Holmes v. Iwasa

• Decision Date: 13 January 1983
• Docket Number: No. 13459,13459
• Citation: 104 Idaho 179,657 P.2d 476
• Parties: William HOLMES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. George IWASA, Optometrist; Berkley Bio-Engineering International, a corporation, or Berkley Bio-Engineering, Inc.; Does I through XV; Does XVI through XXX; Does XXXI through XL; Black Corporations I through XV; White Corporations I through XV; and Green Corporations I through XV, Defendants, and George Iwasa, Optometrist, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 476

657 P.2d 476

104 Idaho 179

William HOLMES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. George IWASA, Optometrist; Berkley Bio-Engineering International, a corporation, or Berkley Bio-Engineering, Inc.; Does I through XV; Does XVI through XXX; Does XXXI through XL; Black Corporations I through XV; White Corporations I through XV; and Green Corporations I through XV, Defendants and George Iwasa, Optometrist, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 13459.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Jan. 13, 1983.

A.L. Lyons, of Lyons, Bohner & Chasan, Boise, for plaintiff-appellant.

Michael Moore, of Imhoff & Lynch, Boise, for defendant-respondent.

BAKES, Justice.

Plaintiff appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of the defendant in this professional malpractice action.

The sequence of events is virtually undisputed. The dispute arises over when the plaintiff's cause of action accrued and when the statute of limitations began to run in this case. The evidence before the district court indicated that plaintiff, William Holmes, initially went to the defendant, Dr. George Iwasa, an optometrist practicing in Weiser and Cambridge, Idaho, on July 24, 1974, for a routine eye examination. Plaintiff complained of headaches and sensitivity to bright lights, ¹ but defendant found that plaintiff's glasses were at that time the correct prescription. However, the defendant anticipated that bifocals might be necessary in the future.

Holmes returned to defendant's office on November 19, 1975, again complaining of problems with bright lights and headaches, and that his vision was blurred. Defendant took a history from the plaintiff, conducted an eye examination, including a test for glaucoma which was accomplished by measuring eye pressure with a tonometer, and prescribed bifocals for plaintiff's problems.

Plaintiff delayed ordering his bifocals from Dr. Iwasa until December 22, 1975, when he returned to defendant's office. Plaintiff's eyes were not examined on that date; he merely chose the frames and ordered the already prescribed bifocals. The purpose of plaintiff's next visit to Dr. Iwasa's office was to pick up his bifocals on January 21, 1976. At that time, Dr. Iwasa did not examine plaintiff's eyes but merely fitted the new bifocals to plaintiff's head.

When the new bifocals failed to relieve his symptoms, plaintiff went to see Dr. Howarth, an opthamologist, on January 23, 1976. Dr. Howarth conducted eye examinations and informed plaintiff that, in his opinion, plaintiff was suffering from glaucoma. ² In his deposition, Dr. Howarth described plaintiff's condition as marked open-angle glaucoma and explained that glaucoma grows progressively worse the longer the condition is present. Dr. Howarth estimated that the glaucoma had been present in plaintiff for at least eight years prior to January 23, 1976.

On December 21, 1977, plaintiff filed complaint against defendant and Berkeley Bio-Engineering International, the manufacturer of the tonometer used by Dr. Iwasa in measuring the pressure in plaintiff's eyes. Berkeley was subsequently dismissed from this action. Defendant, in his motion for summary judgment, alleged that certain counts contained in plaintiff's complaint were inapplicable to a malpractice action and that plaintiff's complaint as a whole was barred by the statute of limitations. The lower court granted defendant's summary judgment motion, based on the statute of limitations, and plaintiff appealed.

Although plaintiff appellant presented several issues on appeal, they all relate to the central issue of whether the district court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the statute of limitations barred plaintiff's claim.

Prior to March 24, 1971, I.C. § 5-219(4), the statute of limitations applicable to professional malpractice actions, in essence provided that an action had to be filed within two years of the alleged professional malpractice; the statute made no reference whatsoever to the interrelationship between the accrual of a cause of action and knowledge of a cause of action. Without the benefit of legislative guidance, this Court adopted the so-called "discovery exception" in cases in which foreign objects were negligently left in a patient's body. In Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224 (1964), we held that "the cause of action [in such cases] does not accrue until the patient learns of, or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have learned of the presence of [the] foreign object in his body." Id. at 498, 389 P.2d at 232. In Renner v. Edwards, 93 Idaho 836, 475 P.2d 530 (1969), aff'd on rehearing, we extended the discovery rule to cases of misdiagnosis and held that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the patient knew or should have known of the physician's misdiagnosis.

However, soon after our decision in Renner, and perhaps partly in response thereto, ^{3 3} the legislature substantially amended I.C. § 5-219(4). ⁴ 1971 Idaho Sess.Laws, ch. 180, § 1. By amending I.C. § 5-219(4), the legislature narrowed the scope of Renner and, in large part, defined when a cause of action accrues for the purposes of applying the statutory period of limitations in professional malpractice actions. Under amended I.C. § 5-219(4), the discovery exception first recognized by this Court in Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224 (1964), is limited to cases involving foreign objects and fraudulent concealment. ⁵ In all other professional malpractice actions, "the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued as of the time of the occurrence, act or omission complained of...." The action must be brought within two years of that time.

The alleged negligent act, occurrence or omission complained of by the plaintiff is Dr. Iwasa's failure to discover plaintiff's glaucoma. The undisputed evidence establishes that Dr. Iwasa examined plaintiff's eyes only on two occasions, July 24, 1974, and November 19, 1975, both dates falling outside the two year period set out in I.C. § 5-219(4). No examinations were performed on plaintiff's two subsequent visits--December 22, 1975, when the bifocals were ordered, and January 21, 1976, when the glasses were fitted to plaintiff's head. Therefore, the question we must decide on appeal is whether, on this record, a material issue of fact exists concerning whether Dr. Iwasa negligently failed to diagnose plaintiff's glaucoma on either December 22, 1975, or January 21, 1976, the two appointment dates within the statutory period of limitations.

In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the party opposing the motion; he is to be given the benefit of all favorable inferences which might reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Taylor v. Choules, 102 Idaho 222, 224, 628 P.2d 1056 1058 (1981); Huyck v. Hecla Mining Co., 101 Idaho 299, 300, 612 P.2d 142, 143 (1980). The record contains the deposition of Dr. Howarth, the opthamologist who ultimately discovered plaintiff's glaucoma. In response to questions regarding what constitutes treatment, Dr. Howarth stated that if a doctor examines a patient one day and several days later writes a prescription, the latter "would be classed as a treatment, and ... when you order the glasses, you are instituting the treatment when the glasses are delivered and fit to the patient's face, and you have then completed the treatment as far as the treating of his refractive error is concerned." The record also contains Dr. Howarth's affidavit in which he stated:

"It is the opinion of this affiant that treatment of a patient commences with the first examination and continues on as long as the problem of the patient is not corrected by the first procedure of the physician or the provider of health care. Eyeglasses themselves are ... a facet of the treatment."

Thus, the record indicates that Dr. Howarth felt that Dr. Iwasa's course of treatment continued throughout the series of appointments. The question, however, is not one of continuing treatment, because I.C. § 5-219(4), as amended, expressly states that any continuing professional relationship between the injured party and the alleged wrongdoer shall not extend the limitation period.

Dr. Howarth stated that Dr. Iwasa's failure to diagnose glaucoma in July of 1974 was an oversight. However, the record contains no reference by Dr. Howarth, or any other evidence, that Dr. Iwasa had a medical duty to reexamine, or retest plaintiff's eyes on December 22, 1975, or January 21, 1976, the respective dates that the glasses were ordered and fitted, or that Dr. Iwasa's failure to do so was in violation of the applicable standard of health care of the community. See I.C. § 6-1012. Viewing all facts and inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and based upon the express declaration of I.C. § 5-219(4) that any continuing professional relationship between the injured party and the alleged wrongdoer shall not extend the limitations period, we conclude that there is no showing in the record that Dr. Iwasa was responsible for any occurrence, act or omission, i.e., the failure to diagnose glaucoma, on a date within the two year limitation period set out in I.C. § 5-219(4).

Plaintiff further alleges that defendant is estopped to assert the statute of limitations as a defense. Plaintiff argues that he relied to his prejudice on Dr. Iwasa's representations that the bifocals should resolve his problems.

This Court very recently recognized that, in a proper case, a defendant may be estopped from relying on a statute of limitations as a bar to an action against him. Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital Bldg. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19, 644 P.2d 341 (1982). Estoppel may prevent a defendant from asserting the statutory bar when his representations or conduct dissuade a plaintiff from prosecuting his cause of action during the period of limitations. See Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital Bldg. v....