Holland v. Liedel

• Decision Date: 17 November 1992
• Docket Number: Docket No. 132122
• Citation: 197 Mich.App. 60,494 N.W.2d 772
• Parties: Janis R. HOLLAND, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James LIEDEL, individually and d/b/a Highland Towers Management Company and d/b/a First Property Holding Company, The Highland Towers Company, a Michigan corporation, Defendant- Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 772

494 N.W.2d 772

197 Mich.App. 60

Janis R. HOLLAND, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James LIEDEL, individually and d/b/a Highland Towers Management Company and d/b/a First Property Holding Company, The Highland Towers Company, a Michigan corporation Defendant- Appellant.

Docket No. 132122.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 3, 1992, at Detroit.

Decided Nov. 17, 1992, at 10:00 a.m.

Released for Publication Feb. 17, 1993.

Sachs, Waldman, O'Hare, Helveston, Hodges & Barnes, P.C. by Kathleen L. Bogas and Barbara M. Robinson, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.

Daguanno, Nemes & Accettura by Robert F. Harrington, Farmington Hills, for defendant-appellant.

Before SAWYER, P.J., and MURPHY and BORRELLO, ^* JJ.

MURPHY, Judge.

Defendant appeals from a judgment entered in favor of plaintiff after a jury found defendant liable in the amount of $150,000. We affirm.

This negligence action arose from plaintiff's abduction from the parking lot of an apartment building owned by defendant. In August 1984, plaintiff began renting an apartment at Highland Towers Apartments. At the time plaintiff rented the apartment, she also rented a parking spot in the apartment building's underground parking ramp.

Access to the underground parking ramp required the use of card keys given to tenants with parking spots. The card keys opened the door, which automatically closed behind each car entering the ramp. Until September 21, 1986, the parking ramp was patrolled by a security guard for five hours each evening. When the guard died, defendant replaced the guard service with a camera monitoring system that monitored the parking ramp doors.

On the evening of March 30, 1987, plaintiff was apparently followed into the ramp by an unknown assailant. The assailant abducted plaintiff, repeatedly raped and assaulted her, and then returned her to the parking ramp. The assailant left when another tenant arrived.

Plaintiff filed this action against defendant, alleging that he had failed to provide reasonable security for the tenants of the apartment complex, including failing to replace the security guard, and that defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of her injuries. Defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10), and also moved during trial for a directed verdict. The trial court denied defendant's motions. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff.

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motions for summary disposition and a directed verdict. Defendant argues that the only allegation remaining at trial was whether he was obligated to provide security guards, and that, as a matter of law, he had no duty to provide a security guard to monitor the parking lot.

The initial question in a negligence action is whether the defendant owed a legal duty to the plaintiff. Johnson v. Bobbie's Party Store, 189 Mich.App. 652, 659, 473 N.W.2d 796 (1991). As a general rule, one person does not have a duty to aid or protect another person. Williams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc., 429 Mich. 495, 499, 418 N.W.2d 381 (1988); Johnson, supra, 189 Mich.App. at 660, 473 N.W.2d 796.

Owners and occupiers of land, however, have a special relationship to their invitees, giving rise to an affirmative duty to protect their invitees. Williams, supra, 429 Mich. at 499, 418 N.W.2d 381. This duty is not absolute, however. The landowner or occupier is obligated to use only reasonable care for the protection of the invitee and is not the insurer of the invitee's safety. Id., at 500, 502, 418 N.W.2d 381.

A landlord may be held liable for exposing invitees to an unreasonable risk of harm arising out of a tenant's use of the premises, particularly in common areas such as a lobby, hallway, stairway, or elevator. Id., 499, 418 N.W.2d 381. A landlord also has the duty to protect tenants from foreseeable criminal activities of third parties in the common areas of the landlord's premises. Rodis v. Herman Kiefer Hosp., 142 Mich.App. 425, 428-429, 370 N.W.2d 18 (1985); Aisner v. Lafayette Towers, 129 Mich.App. 642, 645, 341 N.W.2d 852 (1983). See also Samson v. Saginaw Professional Building, Inc., 393 Mich. 393, 407-408, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975); Johnston v. Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972). Whether the risk of harm from third-party criminal activity is foreseeable in a particular case is a question of fact for the jury. Rodis, supra, 142 Mich.App. at 429, 370 N.W.2d 18.

In Williams, supra, 429 Mich. at 504, 418 N.W.2d 381, however, our Supreme Court held that, as a matter of law, the duty of reasonable care that a merchant owes his customers does not extend to providing armed security guards to protect the customers from the criminal acts of third persons. This Court has since applied the reasoning of Williams in a landlord-tenant case. Bryant v. Brannen, 180 Mich.App. 87, 97-98, 446 N.W.2d 847 (1989).

Assuming, without deciding, that the reasoning of Williams would apply in a landlord-tenant case and not only in a merchant-invitee situation, we nevertheless disagree with defendant's contention that the only issue remaining in this case was whether defendant was obligated to provide security guards. Although plaintiff did allege and argue at trial that defendant was obligated to provide a security guard, she did not limit her allegations of negligence to this question. Plaintiff also argued and presented evidence that the doors of the parking garage were defective and the defendant knew of the repeated problems with the doors. Plaintiff further presented evidence that, although defendant installed a camera system for security, the employees responsible for watching the camera monitors were often too busy with their other duties to do so.

A motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) should be granted only if the claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could justify recovery . Wagner v. Regency Inn Corp., 186 Mich.App. 158, 162, 463 N.W.2d 450 (1990). A motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a claim and should be granted only when it is impossible for the claim to be supported at trial because of a deficiency that cannot be overcome. Pete v. Iron Co., 192 Mich.App. 687, 688-689, 481 N.W.2d 731 (1992).

When determining a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Howard v. Canteen Corp., 192 Mich.App. 427, 431, 481 N.W.2d 718 (1992). The motion should be denied if the evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact upon which reasonable minds could differ. Id. Directed verdicts are disfavored in negligence cases. Vsetula v. Whitmyer, 187 Mich.App. 675, 679, 468 N.W.2d 53 (1991).

We hold that the trial court in this case did not err in denying defendant's motion for summary disposition. Accepting the allegations of plaintiff's complaint as true, it cannot be said that the claim was clearly unenforceable as a matter of law, nor can it be said that it was impossible for the...