Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of Hollywood
| Decision Date | 21 January 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 44642,44642 |
| Citation | 329 So.2d 10 |
| Parties | The HOLLYWOOD BEACH HOTEL COMPANY, an Ohio Corporation, et al., Petitioners, v. The CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, a Municipal Corporation, organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Judson A. Samuels and Hugh S. Glickstein of the Law Offices of Judson A. Samuels and Hugh S. Glickstein, Holly wood, and Howard M. Neu, North Miami, for petitioners.
J. Bart Budetti, City Atty., and Myron H. Burnstein, Special Asst. City Atty., for respondent.
This cause is before us on a petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal. 1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, § 3(b)(3), Fla.Const.
As a general rule, an outline of the sequence of events in chronological order is not of vital importance. However, the instant case represents a significant exception to this rule.
Petitioners-plaintiffs owned a 105 acre plot of real property in the City of Hollywood which was zoned RA--5 (golf course use) except for a 40 400-foot portion in the southwestern corner of same which was zoned RC--12 (multiple family). In late 1968, the petitioners decided to develop the property into a 6,000 unit complete community and petitioned the Hollywood Planning and Zoning Board to zone the entire plot as RC--12 (multiple family). This change was recommended to the Hollywood City Commission by the Planning and Zoning Board, whereupon the City Commission adopted Ordinance 0--69--46, hereinafter referred to, with the preamble reading in part, as follows:
WHEREAS, the City Commission, after several public hearings and only after an independent investigation and study, recognizes that The character of the neighborhood has gone through a series of changes so as to require the granting of the change of zone as hereinafter provided in order to properly preserve and protect the public interest, and
WHEREAS, The City Commission, after careful study of all aspects of the petitioner's application, including traffic patterns, population density, aesthetic considerations, effect upon single family residences in the area, as well as the effect upon the business establishments in the downtown area, Considers that the public interest not only justifies but requires that the change of zone be granted so as to permit construction of the complex in accordance with the circumstances recited herein and as the same appears on the site development plan, attached hereto and made a part hereof as though fully recited herein.' (Emphasis supplied.)
On April 2, 1969, after numerous public hearings and conferences between the City and the petitioners, a comprehensive site plan was approved and the City Commission by a 4 to 1 vote adopted Ordinance 0--69--46 which rezoned said property to RC--12 uses. In early December of 1969 in a City election, two commissioners who voted for the ordinance were defeated by candidates publicly opposed to same. On December 17, 1969, at the second meeting following their election, the two newly elected commissioners joined with the commissioner who had originally voted against the ordinance and passed a motion to petition the Zoning Board to reevaluate the rezoning affected by the foregoing ordinance. This petition did not contain and was not grounded upon Any allegations necessitating rezoning.
On December 30, 1969, petitioners obtained a building permit from the State for the construction of the first five million dollar building. The Zoning Board met on January 12, 1970, and considered the Commission's petition to reevaluate the zoning affected by the above ordinance. At this meeting, the Board stressed the need for zoning stability and stated that the Commission had never 'come back' with a request for a change in a duly enacted zoning ordinance. The motion was tabled and the Board at its February 9th meeting requested clarification from the Commission.
In the meantime, on January 23, 1970, the City issued a building permit for same. At this point, it must be noted the uncontroverted testimony established that it had taken some nine or ten months (April 1969--Jan. 1970) for the petitioners to complete the necessary preparations to begin construction. During this period and subsequently, petitioners expended some $191,269.66.
On February 18, 1970, the Commission in response to the request for clarification by the Zoning Board passed a motion to petition the Zoning Board to rezone the western one-third of the tract to multiple family and the eastern two-thirds to single family golf course use. On February 19 the City filed this petition with the Zoning Board.
On February 21, the petitioners brought an action for a permanent injunction with an accompanying request for a temporary injunction against the City. At the hearing on the temporary injunction and the City's motion to dismiss on March 4, the following pertinent testimony was given: The architect for the project testified that the entire site plan would be destroyed by rezoning part of the property; a member of the Zoning Board testified that the City's petition for rezoning did not contain any allegations that a change in the area where the property was situate necessitated rezoning; and the petitioner, Ben Tobin, testified as to the amount of money expended and that all activities had been brought to a halt because of the City's petition to rezone.
The trial court denied the temporary injunction on the grounds that the application was premature on March 5th. On March 13th, the City's Motion to Dismiss was denied. The City then voted to file an interlocutory appeal on March 16th and such appeal was filed on March 19th.
On March 23rd, the Zoning Board denied the petition to rezone.
The Commission next voted on March 25, 1970, to appeal this denial to the Zoning Board of Appeals, the members of which were comprised solely of the City Commissioners. Such appeal was filed but no definitive action was taken by the Board of Appeals until Feb. 17, 1971. However, at its April 5, 1970, meeting, the Board of Appeals voted to table the appeal for thirty to sixty days. On June 17th, the Board of Appeals discussed the tabled appeal and voted that it be tabled no longer than the first meeting in August.
On July 15th, the City Commission, in response to a request for an extension of the building permit, Voted to extend the building permit indefinitely until the litigation was completed.
At the August 8th meeting of the Board of Appeals, the appeal was left tabled due to the possibility that the City might purchase the property in dispute.
Then, on August 21st, the District Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the City's motion to dismiss.
At its September 2nd meeting, the City Commission voted to petition the District Court for rehearing and if unsuccessful, to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari. Prior to the taking of this vote, one of the Commissioners who voted in the majority, stated that these actions should be taken since 'the City could operate with more leverage as to the purchase of the property if the case remains in Court.' The District Court denied rehearing on September 29, 1970; this Court denied certiorari on January 7, 1971; and the City filed its answer to petitioner's complaint on February 17, 1971.
On the same day the Board of Appeals (City Commissioners) Without prior notice to the petitioners, affirmed the Zoning Board's denial of petition to rezone; and then the (same people sitting as) City Commissioners rescinded its motion of July 15, 1970 which had extended the permit until the end of the litigation between the parties and mandated that the petitioners exercise their rights under the building permit within ninety days.
Prior to the vote on the petition for rezoning and the ninety-day motion, one of the Commissioners who voted for the petition by the City to rezone, stated that he would 'now vote' to affirm the Zoning Board's denial since he did not think the project would ever be built without deviations which would have to come before the Commission for approval. On March 17th, the petitioners requested the return of the permit fee until building conditions improved. This was denied.
In regard to the City's repeal of the building permit allowing an extension to the end of the litigation, it is important to note that during the ninety-day period referred to above, the injunction suit was actively prosecuted by both parties, to-wit: on March 12, 1971, petitioners moved to strike parts of City's Answer; on March 29, 1971, the petitioners moved to amend Complaint; on April 12, City moved for judgment on the pleadings; and on April 20, City's motion for judgment on pleadings was denied and the petitioners' motion for leave to amend was granted.
From June 23, 1971 to January 5, 1972, the City negotiated with the petitioner for the purchase of the property. In the December 1971 City elections, the remaining two Commissioners who had voted for Ord. 0--69--46 were defeated by candidates publicly opposed to it. At its January 5, 1972 meeting, the Commission voted not to buy the property even though a verbal understanding had been reached as to both price and method of financing. The Commission again then passed unanimously a motion requesting the Zoning Board to reconsider the zoning implemented by Ord. 0--69--46, and, in addition thereto, to recommend suitable rezoning (a matter which was not raised in its first request for re-evaluation). The Commission also then took the first vote on a new density ordinance which would have the effect of rendering the petitioners' site plan useless. Petitioners sought a 'temporary injunction' (incorporating all prior pleadings before the court) on February 12. On February 14, the Zoning Board approved a rezoning plan and recommended same to the City Commission.
It is significant to note that at the Zoning Board meeting...
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