Holman v. Olsten Corp., Olsten Health Care Service, CX-86-102

• Citation: 389 N.W.2d 236
• Decision Date: 10 June 1986
• Docket Number: No. CX-86-102,CX-86-102
• Parties: Lynne HOLMAN, Relator, v. OLSTEN CORP., OLSTEN HEALTH CARE SERVICE, Department of Jobs and Training, Respondents.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota

Page 236

389 N.W.2d 236

Lynne HOLMAN, Relator, v. OLSTEN CORP., OLSTEN HEALTH CARE SERVICE, Department of Jobs and Training, Respondents.

No. CX-86-102.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

June 10, 1986.

Syllabus by the Court

Eligibility for unemployment benefits following separation from a full-time job is not lost by taking and quitting another part-time position, especially when it does not appear the part-time job was suitable for the claimant.

Lawrence W. Pry, Minneapolis, for Lynne Holman.

Olsten Corp., Olsten Health Care Service, pro se.

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., Donald E. Notvick, Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for Department of Jobs and Training.

Considered and decided by HUSPENI, P.J., and LESLIE and CRIPPEN, JJ., with oral argument waived.

OPINION

CRIPPEN, Judge.

Relator appeals from the Commissioner's determination that she lost eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits. We reverse.

FACTS

Lynne Holman was employed by the Hazelden Chemical Dependency Center as a prevention consultant from August 1984 until April 1985, at a salary of $20,700 per year. Holman has a masters degree in public health and several years' experience in her field. Due to a serious illness, Holman resigned her position at Hazelden in April. She applied for and began receiving $195 per week in unemployment compensation benefits. See Minn.Stat. Sec. 268.09, subd. 1(2)(b) (1984) (separation from employment due to serious illness shall not disqualify the person for unemployment benefits).

Four months later, on August 19, 1985, Holman accepted an opportunity for part-time employment with respondent Olsten Health Care Service. Holman's job was to coordinate placements of health care workers for Olsten, a temporary employment agency. Olsten hired Holman as a night representative, to work one or two nights a week and one weekend per month. The job required her to respond to telephone calls from clients between 5:00 p.m. and 8:30 a.m. and to assign individual health care workers to the callers. She was paid $15.00 per night plus $1.00 for each assignment she made.

Olsten initially scheduled Holman to work two nights the week of August 19, one night the following week, the weekend following the first week of September, one night the second week of September, and one more night in either the third or fourth week of that month. After working the first two nights, Holman had only earned $43.00 for about 12 hours' work. Holman was dissatisfied with the low wages. She also felt she had to handle too many calls and that the work was unduly stressful because of the many calls she received from patients complaining about the health care workers they had been assigned. After her second night of work, Holman voluntarily quit the job with Olsten.

As a result, a claims deputy found Holman had voluntarily terminated her employment with Olsten without good cause attributable to the employer. The claims deputy notified Holman that she was disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits, including those attributable to her prior employment at Hazelden. On Holman's appeal, a department referee and then a Commissioner's representative affirmed the claims deputy's decision.

ISSUE

Did Holman lose her eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits by quitting the part-time job with Olsten?

ANALYSIS

Relator contends that respondent Commissioner erroneously disqualified her from receipt of unemployment compensation benefits by misapplying the Minnesota unemployment compensation statute and the judicial construction placed on the statute. The determination whether relator was properly disqualified presents a question of law upon which the appellate courts are free to exercise their independent judgment. Smith v. Employers' Overload Co., 314 N.W.2d 220, 221 (Minn.1981).

Because the unemployment compensation statute is remedial in nature, it must be liberally construed to effectuate the public policy that unemployment reserves be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own. Id. at 221-22. For this reason the disqualification provisions of the statute are to be narrowly construed. Id. at 222. The courts give "great weight" to the construction placed upon a statute by the department charged with its administration. Krumm v. R.A. Nadeau Co., 276 N.W.2d 641, 644 (Minn.1979). An unreasonable interpretation by the Commissioner, however, will not be upheld. See Minn.Stat. Sec. 645.17(1) (1984).

The Commissioner's decision is founded upon a longstanding belief that any loss of employment with fault totally disqualifies a person from receiving benefits, even if the person is qualified due to a loss of a full-time job through no fault of his or her own and has been at fault only with regard to the loss of the part-time job opportunity. The basis for the Commissioner's position is the public policy articulated in the general statute on fault and the specific disqualification provisions for fault in quitting a job. See Minn.Stat. Secs. 268.03, 268.09, subd. 1(1) (1984).

This is the fourth in a series of cases related to the Commissioner's stance on wrongful surrender of part-time employment and involving pronounced conflict between the Commissioner and the judiciary. The Commissioner's approach was first limited in Berzac v. Marsden Building Maintenance Co., 311 N.W.2d 873 (Minn.1981). There, the supreme court demanded that there be no disqualification when an employee voluntarily quit a part-time job that was held concurrently with full-time employment and was surrendered before he lost the full-time position through no fault of his own. The court held that the "legislature could not have intended [the] unfortunate result" created by the Commissioner's conclusion "that if an individual voluntarily discontinues but one of multiple employment positions, the disqualification [arising from that act] precludes the receipt of benefits from any employer, regardless of the circumstances creating the unemployment." Id. at 875.

In a similar case, this court also reversed the Commissioner, who adhered to the position unsuccessfully argued to the supreme court in Berzac. See Glende v. Commissioner of Economic Security, 345 N.W.2d 283 (Minn.Ct.App.1984). The only distinction between the two cases was that the basis for the employee's disqualification after leaving the part-time job in Glende was misconduct while in Berzac the basis was the employee's voluntary termination of part-time employment. The court in Glende expressed concern over the Department's "refusal to apply the clear holding of Berzac," noting that the Department

repeated its erroneous practice of denying benefits from the full-time employment by virtue of a "spill-over" taint of disqualification from the previous part-time employment. Such action suggests an affirmative disrespect for the rule of law. * * * There is no justification for simply choosing to ignore applicable law.

Id. at 285.

The supreme court required an additional limitation on the Commissioner's stance in Sticka v. Holiday Village South, 348 N.W.2d 761 (Minn.1984). Sticka again dealt with part-time jobs held concurrently with a full-time position. Sticka, a structural engineer earning $10.65 per hour at her full-time job, had taken the part-time jobs to supplement her income after her employer reduced her hours. She earned $4.00 per hour as a cashier at one of the part-time jobs and $3.45 per hour as a stock clerk at the other. Sticka then lost the full-time employment and qualified for unemployment benefits. Because she was unable to find other employment as a structural engineer in the local area, Sticka decided to quit the two part-time jobs and look for employment in other parts of the country.

Had Sticka been offered either of the part-time jobs during her job search, she could have declined them without jeopardizing her qualification for benefits, as neither of them would have been deemed "suitable employment" as defined by the statute. Id. at 763, n. 1. Despite this, the Commissioner found that Sticka's voluntary termination of her part-time employment disqualified her for all unemployment compensation benefits. Thus, Sticka's part-time work was treated as if it ended her unemployment.

The supreme court reversed, holding that the department was "misguided" in its self-proclaimed "all or nothing proposition" about one's status as employed or unemployed:

Relator's retention of her part-time jobs neither plucked her from the ranks of the unemployed nor significantly reduced the benefits payable to her. * * * Since the relator qualified for at least partial benefits when she had part-time work, it makes no sense that on cessation of the part-time work for any reason, she should become disqualified from any and all benefits.

Id. at 763. The court held that events subsequent to Sticka's qualification for benefits were irrelevant

since the relator cannot be disqualified for benefits for any acts or omissions which occur after her separation from employment with that employer. Minn.Stat....