Hollandale Ice Co. v. Board of Sup'rs, Washington County

• Decision Date: 19 November 1934
• Docket Number: 31478
• Citation: 157 So. 689,171 Miss. 515
• Parties: HOLLANDALE ICE CO. v. BOARD OF SUP'RS, WASHINGTON COUNTY
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

157 So. 689

171 Miss. 515

HOLLANDALE ICE CO. v. BOARD OF SUP'RS, WASHINGTON COUNTY

No. 31478

Supreme Court of Mississippi

November 19, 1934

Division B

1 STATUTES.

Where there is an enactment covering entire subject-matter, last act repeals former act.

2 STATUTES.

In construing statutes, court looks to entire legislation on subject, and determines policy of Legislature from consideration of all statutes together.

3 TAXATION.

Exemptions from taxation are to be strictly construed, and party must bring himself within statute to obtain exemption.

4. TAXATION.

Right to exemption from taxation is statutory, and proceedings to obtain exemption are exclusive.

5. TAXATION.

Exemption granted to new ice factory from state and county ad valorem taxation held not to exempt company's property from ad valorem tax for levee purposes (Laws 1922, chap. 138, secs. 1--3, and chap. 139; Laws 1926, chap. 172, secs. 1--5).

HON. S. F. DAVIS, Judge.

APPEAL from the circuit court of Washington county HON. S. F. DAVIS, Judge.

Proceeding between the Hollandale Ice Company and the Board of Supervisors of Washington county. From an adverse judgment, the former appeals. Affirmed.

Affirmed.

S. V. Anderson, of Greenville, for appellant.

The question presented below and now presented for review here is whether or not the exemption obtained by the Hollandale Ice Company in February, 1927, under the provisions of chapters 138 and 139 of the Laws of 1922, as amended by chapter 172 of the Laws of 1926, exempted that company's property from taxes of the levee district whose corporate style is "board of Mississippi levee commissioners."

The 1922 law in section 1 absolutely exempted from ad valorem taxes.

The intent of the Legislature, and of the attorney-general, at whose instance the 1926 amending act was passed, was to change merely the procedure whereby the exemption from taxes other than municipal taxes, might be obtained, and the language used in the act and in the application form, while it read, "from state and county taxation," was intended to mean "from non-municipal taxation."

The act under discussion, both before and after the amendment, left it optional with a municipal government as to whether exemption should be allowed in any case.

Where the language of the Legislature is clear and unambiguous, or where the legislative intent can be arrived at, it is the duty of the court to follow the legislative intent and no other rule of construction can be invoked.

Wynn, Hafter & Lake, of Greenville, for appellee.

In construing a statute, the court must look to the intention of the Legislature.

Darnell v. Johnston, 68 So. 780, 109 Miss. 570; Roseberry v. Norsworthy, 100 So. 514, 135 Miss. 845; Kennington v. Hemingway, 57 So. 809, 101 Miss. 259; City of Holly Springs v. Marshall County, 61 So. 703, 104 Miss. 752; Canal Bank & Trust Co. v. Brewer, 114 So. 127, 147 Miss. 885; Money v. Wood, 118 So. 357, 162 Miss. 17; Sartin v. Prentiss County, 125 So. 563, 156 Miss. 46; White v. Miller, 139 So. 611, 162 Miss. 296.

It was not the intention of the Legislature of 1922 to include levee taxation within the general term "ad valorem taxation."

General words in a statute should not be construed so as to divest a right clearly granted by a previous statute, if they be susceptible of a fair construction consistent with the right there granted.

McAfee v. Southern Railroad Co., 36 Miss. 669; Southern Railroad v. City of Jackson, 38 Miss. 334; White v. Johnson, 23 Miss. 68.

All statutes relating to the same subject must be taken as one system and construed consistently, if possible.

Eskridge v. McGruder, 45 Miss. 294; Clements v. Anderson, 46 Miss. 581; Clarksdale Building & Loan Association v. Board of Mississippi Levee Commissioners, 150 So. 783; Ellison v. Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co., 36 Miss. 572.

The statutes of 1922 and 1926, being parts of a series of which the acts of 1912, 1918, 1928 and 1930, are also parts, it is necessary to look to the history of such legislation and to trace the changes, in order to determine at what point they took place.

59 C. J. 1041, sec. 619; City of Holly Springs v. Marshall County, 61 So. 703; McKenzie v. Adams-Banks Lbr. Co.) 128 So. 334, 126 So. 883; Myers v. Board of Supervisors, DeSoto County, 125 So. 718; 59 C. J. 1043; Adams v. Y. & M. V. R. R., 22 So. 824; Clements v. Anderson, 46 Miss. 581; 8 S. & M. 824; Robertson v. Texas Oil Co., 106 So. 449.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Legislature of 1922, did intend to include levee taxation in the general terms used, still the Act of 1926, could have had no other effect upon that of 1922, than limiting the scope of the earlier statute.

In construing the statute of 1922, it must be considered in connection with the statute of 1926.

Dreaser v. Hathorn, 109 So. 23; Ellison v. M. & O. R. R., 36 Miss. 572; 8 S. & M. 151; Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss. 268; Dixon & Starkey v. Doa, 1 S. & M. 90; Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. 650.

The later of two conflicting clauses in a statute prevails.

Coker v. Wilkinson, 106 So. 886; Gibbons v. Brittenum, 56 Miss. 232; Southern Railway Co. v. City of Jackson, 38 Miss. 334; Peyton v. Cabaniss, 44 Miss. 808; Myers v. Marshall County, 55 Miss. 344; Ex parte McInnis, 54 So. 260; Eskridge v. McGruder, 45 Miss. 294; Clements v. Anderson, 46 Miss. 581; Adams v. Y. & M. V. R. R. Co., 22 So. 824; White v. Johnson, 23 Miss. 68; Green v. Hutson, 104 So. 171; Greaves v. Hinds County, 145 So. 900.

The general rule is that, where any statute is revised, or when one statute is framed from another, some parts being omitted, the parts omitted are to be considered as annulled.

Clay County v. Chickasaw County, 1 So. 753.

At best, due to the provisions of the 1926 statute and the history of the legislation on the subject, it is doubtful whether the Legislature of 1922, meant to include levee taxation. Therefore, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the state; for exemptions, being in derogation of the state's sovereign authority, must be construed strictly and most favorably to the taxing power.

Yazoo & Miss. Valley R. R. Co. v. Thomas, 5 So. 108; Greenville Ice & Coal Co. v. City of Greenville, 10 So. 574.

Exemptions from taxation must be found in the language employed, and construed most favorably to the state.

12 So. 477; New Standard Club v. McRaven, 71 So. 289; Teche Lines v. Bloard of Supervisors of Forest County, 142 So. 24, 143 So. 486; Leaf Hotel Corp. v. City of Hattiesburg, 150 So. 779.

The person or corporation claiming the exemption has the burden of proving its existence, and the presumption is against its existence.

New Standard Club v. McRaven, 71 So. 289; Morris Ice Co. v. Adams, 22 So. 944; Barnes v. Jones, 103 So. 773; Currie Finch Brick & Lbr. Co. v. Miller, 86 So. 579; Adams County v. National Box Co., 88 So. 168; Magnolia Building & Loan v. Muller, 128 So. 585.

The application shows that the defendant applied for exemption from state and county taxation alone. By failing to ask for exemption from levee taxation, the defendant has waived any right, if any he had, to exemption from levee taxation.

73 N. J. L. 374, 63 A. 1006; 70 N.J.Eq. 568, 62 A. 381; 63 N. J. L. 506.

Argued orally by S. V. Anderson, for appellant, and by William T. Wynn, for appellee.

OPINION

Ethridge, P. J.

The Hollandale Ice Company, a partnership, appellant here, on January 1, 1927, applied to the attorney-general for an exemption from state and county ad valorem taxes under chapters 138 and 139, Laws 1922, and chapter 172, Laws 1926. This exemption was granted by the attorney-general and was filed for record in the office of the chancery clerk of Washington county on February 19, 1927. The board of levee commissioners gave notice to the county tax collector to have the property of the appellant assessed for levee taxes for the years 1927, 1928, 1929, and 1930. The tax assessor served notice, and the board of supervisors made an assessment for levee taxes for said years, and from this assessment an appeal was taken to the circuit court and tried upon an agreed statement of facts in vacation. The assessed value of the property for said years was agreed to, as was also the notice given in pursuance of section 3198, Code 1930, and laws amendatory thereto. It was also agreed that the appellant applied for and obtained exemption from state and county ad valorem taxes on its Washington county property under the provisions of chapter 172, Laws 1926, and that said exemption was filed in the chancery clerk's office. It was further agreed that the personal property did not appear upon the personal roll for the exempt years, and that the question for determination by the court was whether or not the exemption applied for by the ice company exempted its property from the ad valorem tax of the board of Mississippi levee commissioners, and that said board had levied an annual ad valorem tax on all the real and personal property in Washington county for said years.

The circuit court affirmed the judgment of the board of supervisors for the levee taxes.

By section 1 of chapter 138, Laws 1922, it was provided that new factories and public utility enterprises, enumerating them and including ice factories therein, wherever established, are granted exemptions from ad valorem taxation on tangible property for a period of five years, the time of such exemption to commence from the charter, if a corporation, and, if an individual, then from the commencement of the work.

By section 2 of this chapter it is provided that the party claiming such exemption shall apply to the auditor, who, with the written advice of the attorney-general, shall determine whether the property is exempt.

By section 3...