Holm v. City of San Diego

• Decision Date: 11 May 1950
• Citation: 217 P.2d 972,35 Cal.2d 399
• Parties: HOLM et al. v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO et al. L. A. 21216.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 972

217 P.2d 972

35 Cal.2d 399

HOLM et al. v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO et al.

L. A. 21216.

Supreme Court of California, in Bank.

May 11, 1950.

Sweet, Ault & Warner, San Diego, and C. Rupert Linley, El Cajon, for appellants.

Jean F. DuPaul, City Attorney, and McInnis & Hamilton, San Diego, for respondents.

CARTER, Justice.

Plaintiffs' action for damages for personal injuries is predicated on the alleged negligence of defendants, City of San Diego, and an employee thereof, in the operation of a motor vehicle by the employee in the course of his employment. The sole basis of liability of defendant city is respondeat superior, and there is no claim that the negligence consisted of a dangerous or defective condition of any city property or works. Defendants' demurrer, on the ground that the claim filed by plaintiffs with the city clerk and the employee was defective for lack of plaintiff-claimants' address as required by section 1982 of the Government Code, see also sec. 1981, was sustained and judgment of dismissal followed.

Insofar as the action against defendant city is concerned, the judgment must be reversed for there is no state statute requiring a claim to be filed under the circumstances here presented. Ansell v. City of San Diego, Cal.Supp., 216 P.2d 455.

With reference to the defendant city employee and the claim, it appears that, although the claim does not state plaintiff-claimants' address in those words, it does contain the following: It gives in detail the nature, time and place of the accident giving rise to the claim; in listing the items of expense incurred, it mentions expenses for trips 'to San Diego from Lakeside'. In this connection, defendants claim there is an inconsistency in that in another part of the claim, it is said that one of the claimants was continuously confined in a hospital, but that presented no obstacle or burden in the path of locating claimants. At the end of the claim, just before claimants' signatures, it is stated: 'Signed at Lakeside or La Mesa, Calif.'

Substantial compliance suffices to satisfy the claim statutes. Knight v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal.2d 764, 160 P.2d 779. The chief purpose of the claim requirement is to enable the city to make an investigation of the claim and give it an opportunity to settle without litigation. It is plain from the above-mentioned portions of the claim that plaintiffs resided at Lakeside. They had to travel therefrom to San Diego, and it was signed at La Mesa or Lakeside. Those latter towns are only 11 miles from each other and the former had a population, as of the 1940 census, of only 1500, and the latter, 3925. There was sufficient information from which the city authorities, without undue trouble, could locate and interview the claimants, and it does not appear that the city was misled or prejudiced. In Uttley v. City of Santa Ana, 136 Cal.App. 23, 25, 28 P.2d 377, 378, the court held that the office address of the claimant's attorney was sufficient compliance, stating: 'Even in that state (Washington) it has been held that 'it is sufficient, therefore, if the notice or claim is not calculated to mislead, but contains such evidence of identity of place and person as to enable the investigating officials to make proper investigation when aided by reasonable inquiry. When, therefore, there is no evident intention to mislead, but a bona fide attempt to comply with the law, the notice is sufficient in the absence of any evidence that it did in fact mislead.' * * * The purpose of the statute would seem to be accomplished if an address is given at which or through which the claimant may be found, in order that the city officials may make such investigation of the merits of the claim as may be desired.' In Stewart v. City of Rio Vista, 72 Cal.App.2d 279, 164 P.2d 274, the only address given was the statement in the verification by the claimant's attorney that he had his office in Vacaville, California. In Ridge v. Boulder Creek, etc. School Dist., 60 Cal.App.2d 453, 140 P.2d 990, 992, the claim stated that the claimants were residents of Santa Cruz County, and one of them, a minor, is a pupil at Boulder Creek Union High School. The court, in holding that to be enough, stated:

'Webster's dictionary defines the word 'address': 'The directions for delivery of a letter; the name or description of a place of residence, business etc., where a person may be found or communicated with.' This definition clearly indicates that the word 'address' is not always synonymous with the word 'residence', although for the purpose of some statutes the courts have so interpreted its meaning. * * *

'In interpreting a similar requirement for filing of a claim in suits against municipalities, the court said in Uttley v. City of Santa Ana, 136 Cal.App. 23, 25, 28 P.2d 377, 379: 'The purpose of the statute would seem to be accomplished if an address is given at which or through which the claimant may be found, in order that the city officials may make such investigation of the merits of the claim as may be desired. The statute does not definitely require the giving of the claimant's home address or usual business address, and it is conceivable that a claimant might have neither a home address nor a permanent business address. * * * In the absence of any showing that the appellant (municipality) was misled or prejudiced, we think the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to show a substantial compliance with the statute.' In that case the court held that the address of the claimant's attorney within the verified claim was a substantial compliance with the statute which required the claimant's address to be in the verified claim. The situation of claimant Walter Ridge is comparable to that of the claimant in the city case. The recital in the claim that Walter Ridge was a student at Boulder Creek Union High...