Holt v. Castaneda, 87-5621
Decision Date | 09 October 1987 |
Docket Number | No. 87-5621,87-5621 |
Citation | 832 F.2d 123 |
Parties | Chauncey Marvin HOLT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard Modesto CASTANEDA, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Chauncey Marvin Holt, pro se.
Bernard Richard Deetman, San Diego, Cal., for defendant-appellee Richard Modesto Castaneda.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.
Before GOODWIN, ALARCON and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
The question presented in this case is whether a police officer who gives perjurious testimony during adversarial pretrial proceedings in a criminal matter is entitled to absolute witness immunity from liability for damages flowing from his testimony. Our reading of Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) compels us to conclude that a person may not maintain an action for damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982) against a police officer who gives perjurious testimony during pretrial proceedings in a criminal case. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint in this case.
Plaintiff-appellant Chauncey Marvin Holt (Holt) appeals from an order dismissing his First Amended Complaint (complaint) with prejudice. Holt's pro se complaint sought damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982) for violation of his federal constitutional rights as the result of perjurious testimony given by defendant-appellee Richard Modesto Castaneda (Castaneda) at pretrial proceedings in a criminal prosecution brought against Holt. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Castaneda gave perjurious testimony during a preliminary examination and a hearing on a motion to quash search warrants in the Municipal Court of the North County Judicial District of the County of San Diego, California and in the San Diego Superior Court at a consolidated hearing of Holt's motions to suppress evidence, to quash search warrants, to set aside the information, and to dismiss for unreasonable delay.
Castaneda moved to dismiss the complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), claiming absolute immunity. The district court granted Castaneda's motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. On appeal, Holt contends that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint because absolute immunity is not accorded police officers who commit perjury in pretrial proceedings.
An order dismissing a complaint with prejudice is final and appealable. Conerly v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 623 F.2d 117, 119 (9th Cir.1980). We have jurisdiction over Holt's timely appeal under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 (1982).
"A decision to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is reviewable de novo." Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir.1985), aff'd, 476 U.S. 488, 106 S.Ct. 2034, 90 L.Ed.2d 480 (1986). The issue of immunity is a question of law and is also reviewable de novo. See Crooks v. Maynard, 820 F.2d 329, 331 (9th Cir.1987), cert. granted --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 744, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (judicial immunity).
We will uphold an order dismissing a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982) only if, construing the complaint liberally, it is beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10, 101 S.Ct. 173, 176, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980); Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 648-49 (9th Cir.1984).
The starting point for our analysis is the Supreme Court's opinion in Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983). The Court there held that a convicted defendant could not state a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982) against a police officer who had allegedly given perjurious testimony during the trial on the issue of guilt. The Court based its ruling on the absolute immunity accorded at common law to witnesses in judicial proceedings. Section 1983, the Court explained, did not abrogate common law immunity. Moreover, "the common law provided absolute immunity from subsequent damages liability for all persons-- governmental or otherwise--who were integral parts of the judicial process." 460 U.S. at 335, 103 S.Ct. at 1115-16. Accordingly, police officer witnesses enjoy the same absolute immunity from liability under section 1983 that private witnesses enjoy.
The matter before this court concerns a police officer who allegedly gave perjurious testimony during pretrial proceedings. We see no principled basis for distinguishing between the pretrial proceedings and the trial on the merits in determining whether absolute immunity should be granted to a police officer witness. Immunity analysis rests on "functional categories." Id. at 342, 103 S.Ct at 1119. The functions of a witness are identical at an adversarial pretrial hearing and at the trial on the merits. In both types of proceedings, the witness assists the trier of fact in ascertaining the truth. In adversarial pretrial proceedings, as in trials, the witness testifies in court, under oath, under the supervision of the presiding judge and is subject to criminal prosecution for perjury. Moreover, in adversarial pretrial matters, the witness is available for cross-examination. The existence of these checks "undermines the argument that the imposition of civil liability is the only way to prevent a witness from inflicting constitutional injury through false testimony." Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 54 (D.C.Cir.1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 3089, 57 L.Ed.2d 1133 (1978), modified on reh'g, 712 F.2d 1444 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040, 104 S.Ct. 704, 79 L.Ed.2d 169 (1984) (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
The rationale for according absolute immunity to a witness against a claim based on court testimony applies with equal force in both trial and pretrial settings. Whether testifying at trial or in a pretrial proceeding, a witness who knows he may be subjected to costly and time-consuming civil litigation for offering testimony that he is unable to substantiate may consciously or otherwise shade his testimony in such a way as to limit potential liability. As a result, "the paths which lead to the ascertainment of truth" may be obstructed. See Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 333-34 & n. 13, 103 S.Ct. at 1114-15 & n. 13 (quoting Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 193, 197 (1860)).
We are fortified in our conclusion that we should not attempt to distinguish trial from pretrial testimony, for the purpose of according absolute witness immunity, by the apparent absence of any such distinction at common law. The Briscoe Court itself noted that common law witness immunity protected all persons "from subsequent damages liability for their testimony in judicial proceedings." 460 U.S. at 330-31, 103 S.Ct. at 1113 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). Other courts, including this one, had earlier reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Charles v. Wade, 665 F.2d 661, 666 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1036, 103 S.Ct. 1426, 75 L.Ed.2d 787 (1983) (); Briscoe v. LaHue, 663 F.2d 713, 718 (7th Cir.1981), aff'd, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (); Conley v. Office of the Public Defender, 653 F.2d 1241, 1242 (8th Cir.1981) (); Blevins v. Ford, 572 F.2d 1336, 1338 (9th Cir.1978) (); Briggs, 569 F.2d at 51 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) ( ).
We also note that many courts, including the Supreme Court itself, have understood Briscoe to apply beyond the narrow confines of criminal trials to judicial proceedings generally. See, e.g., Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 106 S.Ct. 496, 500, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985) ( ); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1466 (8th Cir.1987), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 ( ); Tripati v. INS, 784 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir.1986) ( ); Macko v. Byron, 760 F.2d 95, 97 (6th Cir.1985) ( ); San Filippo v. U.S. Trust Co., 737 F.2d 246, 254 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1035, 105 S.Ct. 1408, 84 L.Ed.2d 797 (1985) (dictum) ("it must follow" from Briscoe that grand jury witnesses are protected by the same absolute immunity that is enjoyed by witnesses at trial) that ; Flynn v. Dyzwilewski, 644 F.Supp. 769, 773-74 (N.D.Ill.1986) (...
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