Holdom v. Grand Lodge of Ancient Order of United Workmen

• Decision Date: 11 October 1895
• Citation: 43 N.E. 772,159 Ill. 619
• Parties: HOLDOM v. GRAND LODGE OF ANCIENT ORDER OF UNITED WORKMEN.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

159 Ill. 619

43 N.E. 772

HOLDOM

v.GRAND LODGE OF ANCIENT ORDER OF UNITED WORKMEN.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 11, 1895.

Appeal from appellate court, First district.

Action by Jesse Holdom, conservator of the estate of Paul Holz, against the Grand Lodge of Ancient Order of United Workmen. From a judgment of the appellate court (51 Ill. App. 200) reversing a judgment for plaintiff, he appeals. Reversed.Case, Hogan & Case, for appellant.

J. McCartney, for appellee.

On April 10, 1888, appellee made and delivered to one Carl Holz a certificate, in consideration of payment of an examination fee and all dues and assessments, etc. The certificate states that Carl Holz is a member of Alleghany Lodge, No. 346, located in Chicago, and entitled to participate in the beneficiary fund, to the amount of $2,000, which at his death shall be paid to his son, Paul Holz. Suit was brought by the beneficiary, by his conservator, on that certificate; the declaration averring that Carl Holz departed this life on the 16th day of December, 1890, and averring compliance by Carl Holz with all the rules and laws of the order, and that at the time of his death he was a member in good standing, and that appellee had satisfactory evidence of death. It avers that appellant is a minor son of deceased, and the beneficiary in the certificate; the appointment of conservator; and that the $2,000 has not been paid, nor any part thereof. Appellee pleaded the general issue, and a special plea alleging that the beneficiary in the certificate, on December 15, 1890, killed and murdered the insured, whereby he forfeited and lost all rights as a beneficiary under the certificate. Replication was filed to the special plea, averring that the beneficiary did not murder the insured, as alleged in the plea, but avers that he did kill the insured, as alleged, while the beneficiary was insane. To that replication appellee filed a general demurrer, which was overruled, and appellee elected to stand by the demurrer, on an agreed state of facts. Judgment was entered for plaintiff for $2,000, with costs of suit. An appeal was prosecuted to the appellate court of the First district, where that judgment was reversed, and a judgment entered for the defendant. The beneficiary, by his conservator, prosecutes this appeal.

PHILLIPS, J. (after stating the facts).

The only question of law presented in this record is, does an insane beneficiary in a life insurance policy, who kills the insured under such circumstances as would cause the killing to be murder if the beneficiary was sane, thereby forfeit his right to recover the insurance money? This presents a question of first impression. That an assignee, who was sane, of a policy of life insurance, caused the death of the assured by felonious means, has been held sufficient to defeat a recovery on the policy. Insurance Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 591, 6 Sup. Ct. 877; Association v. Palmer, 25 Beav. 605. The general doctrine is that insane persons are liable for damages caused by their torts,-distinguishing these from criminal liability. In Morse v. Crawford, 17 V. 499, it was held that the insanity of a bailee did not relieve him from liability for destroying property held by him as bailee. In Cross v. Kent, 32 Md. 581, a lunatic was held liable in damages for burning a barn, whether occurring through negligence, or as an insane act. In Taggard v. Innes, 12 U. C. C. P. 177, it was held that insanity constituted no defense in a civil action for damages in an action of trespass vi et armis. In Williams v. Hays, 143 N. Y. 442, 38 N. E. 449, it was held that insamty of one who is the owner pro hac vice of a vessel did not relieve him from liability to other owners for negligence in her management. In this latter case many authorities are collected and considered, and the question is treated exhaustively. In McIntyre v. Sholty, 121 Ill. 660, 13 N. E. 239, it was held that insanity did not avail as a defense to a civil action for damages resulting from killing a person under circumstances that would have been a felony, had the insane person who did the killing been sane at the time. Such is the current of authorities as to the liability of an insane person for his torts. By the great weight of authority, it is held in such cases that the lunatic, not having the element of intention or malice, is only liable for damages that would be compensatory, and not liable for vindicatory damages; and such is the rule in this state. McIntyre v. Sholty, supra. The reason for the rule that an insane man shall be held liable for his torts is that, where a loss must fall upon one of two persons equally innocent, it must be borne by the one who caused it. The liability is in no way dependent upon the intent or design to commit the act; for a lunatic can have no will, and can form no design or intent, and would not be liable for a tort wherein the intent is a necessary ingredient. Such is the rule with reference to torts. A very different question is, however, presented with reference to a contract of insurance, and the liability of a company on its policy. In the absence of an express stipulation relieving the company from liability in such case, where there is no fraud or design, a fire insurance company is not relieved from liability on its policy by reason of loss by fire through negligence of the assured or his servants. Shaw v. Robberds, 6 Adol. & E. 75; Walker v. Maitland, 5 Barn. & Ald. 171; Buck v. Assurance Co., 2 Barn. & Ald. 73; Dobson v. Sotheby, Moody & M. 90; Waters v. Insurance Co., 11 Pet. 213;Insurance Co. v. Lawrence, 10 Pet. 507;Catlin v. Insurance Co., 1 Sumn. 434, Fed. Cas. No. 2,522;Insurance Co. v. Glasgow, 8 Mo. 713;Gates v. Insurance Co., 5 N. Y. 469; Nelson v. Insurance Co., 8 Cush. j77; Mathews v. Insurance Co., 11 N. Y. 14; Huckins v. Insurance Co., 11 Fost. (N. H.) 247; Johnson v. Insurance Co., 4 Allen, 388.Mickey v. Insurance Co., 35 Iowa, 174; Protection Co. v. Douglas, 58 Pa. St. 423; Gove v. Insurance Co., 48 N. H. 41;Insurance Co. v. Webster, 83 Ill. 470. If a loss is incurred by a peril insured against, the liability exists, even though the remote cause be the negligence of the assured or his servants, unless that negligence be so gross as to authorize the presumption of fraud. In Karow v. Insurance Co., 57 Wis. 56, 15 N. W. 27, in a clearly-reasoned and well-considered case, it is held that, where there is nothing in the policy to the contrary, an insurer is not released from liability because the property was burned by the assured while insane. The...