Holman v. State
| Citation | 183 P.3d 368,2008 WY 54 |
| Decision Date | 14 May 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-140.,06-140. |
| Parties | Daniel Ray HOLMAN, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Representing Appellant: Thomas R. Smith of Chapman Valdez at Beech Street Law Office, Casper, Wyoming.
Representing Appellee: Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric A. Johnson, Faculty Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; and Kevin Kessner, Student Director, Prosecution Assistance Program. Argument by Mr. Kessner.
Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.
[¶ 1] Daniel Ray Holman ("the appellant") pled guilty to one count of third or subsequent possession of a controlled substance, specifically, methamphetamine, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(i) (LexisNexis 2007), reserving his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during the search of his car at the time of his arrest.1 We reverse because the search of the appellant's vehicle violated the appellant's right to be free from unreasonable search under Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.
[¶ 2] Whether the search at issue violated Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution?
[¶ 3] On July 28, 2005, Casper Police Officer Joseph Moody was sitting in his patrol car near the North Casper ball fields when he was approached by Telicia Ramon. Ms. Ramon pointed to the appellant's vehicle and stated that the driver had been acting suspicious, watching children through binoculars, and moving when people approached. Upon receiving this information, Officer Moody proceeded to the area where the appellant was parked so that he could contact the appellant. Officer Moody approached the appellant's vehicle just as the appellant began to drive away. Officer Moody followed the appellant and stopped him before he left the ball field area.
[¶ 4] Upon stopping the appellant's vehicle, Officer Moody approached and asked for the appellant's license, registration, and proof of insurance. The appellant did not have a driver's license but provided the officer with his Wyoming identification card. Additionally, Officer Moody asked what the appellant was doing in the area. The appellant gave the names of his two sons and explained he was looking for them as they were supposed to be playing one of the sporting events in the area. When asked if he was looking at children through binoculars, the appellant told Officer Moody that he was using a monocular and showed it to the officer.
[¶ 5] Dispatch informed Officer Moody that the appellant's driver's license had been suspended. Shortly thereafter, Officer Moody's supervisor, Sergeant Malone, arrived. The officers placed the appellant under arrest for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed him and placed him in the back of Officer Moody's police car.
[¶ 6] After the appellant's arrest, Officer Moody and Sergeant Malone searched the appellant's vehicle. Their search revealed a small, transparent, sealable plastic baggie containing a small amount of white crystal substance in the center console between the front driver and passenger seats. A field test later confirmed that the substance was methamphetamine.
[¶ 7] The appellant was charged with third or subsequent possession of a controlled substance, specifically, methamphetamine, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(i) (LexisNexis 2007). He filed a Motion to Suppress, which motion was denied. The appellant then entered a conditional guilty plea, was sentenced, and filed a timely notice of appeal.
[¶8] Findings on factual issues made by the district court considering a motion to suppress are not disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 (Wyo. 1994). Since the district court conducts the hearing on the motion to suppress and has the opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions, evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the district court's determination. Id. The issue of law, whether an unreasonable search or seizure has occurred in violation of constitutional rights, is reviewed de novo. Id.; Brown v. State, 944 P.2d 1168, 1170-71 (Wyo.1997).
Grant v. State, 2004 WY, 45, ¶ 10, 88 P.3d 1016, 1018 (Wyo.2004) (quoting McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Wyo.1999)).
[¶ 9] The appellant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence discovered when his vehicle was searched following his arrest. He argues that the search was unreasonable and violated Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.2 In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that, under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, an officer arresting an occupant of a vehicle may contemporaneously search the passenger compartment of that vehicle, incident to that arrest. In Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 480-89 (Wyo.1999), we rejected the minimal protection that Belton's "bright-line rule" provides, and we held that Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution provides greater protection. Specifically, we announced that Article 1, Section 4 requires the search of an arrestee's vehicle to be "reasonable under all of the circumstances." Id. at 489.
[¶ 10] "We have stated that under both constitutions, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless they are justified by probable cause and established exceptions." Pena v. State, 2004 WY 115, ¶ 29, 98 P.3d 857, 870 (Wyo.2004).
Consent is one exception to the warrant requirement. Id. Other exceptions include a search: 1) of an arrested suspect and the area within his control; 2) conducted while in pursuit of a fleeing suspect; 3) to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence; 4) of an automobile upon probable cause; 5) which results when an object is inadvertently in the plain view of police officers while they are where they have a right to be; and 6) which results from an entry into a dwelling in order to prevent loss of life or property (also referred to as the emergency assistance exception).
Moulton v. State, 2006 WY 152, ¶ 16, 148 P.3d 38, 43 (Wyo.2006). We have recognized that these exceptions extend to automobiles and have decided that "a search of an automobile without a warrant cannot be said to be unreasonable under all circumstances, and specifically allowed automobile searches when there is probable cause for believing that a vehicle is carrying contraband or illegal goods and searches incidental to lawful arrest." Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 487. "When a defendant properly objects to or moves for suppression of evidence seized, the State bears the burden of proving that one of the exceptions applies." Moulton, 2006 WY 152, ¶ 16, 148 P.3d at 43.
[¶ 11] Before evaluating whether any of the above-mentioned exceptions apply here (see supra ¶ 10), we will examine the particular facts surrounding the search. Those facts are derived from three different sources in the record: 1) the Affidavit Supporting Complaint, 2) Officer Moody's testimony at the preliminary hearing, and 3) Officer Moody's testimony at the motion hearing. The factual description of the circumstances surrounding the search outlined in the Affidavit Supporting Complaint are quite sparse and merely state that the appellant was arrested for driving under suspension, that he was handcuffed, and that Officer Moody and Sergeant Malone then searched his vehicle.
[¶ 12] At the preliminary hearing, Officer Moody provided additional testimony concerning the search.
[Defense Counsel]: Okay. So, [the appellant] gave permission to move the vehicle, lock it and leave it at the ball fields?
[Officer Moody]: Yes, sir.
[Defense Counsel]: Okay. What happened after that permission was given?
[Officer Moody]: Uh, I searched the vehicle; found the suspected methamphetamine. Uh, like I said, I myself, never had the intention of leaving it except for that Sergeant Malone was gonna say to because he got permission. But then once we found the methamphetamine, we towed it as we usually do for driving under suspension.
[Defense Counsel]: And it was searched before it was moved to the parking lot?
[Officer Moody]: No.
[Defense Counsel]: Okay, so ...
[Officer Moody]: Well, it was searched. I might have just misunderstood your question. It was searched before it was moved. It was never moved to the parking lot. Right where, when I made the traffic stop, where he stopped the vehicle is where I searched it.
[Defense Counsel]: Okay. And it was searched after Sergeant Malone asked [the appellant] if he minded if the vehicle was moved to the parking lot and locked up.
[Officer Moody]: Yes, sir.
[Defense Counsel]: And, and why did you search the vehicle?
[Officer Moody]: Search incident to arrest. That's what I always do.
Finally, at the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Moody testified as follows:
[Prosecutor]: Now, Officer, counsel asked you some questions about the options between parking the vehicle versus towing the vehicle. My question is at some point in time, did you determine that you weren't going to search the vehicle —
[Officer Moody]: No.
[Prosecutor]: — after you placed the defendant under oath (sic)?
[Officer Moody]: No. Once he's arrested, I'm going to search the vehicle regardless of whether we're going to leave it parked there or move it to a different spot to be parked or tow it or have it picked up by somebody that he trusts. It doesn't matter. I'm going to search the vehicle.
[Prosecutor]: And the grounds for your searching the vehicle is what?
[Officer Moody]: Search incident to arrest.
[Prosecuto...
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