Holmes v. State
Decision Date | 23 February 1998 |
Docket Number | No. S97A1963.,S97A1963. |
Citation | 269 Ga. 124,498 S.E.2d 732 |
Parties | HOLMES v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Virginia W. Tinkler, Decatur, for Donovan Holmes.
Robert M. Coker, Asst. Dist. Atty., Allison Beth Goldberg, Asst. Atty. Gen., Paula K. Smith, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Atlanta, for the State.
Donovan Holmes appeals his conviction for malice murder.1 For the reasons which follow, we affirm.
Terry Walker was talking on a public telephone outside a convenience store. As he finished his conversation, two men approached. One man produced a gun and told Walker to give them his money. Walker fled and was shot in the back, but he continued to run. The shooter told his accomplice to cut Walker off, and the accomplice went around the store. The shooter ran directly after Walker. In a nearby building, Walker was found dead from a single gunshot wound to the back.
At trial, an eyewitness identified Holmes as the man who shot Walker. The State also played an audio tape of Holmes' custodial statement in which he admitted being one of the two men who approached Walker, but contended that it was his companion Johnson who fired. Holmes admitted telling Johnson to shoot Walker, but contended he did so only because he believed Walker was going for a gun. Holmes also stated that he and Johnson left the area in a stolen car they had brought to the scene.2
1. Holmes challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, contending that the eyewitness' identification of him as the shooter was obviously mistaken and must be discarded. This contention is based on the eyewitness' repeated statements that the taller of the two men was the shooter, even though Holmes' arrest record and Johnson's autopsy record reflected that Johnson was taller than Holmes. At most, this created an inconsistency in the testimony which did not render it without probative value but affected only the weight and credit to be afforded it by the jury. Clifford v. State, 266 Ga. 620, 621(1), 469 S.E.2d 155 (1996). The jury was authorized to accept the eyewitness' testimony, and the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find Holmes guilty of malice murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. Holmes contends that the trial court should have excused prospective jurors Carlton and Covington for cause. Each had been personally close to a murder victim and each expressed some concern about judging the case impartially. The court asked the statutory questions of OCGA § 15-12-164(a)(1), and neither juror responded that he or she had any bias or partiality.
When Carlton was asked whether, "understanding that everybody brings in their own experiences, could you listen to the evidence in this case and try to take the law and apply the law to the facts as you see it," she responded "I would hope I could." She also stated Under repeated questioning on the matter, Carlton said she had already answered whether she could be fair and, in the midst of interruption by defense counsel, repeated that she had reservations about her ability to do so. When Holmes challenged Carlton, the court noted she did not say that she could not be fair, and denied the challenge, specifically relying on Carlton's testimony that she would try to be fair and impartial.
When Covington was asked whether he could be impartial in light of his experiences, he stated he "would attempt with everything in me to be unbiased." He was then asked whether he would try to be fair and impartial to the best of his ability, and answered "[d]epending on the evidence, yes, I'll try to." He later clarified this: and; He also answered affirmatively when asked if he would vote to acquit Holmes if the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the murder.
Whether to strike a juror for cause lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Garland v. State, 263 Ga. 495, 496(1), 435 S.E.2d 431 (1993). For a juror to be excused for cause, it must be shown that he or she holds...
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...and credibility which are peculiarly in the trial court's province, and those findings are to be given deference.Holmes v. State, 269 Ga. 124, 126(2), 498 S.E.2d 732 (1998) (citations omitted). Applying those principles to the challenged jurors, we find no error, as none of the jurors' resp......
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