Holloway v. Soo Line R.R. Co.
| Decision Date | 19 January 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 16 CV 9191,16 CV 9191 |
| Parties | DOUGLAS HOLLOWAY, Plaintiff, v. SOO LINE RAILROAD COMPANY d/b/a CANADIAN PACIFIC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:
Plaintiff Douglas Holloway ("Plaintiff" or "Holloway") brings this action against Defendant Soo Line Railroad Company d/b/a Canadian Pacific ("Defendant" or "CP") after Defendant terminated Plaintiff's employment following an incident with a Kubota utility vehicle at CP's rail yard. The parties have filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). Specifically, Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on Count I, in which he alleges a violation of the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., and Count III, in which he brings a claim pursuant to the Federal Railroad Safety Act ("FRSA"), 49 U.S.C. § 20109 et seq. Defendant moves for summary judgment on Count II, Plaintiff's reverse discrimination claim brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and Plaintiff's FRSA claim in Count III. For the following reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and grants Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. The only remaining claim in this lawsuit is Plaintiff's FELA claim as alleged in Count I.
Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1 "is designed, in part, to aid the district court, 'which does not have the advantage of the parties' familiarity with the record and often cannot afford to spend the time combing the record to locate the relevant information,' in determining whether a trial is necessary." Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 924 (7th Cir. 1994)). Specifically, Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires the moving party to provide "a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law." L.R. 56.1(a)(3); Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 807 F.3d 215, 291 (7th Cir. 2015). The nonmoving party must file "a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon." L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(B); Petty v. Chicago, 754 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 2014). The nonmoving party also may submit a separate statement of additional facts that require the denial of summary judgment, including references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other materials relied upon to support those facts. L.R. 56.1 (b)(3)(C); see also Ciomber v. Coop. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 643-44 (7th Cir. 2008).
The purpose of Rule 56.1 statements and responses is to identify the relevant admissible evidence supporting the material facts, not to make factual or legal arguments. See Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 2006). Moreover, Local Rule 56.1 response requirements are "not satisfied by evasive denials that do not fairly meet the substance of the material facts asserted." Bordelon v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 233 F.3d 524, 528 (7thCir. 2000). Also, "[t]he non-moving party's failure to admit or deny facts as presented in the moving party's statement or to cite to any admissible evidence to support facts presented in response by the non-moving party render the facts presented by the moving party as undisputed." Curtis, 807 F.3d at 218-19; see also Cracco v. Vitran Exp., Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2009) (). Further, the Court may disregard statements and responses that do not properly cite to the record. See Cichon v. Exelon Generation Co., LLC, 401 F.3d 803, 809-810 (7th Cir. 2005).
After carefully reviewing the parties' Rule 56.1 statements, the parties have failed to follow the dictates of Local Rule 56.1 in several ways. See Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 914 (7th Cir. 2016) (). In response to certain statements of fact, for example, the parties admit the facts but then supplement the facts with further details or a legal conclusion. (See, e.g., R. 64 at ¶ 3; R. 68 at ¶ 15.) At times, Defendant fails to cite to the record, making factual statements without a single reference to the record. (See, e.g., R. 64 at ¶ 31.) Moreover, Defendant attempts to create factual disputes by challenging the inferences or implications that can be drawn from the evidence (See, e.g., R. 68 at ¶ 5.), or denying allegations in an exhibit (See, e.g., R. 68 at ¶ 6.). Defendant also includes multiple factual premises in one large paragraph instead of splitting the facts up into short, numbered paragraphs as required. (See, e.g., R. 64 at ¶ 55.) Additionally, Plaintiff misquotes exhibits or otherwise misstates the evidence. (See, e.g., R. 68 at ¶ 67, 70.) In its review of the facts, the Court disregards the factual statements where the parties fail to adhere to Rule 56.1.
When reviewing a summary judgment motion, courts may only consider admissible evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); McGreal v. Vill. of Orland Park, 850 F.3d 308, 312-14 (7th Cir. 2017). "To be considered on summary judgment, evidence must be admissible at trial, though 'the form produced at summary judgment need not be admissible.'" Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 830 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Wragg v. Village of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464, 466 (7th Cir. 2010)). In particular, Rule 56(c) provides that a "party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence." Id. Further, an "affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated." Id. "A verified complaint is the equivalent of an affidavit for summary judgment purposes." Devbrow v. Gallegos, 735 F.3d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 2013).
Rule 56 further instructs that "[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may: "(1) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact; (2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion; (3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supportingmaterials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it; or (4) issue any other appropriate order." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
In addition, Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) demands that the proponent of evidence authenticate or identify the item of evidence by "produc[ing] evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is." Fed. R. Evid. 901(a); Devbrow, 735 F.3d at 586-87 (). "Under Federal Rule of Evidence 901, evidence must be authenticated as a condition precedent to its admissibility." Peals v. Terre Haute Police Dep't, 535 F.3d 621, 627 (7th Cir. 2008) (). Rule 901 lists examples of evidence that can authenticate or identify an item of evidence, including testimony of a witness with knowledge "that an item is what it is claimed to be." Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(1).
With these standards in mind, the Court turns to the relevant facts of this case.
Plaintiff Douglas Holloway is male. (R. 47-2, Pl.'s Ex. 1, ¶6.) He began his employment with CP in July 2014 and, at the time of the Kubota incident on October 18, 2015, Defendant employed him as a conductor. (Pl.'s Ex. 1, ¶8; Def.'s Ex., Tab A, p. 102.) Holloway received training as a conductor from both CP as well as his former railroad company employer. (Def.'s Ex., Tab A, pp. 55, 79, 80-81; Def.'s Ex., Tab J.) As such, he had at least four years of railroad work experience before joining CP. (Def.'s Ex., Tab A, pp. 53-57; Def.'s Ex., Tab C.)
Defendant Soo Line Railroad Company d/b/a Canadian Pacific is a Class I railroad thatprovides freight rail transportation services. (R. 56, Cobb Decl., ¶ 3.) One of CP's rail yard facilities is located in Franklin Park, Illinois (the "Bensenville Yard"). (Id.)
A collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between the United Transportation Union ("UTU") and CP governs the terms and conditions of Plaintiff's employment as a conductor. (Def.'s Ex., Tab A, pp. 86-87.) The CBA governs bidding rights, pay rates, benefits, seniority, furloughs, and other matters. (Id. at 86- 87, 89.) It applies to all crafts and classes of road service and yard service...
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