Holloway v. State
Decision Date | 03 February 1970 |
Docket Number | No. 273,273 |
Citation | 261 A.2d 811,8 Md.App. 618 |
Parties | Eldon Louis HOLLOWAY v. STATE of Maryland. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
A. Gordon Boone, Jr., Towson, with W. Kennedy Boone, III, Towson, on brief, for appellant.
Francis X. Pugh, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., and Donaldson C. Cole, State's Atty. for Cecil County, on brief, for appellee.
Before MURPHY, C. J., and ANDERSON, MORTON, ORTH and THOMPSON, JJ.
Certain aspects of a plea of guilty in criminal causes are covered by the Maryland Rules of Practice and Procedure. An accused may plead guilty to one or more of the offenses of which he is charged, or to a degree of an offense which by law may be divided into degrees of guilt. Rules 720 and 724. See Smith v. State, 5 Md.App. 633, 248 A.2d 913. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty. Rule 721. It may strike out a plea of guilty at any time and enter a plea of not guilty, if it deems such action necessary in the interest of justice. Rule 722.
Substantively, a plea of guilty involves the waiver of several federal constitutional rights of an accused. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274. Therefore, it can be effectively accepted by the court only under the standard applicable to waiver of such rights. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 422, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934. To satisfy this standard a plea of guilty must be entered by an accused:
(1) voluntarily; and
(2) with an intelligent understanding:
(a) of the nature of the offense to which he is pleading guilty; and
(b) of the possible consequences of the plea.
See Wayne v. State, 4 Md.App. 424, 429-430, 243 A.2d 19; Duvall v. State, 5 Md.App. 484, 486, 248 A.2d 401. The record must affirmatively show that the plea was so entered, as presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70. To be voluntary the plea must not be entered through coercion, terror, inducements, or subtle or blatant threats. 1 To be entered with an intelligent understanding on the part of the defendant, it must not be made through ignorance or incomprehension. 2 And the plea of guilty must be unconditional. Wayne v. State, supra, 4 Md.App. at 429-430, 243 A.2d 19. The Supreme Court said in Boykin:
(citations omitted), 89 S.Ct. at 1712, 1713.
And it noted, note 7 at 1713, quoting Commonwealth ex rel. West v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 105, 237 A.2d 196, 197-198 (1967):
Eldon Louis Holloway (appellant) was charged in a criminal information with the grand larceny of a motorcycle (1st count) and the unauthorized use of it (2nd count). On arraignment he entered a general plea of not guilty and prayed a trial by jury. When the case was called for trial defense counsel withdrew the plea and requested that appellant be rearraigned. The court suggested that it question appellant and counsel agreed. During the course of the inquiry by the court, appellant was rearraigned, pleaded not guilty to the first count and guilty to the second count, whereupon the State entered a nolle prosequi to the first count without objection. Rule 711. The court continued its inquiry of appellant and, at its conclusion, accepted the guilty plea.
The inquiry by the court clearly established before it accepted the plea of guilty that it was voluntary in the traditional sense as not the result of coercion, threats or inducements and that it was made with an intelligent understanding of the possible consequences. It also elicited from appellant that he had decided to plead guilty 'the first of last month' and that he decided toi plead guilty 'because I was guilty.' But just before the acceptance of the plea the transcript reads as follows:
'THE COURT: Now, then, gentlemen, for the record, I think that there ought to be a brief statement as to any discussions that occurred between counsel relative to the election or reduction of the charge, or it would be a reduced charge in this case, for instance, unauthorized use as opposed to grand larceny. What discussions have you had?
MR. COLE (State's Attorney): Your Honor, I just told Mr. Goodrick I would accept a plea on the second count, because I felt it was unauthorized use.
THE COURT: Very good. And you?
MR. GOODRICK (Defense Counsel): I went to the State's Attorney with the idea in mind that I felt that the facts as I learned through my investigation did not warrant the first charge, and I too felt that if anything, if he was guilty of anything, it would only be guilty of unauthorized use.
We do not believe that on this recounting by appellant do his acts with regard to the motorcycle the lower court could be properly satisfied that appellant's acts were sufficient to constitute the offense for which he was charged. We feel that the record did not affirmatively show that appellant had an intelligent understanding of the nature of the offense to which he pleaded guilty; on the contrary we think that it shows that he did not. We reach this conclusion because '(i)t is clear that no one, whether principal perpetrator or aider or abettor, can violate (the larceny of use) statute unless he possesses criminal intent.' Anello v. State, 201 Md. 164, 168, 93 A.2d 71, 72. Whether or not the State at trial could have contradicted, disputed or refuted appellant's version or whether the trier of fact...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Metheny v. State
...379 U.S. 844, 85 S.Ct. 84 (1964). See also Palacorolle v. State, 239 Md. 416, 421, 211 A.2d 828, 830-31 (1965); Holloway v. State, 8 Md.App. 618, 626, 261 A.2d 811, 815 (1970). In addition, such an accused waives the right to a jury or court trial. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748,......
-
Sutton v. State
...85 S.Ct. 84, 13 L.Ed.2d 49 (1964). See also Palacorolle v. State, 239 Md. 416, 421, 211 A.2d 828, 830-31 (1965); Holloway v. State, 8 Md.App. 618, 626, 261 A.2d 811, 815 (1970). In addition, such an accused waives the right to a jury or court trial. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748......
-
Johnson v. State
...747. Yet the voluntariness of a guilty plea is necessarily determined solely by the judge before he accepts it. Holloway v. State, 8 Md.App. 618, 620, 261 A.2d 811; McCall v. State, 9 Md.App. 191, 195, 263 A.2d We are not convinced that the Court of Appeals intended to exclude consent searc......
-
McCall v. State
...of a plea of nolo contendere are the same. We discussed the requirements of an effective acceptance of a plea of guilty in Holloway v. State, Md.App., 261 A.2d 811, filed 3 February 1970, in finding that the plea had not been properly accepted, and in Obey v. State, Md.App., 261 A.2d 816, i......