Hollingsworth v. City of Rainbow City
Decision Date | 02 November 2001 |
Parties | Amanda HOLLINGSWORTH and Miranda Smith v. CITY OF RAINBOW CITY. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Charles J. Lorant of Alabama Injury Lawyers, P.C., Birmingham, for appellants.
Elizabeth R. Howard, Gadsden, for appellee.
On May 28, 1999, Amanda Hollingsworth and Amanda Smith sued the City of Rainbow City ("the City") to recover compensatory damages for injuries they sustained as a result of an automobile accident. The plaintiffs alleged that the City had negligently designed the roadway on which the accident occurred, and had failed to maintain that roadway in a safe condition, and that they were injured as a result. The City answered the plaintiffs' complaint with a general denial and alleged that the plaintiffs' injuries were proximately caused by third parties.
On October 4, 1999, the City filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to comply with Ala.Code 1975, § 11-47-191, which requires the injured party to join as defendants other persons who may be liable. The plaintiffs responded to that motion on October 12, 1999, and they filed an amended complaint on October 26, 1999. The amended complaint substituted M.V. Gidley, as legal guardian of Livvy Lynn Gidley, a minor, for fictitious defendant "A" specified in the plaintiffs' original complaint. The amended complaint alleged that Livvy Lynn Gidley was the owner and driver of the automobile that had collided with the automobile driven by Kevin Kilgore in which the plaintiffs were passengers and that Gidley's negligence or wantonness had proximately caused the plaintiffs' injuries. Kevin Kilgore, the driver of the vehicle in which the plaintiffs were riding, was never named as a defendant.
On August 14, 2000, M.V. Gidley filed a motion for a summary judgment with supporting documents pursuant to Rule 56, Ala.R.Civ.P., and on October 5, 2000, the City filed a motion for a summary judgment, similarly supported. After the plaintiffs' response, the trial court held a hearing on the summary-judgment motions on November 6, 2000. On December 13, 2000, the trial court entered a summary judgment for the City and certified the summary judgment as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala.R.Civ.P. The trial court later denied M.V. Gidley's motion for a summary judgment.
The plaintiffs appeal the summary judgment for the City, arguing that they presented substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of fact as to whether the City had notice of a defective roadway condition and was under a duty to remedy that defect.
We review the trial court's entry of a summary judgment de novo, and our standard of review is well settled.
Hobson v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 690 So.2d 341, 344 (Ala.1997).
The evidence, viewed, as we must, in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, Wilma Corp. v. Fleming Foods of Alabama, Inc., 613 So.2d 359 (Ala.1993), shows that there was a dangerous condition at the intersection that was the site of the accident, i.e., a "blind spot" occasioned by the contour of a hill leading to the intersection; and that the City had been placed on notice of the defective roadway condition. To establish the existence of the "blind spot" and the danger it created, the plaintiffs placed in the record their depositions, the affidavits of Smith's mother and grandfather, and the testimony of Livvy Lynn Gidley, the driver of the other vehicle involved in the collision. The accident occurred at approximately 7:30 p.m. on January 3, 1999, when a vehicle driven by Kevin Kilgore and in which the plaintiffs were passengers, was traveling north on Palace Avenue and attempting to make a left turn onto Pineapple Street. It was struck on the passenger's side by the car driven by Livvy Lynn Gidley, traveling south on Palace. The plaintiffs testified that they were looking straight ahead before the attempted left turn and that they had ample time to notice lights from any oncoming cars, but did not see the lights of Gidley's vehicle until immediately before impact. Gidley testified that the hill on Palace Avenue leading to its intersection with Pineapple Street created a blind spot that blocked a driver's view and that, as a consequence, she did not see the lights of the other vehicle at any time while she was traveling on Palace Avenue, until she crested the hill immediately before impact. The mother and the grandfather of plaintiff Smith, both long-time residents of Pineapple Street, filed affidavits stating that there was a blind spot at the intersection.
With respect to the issue whether the City had notice of the existence of the blind spot, Smith's mother swore in her affidavit as follows:
Smith's grandfather, a long-time resident of Pineapple Street, stated the following in his affidavit:
We conclude that this evidence constitutes substantial evidence that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City had received notice of the alleged dangerous defect at the intersection of Palace Avenue and Pineapple Street, so as to impose upon it a duty to correct the defect or to provide warning signs of its presence. See, e.g., Mixon v. Houston County, 598 So.2d 1317 (Ala.1992)
; Elmore County Comm'n v. Ragona, 540 So.2d 720 (Ala. 1989). Either actual notice or constructive notice will suffice to impose the duty upon a municipality. Tuscaloosa County v. Barnett, 562 So.2d 166 (Ala.1990). Additionally, we note that...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Ex parte McCord-Baugh
...due a summary judgment on that claim, even if the record also contains substantial countervailing evidence. See Hollingsworth v. City of Rainbow City, 826 So.2d 787 (Ala.2001); McGinnis v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 800 So.2d 140 (Ala.2001); Ex parte Alfa Mut. Gen. Ins. Co., 742 So.2d 182, 184......
-
Coffey v. Moore
...and Metropolitan. II. Standard of Review "We review the trial court's entry of a summary judgment de novo." Hollingsworth v. City of Rainbow City, 826 So.2d 787, 789 (Ala.2001). In reviewing a motion for a summary judgment, we determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and ......
-
Saia Food Distributors & Club, Inc. v. SecurityLink from Ameritech, Inc.
...Inc., 564 So.2d 412, 413 (Ala.1990).' "Hobson v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 690 So.2d 341, 344 (Ala.1997)." Hollingsworth v. City of Rainbow City, 826 So.2d 787, 789 (Ala.2001). We address the claim of promissory fraud "`The elements of fraud are (1) a false representation (2) of a materi......
-
Valentine v. Watters
...most favorable to the nonmovant and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant."'" Id. (quoting Hollingsworth v. City of Rainbow City, 826 So.2d 787, 789 (Ala.2001), quoting other The movant, Watters, may satisfy his burden of production by submitting affirmative evidence that ne......