Holly Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, Inc., 88-LW-1513

• Decision Date: 26 April 1988
• Docket Number: 88-LW-1513,86AP-1073
• Parties: Holly HELMICK et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CINCINNATI WORD PROCESSING, INC. et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Holly HELMICK et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CINCINNATI WORD PROCESSING, INC. et al Defendants-Appellees.

No. 86AP-1073. Judgment affirmed, 45 Ohio St. 3d 131 (1989).

88-LW-1513 (10th)

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District Franklin.

April 26, 1988

Appeal from the Franklin County Common Pleas Court.

Spater Gittes & Terzian, Frederick M. Gittes and John S. Marshall for appellants.

Lane, Alton & Horst, John M. Alton and D. Wesley Newhouse, for appellees.

Louis A. Jacobs, for Amicus Curiae.

OPINION

WHITESIDE Presiding Judge.

Plaintiffs, Holly Helmick, Linda Eichenlaub and Brenda Evans, appeal from a decision of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas and raise the following assignments of error:

"1.The trial court erred by granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the claims for breach of the plaintiffs' employment contracts when the plaintiffs have submitted sworn testimony and other evidence demonstrating genuine issues of fact concerning whether: 1) the plaintiffs were orally promised continued employment subject to their continued satisfactory job performance, 2) the plaintiffs were told by defendants they were more than adequately performing their duties 3) the defendants' custom and practice was to discharge employees only for just cause and 4) the plaintiffs were either constructively or officially terminated without good reason.

"2.The trial court's ruling that employees with possible claims of employment discrimination, such as sexual harassment, may only pursue equitable relief through the Ohio Civil Rights Commission under Section 4112.02 and are barred from seeking damages under common law theories such as assault and invasion of privacy (which do not require proof of discrimination) is without any support in the language or operation of the statute, any prior judicial decision, or common sense.

"3.Where only those litigants who have potential discrimination claims are barred by the trial court's ruling from pursuing their common law tort remedies, the trial court's ruling as applied violates rights to equal protection and due process of law and appellants' right to trial by jury secured by the Ohio and Federal Constitutions."

Plaintiffs were employed by defendant, Cincinnati Word Processing in Cincinnati to work in its Columbus office, Columbus Word Processing. On January 8, 1985, plaintiffs filed suit against defendants Cincinnati Word Processing, Charles Bray, Margaret Alderson (now Welch) and Terry Theye, alleging torts of intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, invasion of privacy, defamation of character and tortious interference of contract. Plaintiffs also alleged breach of employment contract by defendants.

After extensive discovery, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court, after a non-oral hearing, granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the issue of breach of contract, denied the motion for summary judgment on plaintiff Helmick's claim against defendant Alderson for assault and battery, and sustained defendants' motion for summary judgment on the other causes of action. In its judgment entry, the trial court stated:

"The conduct described in each of Plaintiffs' causes of action, except for the cause of action for assault and battery asserted against Defendant Margaret Alderson, sets forth claims for sex based discrimination pursuant to Ohio Revised Code ] 4112.02. Plaintiffs failed to file a charge of discrimination with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission within six (6) months of the occurrence of the conduct which is the basis for their claims. All of the claims stated in the Complaint, therefore, * * * are barred for the Plaintiffs' failure to pursue their claims before the Ohio Civil Rights Commission within six (6) months. The Motion is well-taken in this regard, and is SUSTAINED."

Plaintiffs, in their first assignment of error, contend that it was error for the trial court to grant defendants' motion for summary judgment because there existed genuine issues of fact.

Civ.R. 56(C) provides, in pertinent part, that:

" * * * Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleading, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence in the pending case, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of law. * * * A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from such evidence or stipulation and only therefrom, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, such party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in his favor. * * * "

The Ohio Supreme Court in Norris v. Ohio Std. Oil Co. (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 1, states that summary judgment is a procedural device to terminate litigation and to avoid a formal trial, but that " * * * [i]t must be awarded with caution, resolving doubts and construing evidence against the moving party, and granted only when it appears from the evidentiary material that reasonable minds can reach only an adverse conclusion as to the party opposing the motion."

The Ohio Supreme Court in Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 100, in paragraph one of the syllabus, held the employment-at-will doctrine has continuing validity by stating:

"Unless otherwise agreed, either party to an oral employment-at-will employment agreement may terminate the employment relationship for any reason which is not contrary to law."

In refusing to abolish the employment-at-will doctrine, the Supreme Court found that a need for certainty and continuity in the law required the court to follow precedent and not disturb a settled point unless extraordinary circumstances require it. The court did find, however, that there are occasions when exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine are recognized in the interest of justice. Accordingly, paragraphs two and three of the syllabus of Mers, supra, require courts to consider the following:

"2.The facts and circumstances surrounding an oral employment-at-will agreement, including the character of the employment, custom, the course of dealing between the parties, company policy, or any other fact which may illuminate the question, can be considered by the trier of fact in order to determine the agreement's explicit and implicit terms concerning discharge.

"3.The doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable and binding to oral at-will employment agreements. The test in such cases is whether the employer should have reasonably expected its representation to be relied upon by its employee and, if so, whether the expected action or forbearance actually resulted and was detrimental to the employee."

In other words, the court in Mers did not abolish the employment-at-will doctrine, but merely noted those conditions which may be present which would allow a court to find that the employment-at-will doctrine of termination was altered by the parties to limit an employer's right to discharge for any reason.

In reaching this decision in Mers, supra, the Ohio Supreme Court relied on its statement in Henkel v Educational Research Council (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 249, wherein the court found that facts and circumstances surrounding an employment-at-will agreement should be considered in order to ascertain if there is any indication that the terms of the employment-at-will contract have been altered...