Holman v. Kelly Catering, Inc.
Decision Date | 01 September 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 100,100 |
Citation | 639 A.2d 701,334 Md. 480 |
Parties | Sandra A. HOLMAN v. KELLY CATERING, INC. , |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Timothy F. Talbot (Harvey S. Wasserman, Joel L. Katz, P.A., all on brief) Annapolis, for petitioner.
Evelyn O. Cannon and James Himes, Asst. Attys. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., all on brief), Baltimore, for Uninsured Employers' Fund, amicus curiae.
Richard F. Walsh (Northrop, Walsh, Radcliff, Schiszik & Becker, all on brief), Bowie, for respondent.
Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW KARWACKI, BELL and RAKER, JJ.
On September 26, 1989, Sandra Ann Holman filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits based on various bodily injuries she sustained in an accident while driving a catering truck for Kelly Catering, Inc. Kelly contested this claim and contended that Holman was precluded from claiming benefits because she was an independent contractor rather than an employee. A hearing on Holman's claim was held before the Maryland Workers' Compensation Commission on May 14, 1990. Based on the testimony at that hearing, the Commission decided in Kelly's favor and found that Holman should be denied benefits because she was not an employee of the catering service.
Holman appealed this adverse decision to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, and requested a jury trial. Prior to trial, Holman moved that the court exclude any reference to the Commission's decision in favor of Kelly. Kelly objected and contended that the legislature's requirement that the "decision of the Commission is presumed to be prima facie correct" would be pointless if the jury could not be told of the Commission's decision. See Maryland Code (1991 Repl.Vol.), LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARTICLE, § 9-745(B)(1)1. Notwithstanding Kelly's objection, the trial court granted Holman's motion and trial began. Prior to opening statements, the judge entertained further discussion on whether the jury should be informed of the Commission's decision, reiterated his ruling that the jury should not, and granted Kelly's standing objection to that ruling.
Following presentation of the evidence, Kelly directed the judge's attention to Maryland Civil Pattern Jury Instruction 30:3, which explains that the case "has been heard and decided by the [Commission]," instructs on what the Commission decided, and informs the jury that "[the] decision is presumed to be correct." Maryland Civil Pattern Jury Instructions 30:3, at 653 (2d ed. 1984). 2 See also Maryland Civil Pattern Jury Instructions 30:3, at 644 (3d ed. 1993). In accordance with his earlier ruling, however, the judge instructed the jury without mentioning the Commission's decision:
(Emphasis added).
The jury returned a verdict that Holman was an employee of Kelly. Kelly appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case to that court for a new trial. See Kelly Catering, Inc. v. Holman, 96 Md.App. 256, 624 A.2d 1300 (1993). One of the bases for reversal was the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the Commission's decision which, according to the intermediate appellate court, was "a necessary and proper component of the jury instructions in cases such as this." Kelly Catering, 96 Md.App. at 275, 624 A.2d at 1309.
We granted certiorari in this case to consider the role of the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision in a circuit court appellate proceeding where a jury trial has been requested. 3 For the reasons discussed below, we shall affirm the Court of Special Appeals' decision.
Pursuant to § 9-737 of the Labor and Employment Article, a party aggrieved by the decision of the Commission may appeal to the circuit court. Section 9-745 provides the procedure for conducting appellate proceedings in the circuit court. Under § 9-745(d), the appealing party may request a trial by jury, as Holman did, to which "any question of fact involved in the case" is submitted. Although not expressly specified, we have recognized that the statute "contemplates a trial which essentially is de novo." Smith v. State Roads Comm., 240 Md. 525, 533, 214 A.2d 792, 796 (1965). See also Richardson v. Home Mutual, 235 Md. 252, 255, 201 A.2d 340, 342 (1964) ( ); General Motors Corp. v. Bark, 79 Md.App. 68, 74, 555 A.2d 542, 545 (1989) ( ).
The present dispute primarily concerns the scope of § 9-745(b), which addresses the burden of proof and the prima facie correctness of the Commission's decision in a circuit court appellate proceeding. Section 9-745(b) provides as follows:
Holman and Kelly disagree over the legislature's intention behind this provision. Kelly contends that part of the statute's purpose is to bring the decision of the Commission to the jury's attention. Therefore, Kelly argues, the trial judge's failure to inform "the jury of the Commission[']s decision and the weight to be attached to that decision" was erroneous. To the contrary, Holman contends the statute merely envisions that "the Commission's decision is ... the means used for shifting the burden of proof at trial," and in no way requires that the decision be presented to the jury.
We begin our analysis of § 9-745(b) by reiterating that "[o]ur inquiry into legislative intent begins with the words of the statute...." Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 145, 626 A.2d 946, 950 (1993). See also State v. Bricker, 321 Md. 86, 92, 581 A.2d 9, 12 (1990) (). Our examination of such words is guided by the principle that we should read "pertinent parts of the legislative language together, giving effect to all of those parts if we can, and rendering no part of the law surplusage." Sinai Hosp. v. Dep't of Employment, 309 Md. 28, 40, 522 A.2d 382, 388 (1987).
In § 9-745(b), the legislature has specified that the decision of the Commission is (1) "presumed to be prima facie correct," and (2) "the party challenging the decision has the burden of proof." These are two distinct yet connected requirements. See Comptroller v. Fairchild Industries, 303 Md. 280, 285-86, 493 A.2d 341, 343-44 (1985) (); 1A Sutherland Stat. Const. § 21.14, at 129 (5th ed. 1993) (). Holman maintains, however, that both provisions perform the same function and simply shift the burden of proof in an appeal. Notwithstanding Holman's assertion, we believe that, by including both of these provisions, the legislature intended that the Commission's decision have a greater effect than merely placing the burden of proof on the party who challenges that decision.
Section 9-745(b)(2) already explicitly shifts the burden of proof to the appealing party. Thus, if the only effect of § 9-745(b)(1)'s presumption of prima facie correctness is to place the burden of proof on the party appealing the decision, this provision would be superfluous in light of subsection (b)(2). On many occasions this Court has recognized the " 'fundamental rule of statutory construction ... that no word, clause, sentence or phrase should be rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory.' " In re Wallace W., 333 Md. 186, 192, 634 A.2d 53, 56-57 (1993) (quoting Md. Port Adm. v. Brawner Contracting Co., 303 Md. 44, 60, 492 A.2d 281, 289 (1985)). See also Management Personnel Serv. v. Sandefur, 300 Md. 332, 341, 478 A.2d 310, 315 (1984); City of Baltimore v. Hackley, 300 Md. 277, 283, 477 A.2d 1174, 1177 (1984). In light of this principle, we reject Holman's contention because we are unwilling to deem § 9-745(b)(1)'s presumption of prima facie correctness as mere surplusage to § 9-745(b)(2).
In order to effectuate the legislature's mandate that the Commission's "decision ... is presumed to be prima facie correct," the jury should know what decision is presumed correct and who made that decision. See Kelly Catering, 96 Md.App. at 272, 624 A.2d at 1308 ; Alexander v. Montgomery County, 87 Md.App. 275, 287, 589 A.2d 563, 569 (1991) (...
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