly stated:

Each department of the government must exercise its own delegated powers, and unless otherwise limited by the constitution, each exercises such inherent power as will protect it in the performance of its major duty; one department may not be controlled or even embarrassed by another department unless the constitution so ordains. 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 213 (1964).

The courts derive their basic authority from the constitution which, by necessity, grants all powers necessary to engage in the complete performance of the judicial function. However, the courts are caught in a unique dilemma in performing that function.

As a co-equal branch of government, the judiciary is the least co-equal:

(T)hey constitute an independent branch of government, critically necessary to the balance of our constitutional system. Yet they are expected to eschew the normal political process and, unlike competitors for public resources, are prohibited from cultivating their own constituencies and utilizing lobbyists. Hazard, McNamera & Sentilles, Court Finance and Unitary Budgeting, 81 Yale L.J. 1286 (1972). (hereinafter cited as Hazard).

Further:

(t)he judiciary has no power to appropriate funds, as does the legislative branch, and . . . no power to exercise a veto as a bargaining device, as does the executive . . . . Taggart, Judicial Power The Inherent Power of the Courts to Compel Funding for Their Own Needs In Re Juvenile Director, 87 Wash.2d 232, 552 P.2d 163 (1976), 53 Wash.L.Rev. 331 (1978) (hereinafter cited as Taggart).

The problem is exacerbated because:

(J)udges wield little political power and are afflicted with a self-effacing attitude of judicial restraint. Traditionally, the court system has been the "nonsqueaky wheel" (of public finance). Thus . . . in deference to separation of powers, judges will lean over backward to avoid encroaching on the legislative branch's (power) . . . . Carrigan, Inherent Powers of the Courts, Nat'l C. St. Judiciary 1 (1973) (hereinafter cited as Carrigan).

Whatever negative aspects the separation of powers doctrine has on the ability of the courts to operate effectively and efficiently, there is a corollary positive aspect of the doctrine.

However, the separation of powers doctrine, properly understood, imposes on the judicial branch not merely a Negative duty Not to interfere with the executive or legislative branches, but a Positive responsibility to perform its own job efficiently. This Positive aspect of separation of powers imposes on courts affirmative obligations to assert and fully exercise their powers, to operate efficiently by modern standards, to protect their independent status, and to fend off legislative or executive attempts to encroach upon judicial perogatives. Id. at 1-2.

This doctrine of separation of powers is not absolute. It is complemented in constitutional theory by the doctrine of checks and balances.

Indeed, there is evidence that the drafters of the constitution viewed checks and balances as an integral part of the separation of powers doctrine. Madison, in discussing separation of powers, argued: "(U)nless these departments (the three branches of government) be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a free government, can never in practice be duly maintained." The Federalist No. 48 (J. Madison). Taggart, Supra at 335 n. 18.

This is important because to the extent that any one branch of government becomes subservient to another, its ability to act in its role of providing a "check and balance" is curtailed and the effective concept of government ordained by our constitution rapidly loses its viability as envisioned by the founding fathers.

To offset their politically disadvantageous position and to insure the orderly and efficient operation of their functions, the courts, in recent years, have been more willing to utilize their inherent powers.

The concept of inherent powers has been utilized by the courts most often and strongly in insuring proper funding of the judicial function. In this context, the concept has been defined in this manner:

The courts are a constitutionally created branch of government whose continued effective functioning is indispensible; performance of that constitutional function is a responsibility committed to the courts; this responsibility implies the authority necessary to carry it out . . . . Hazard, Supra at 1287.

The phrase "inherent powers" is used to refer to powers included within the scope of a court's jurisdiction which a court possesses irrespective of specific grant by constitution or legislation. 20 Am.Jur.2d Courts § 78 (1964).

The term "inherent power of the judiciary" means that which is essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the court from the very fact that it is a court. In Re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 286, 275 N.W. 265, 267 (1937).

Inherent powers consist of all powers reasonably required to enable a court to perform efficiently its judicial functions, to protect its dignity, independence and integrity, and to make its lawful actions effective. Carrigan, Supra at 2.

The inherent power that vests in a court at its creation, however, is not unlimited.

The inherent powers of a court do not increase its jurisdiction; they are limited to such powers as are essential to the existence of the court and necessary to the orderly efficient exercise of its jurisdiction. 20 Am.Jur.2d Courts § 78 (1964).

Primarily, the use of the...