Holguin v. Lopez

• Citation: 584 F.Supp.2d 921
• Decision Date: 28 October 2008
• Docket Number: No. EP-07-CV-436-PRM.,EP-07-CV-436-PRM.
• Parties: Eduardo HOLGUIN, Plaintiff, v. Trini LOPEZ, K.W. Bill Mansion and Socorro Police Officer Robles, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

584 F.Supp.2d 921

Eduardo HOLGUIN, Plaintiff, v. Trini LOPEZ, K.W. Bill Mansion and Socorro Police Officer Robles, Defendants.

No. EP-07-CV-436-PRM.

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, El Paso Division.

October 28, 2008.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ray Vasquez Gutierrez, Law Office of Ray Gutierrez, El Paso, TX, for Plaintiff.

Eric M. Brittain, Windle, Hood, Alley, Norton, Brittain & Jay, El Paso, TX, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

PHILIP R. MARTINEZ, District Judge.

On this day, the Court considered Defendant Officer Oscar Robles's ("Officer Robles") "Local Rule CV-12 Motion to Dismiss," filed on April 15, 2008, and Plaintiff Eduardo Holguin's ("Holguin") "Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support," filed on April 28, 2008, in the above-captioned cause. After due consideration, the Court is of the opinion that Officer Robles's Motion should be granted in part and denied in part for the reasons set forth below.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 2, 2005, Holguin received a call from Veneranda Soltero, a former girlfriend, asking him to retrieve some personal belongings he left in her home. Pl.'s First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9-10. Upon arrival, Holguin "noticed a lot of items were missing, so [he] asked [Soltero] to give [him] the rest of [his] belongings." Id. ¶ 11. Soltero refused, demanded that he leave, and called "the police or 911." Id. ¶ 14. Realizing that Soltero had called the police, Holguin exited the house and began walking toward his truck. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. As Holguin placed some of his belongings in his truck, he "noticed [a] police car approaching [so he] moved out of [his] truck and walked over to the police car." Id. After Officer Robles exited the police car, he instructed Holguin to "put [his] things on the hood [of the truck] and spread [his] legs." Id. ¶ 17. According to Holguin, "Officer Robles, using excessive force, kicked [his] ankles hard and screamed [that he] open [his legs] wider, causing excruciating pain to [his] left ankle." Id. During this time, Officer Robles allegedly handcuffed Holguin "so tight" that Holguin's left hand is still swollen and numb from the incident. Id. ¶ 18. Thereafter, Officer Robles arrested Holguin for DWI and phone harassment.¹ Id. ¶ 21. In light of his DWI arrest, Holguin allegedly told Officer Robles (1) that he was not driving his truck, (2) that his keys were not in the ignition, and (3) that his truck was not running.² Id. ¶ 22. Regardless, Officer Robles transported and detained Holguin at the Socorro Police Jail. Id.

Aside from various state law claims,³ Pl.'s First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37-44, Holguin also brought suit against Officer Robles in his individual and official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, id. ¶¶ 34-35. Specifically, Holguin alleges that Officer Robles violated his constitutional rights by (1) arresting him without probable cause and (2) using excessive force in handcuffing him. Id. ¶¶ 10, 27, 31. In the instant Motion, Officer Robles seeks a stay of discovery and asks the Court to dismiss the claims against him in his individual capacity on the basis of qualified immunity. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss ¶¶ 2-3. Holguin, in turn, opposes the Motion, arguing that his First Amended Complaint "adequately set[s] forth sufficient questions of fact to assert [his] claims." Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss 3. The Court addresses the Motion below.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ("Rule 12(b)(6)") authorizes dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). However, "the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted." Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir.1982) (quotation omitted). To resolve a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts must determine "whether in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and with every doubt resolved on his behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief." Gregson v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 883, 885 (5th Cir.2003) (internal quotation omitted). The complaint "`does not need detailed factual allegations,' but must provide the plaintiff's grounds for entitlement to relief—including factual allegations that when assumed to be true `raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).

B. Qualified Immunity

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for individuals who have been "deprived of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States by a person or entity acting under color of state law.⁴ 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, qualified immunity shields state actors performing discretionary functions from liability unless their conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 322 (5th Cir.2002) (en banc) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)); Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir.2003).

To determine whether a state actor is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must employ a two-prong test. Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 621 (5th Cir.2006). First, the Court must evaluate whether "in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). If so, the Court then "consider[s] whether the [officer]'s actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the conduct in question." Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 411 (5th Cir.2007). "The touchstone of this inquiry is whether a reasonable person would have believed that his conduct conformed to the constitutional standard in light of the information available to him and the clearly established law." Goodson v. Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir.2000). This means that even law enforcement officials who "reasonably but mistakenly [commit a constitutional violation]" are entitled to immunity. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991); Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 312 (5th Cir.2001).

When a defendant, as here, asserts qualified immunity in a motion to dismiss, "it is the defendant's conduct as alleged in the complaint that is scrutinized for `objective legal reasonableness.'" McClendon, 305 F.3d at 323 (quoting Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996)). The plaintiff has the burden to "plead specific facts that, if proved, would overcome the individual defendant's immunity defense; [however,] complaints containing conclusory allegations, absent reference to material facts, will not survive motions to dismiss." Jackson v. Beaumont Police Dep't, 958 F.2d 616, 620 (5th Cir.1992).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Unlawful Arrest

Holguin argues that Officer Robles arrested him without probable cause. Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss 4. The Fourth Amendment requires that an arrest be supported by a properly issued arrest warrant or probable cause. Haggerty v. Tex. S. Univ., 391 F.3d 653, 655 (5th Cir.2004). "Probable cause exists when the totality of the facts and circumstances within a police officer's knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense." Id. at 655-56. An arrest is lawful "if the officer making the arrest has probable cause to arrest the defendant for any crime, regardless of whether the defendant can lawfully be arrested for the crime for which the officer states or believes he is making the arrest." United States v. Bain, 135 Fed.Appx. 695, 697 (5th Cir.2005).

Here, Officer Robles arrested Holguin for driving while intoxicated and making harassing phone calls. Pl.'s First Am. Compl. ¶ 27. Under Texas law, "[a] person commits an offense if the person is intoxicated while driving or operating a motor vehicle in a public place." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04 (2007) (emphasis added). "[T]o prove operation, the evidence must show that the defendant, while intoxicated, exerted personal effort to cause the vehicle to function." Barton v. Texas, 882 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, no pet. h.) (quotation omitted). However, Holguin claims (1) that he was not driving his truck; (2) that his keys were not in the ignition, and (3) that his truck was not running. Pl.'s First Am. Compl. ¶ 22; see Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss 5 (noting that Holguin was not "behind the wheel of the vehicle"). In support of his allegations,⁵ Holguin states, in relevant part:

The DPS Officer asked me, "are you sure, [sic] he did not pull you over?" I said, "Yes sir. I'm sure he did not pull me over. He did not." Then he asked, "Was [sic] the keys in the ignition and was the engine running?" I said, "No sir." Then he asked, "We're [sic] you sitting inside the vehicle?" I said, "No sir. I walked over, [sic] when the Officer arrived at the address, I walked over to his vehicle and he put me under arrest for DWI and phone harassment." At that time the DPS Officer said, "Hold on." He opened the door called Officer Robles and asked Robles if he had pulled me over. Officer Robles said, "NO."

Pl.'s First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25-26.

Taking these allegations as true, as the Court must, the Court finds it unlikely for a reasonable person in Officer Robles's position, in light of the clearly established law, to conclude that Holguin was driving while intoxicated.⁶ See Haggerty, 391 F.3d at 655-56. Accordingly, viewing the...