Holt v. Grinnell
| Citation | 212 Ga.App. 520,441 S.E.2d 874 |
| Decision Date | 02 March 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. A94A0420,A94A0420 |
| Parties | HOLT v. GRINNELL et al. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Harper, Waldon & Craig, J. Blair Craig, Frank Boucek III, Atlanta, for appellant.
Robert B. Lipman, Atlanta, James E. Thompson, Tucker, for appellees.
Butler, Wooten, Overby & Cheeley, Albert Pearson III, Atlanta, amicus curiae.
Grinnell sued Holt for injuries sustained when his automobile collided with an automobile driven by Holt. We granted Holt's application for an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of his motion in limine.
Grinnell sought compensatory and punitive damages contending that at the time of the accident Holt negligently drove his automobile while under the influence of alcohol. Holt admitted in his answer to the complaint that he was at fault in the accident. It is also undisputed that Holt pled guilty to the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol in connection with the present accident and that prior to the present accident Holt had twice entered pleas of nolo contendere to charges of driving under the influence of alcohol. Holt moved in limine for an order "excluding the introduction of evidence, argument or reference [to] prior charges of DUI to which the defendant pled nolo contendere including evidence of any sentences or penalties as well as the defendant's prior driving record." The trial court ruled that such evidence was inadmissible in the first bifurcated phase of the trial as to punitive damages dealing with whether or not punitive damages should be awarded. See OCGA § 51-12-5.1(d)(1). However, the trial court concluded that in the second phase of the punitive damages issue "evidence of the circumstances surrounding the two prior DUIs, including evidence of the pleas and the consequences of same, is admissible" as relevant to the amount of punitive damages to be awarded. See OCGA § 51-12-5.1(d)(2).
We have previously ruled that the plain language of OCGA § 17-7-95(c) stating that "a plea of nolo contendere shall not be used against the defendant in any other court or proceedings as an admission of guilt or otherwise or for any purpose" prohibits use of a prior plea of nolo contendere as evidence relevant to the issue of punitive damages. Beal v. Braunecker, 185 Ga.App. 429, 431-432, 364 S.E.2d 308 (1987). Accordingly, the trial court erred by ruling that Holt's prior pleas of nolo contendere were admissible.
The remaining issue is whether the trial court was correct in ruling that evidence relating to the prior DUIs, other than the pleas of nolo contendere, was admissible for determining the amount of punitive damages to be awarded, if any.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Thompson v. Moore, 174 Ga.App. 331, 332, 329 S.E.2d 914 (1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, Moore v. Thompson, 255 Ga. 236, 336 S.E.2d 749 (1985). However, an exception to the general rule applies where the defendant's driving under the influence in the incident at issue is an aggravating circumstance which would authorize the trier of fact to impose punitive damages. Moore, supra at 236, 237, 336 S.E.2d 749. Under those circumstances, which apply to the present case, "[t]he extent of the defendant's wilful misconduct, wantonness and entire want of care in driving under the influence cannot be gauged solely by focusing on the incident in issue." Id. at 237, 336 S.E.2d 749. Accordingly, in such cases, evidence that the defendant pled guilty to driving under the influence prior to or even after the incident in issue would be admissible as relevant to the issue of punitive damages. Id. at 237-238, 336 S.E.2d 749; Thompson, supra. 1 "The only reason to exclude the evidence would be the danger of prejudice, but in the balance of things, its relevance to the question of wilful and wanton behavior outweighs any prejudice, where the jury is fully cautioned that the evidence goes only to the question of wilful and wanton behavior and conscious disregard of consequences, and not to the question of negligence in the particular incident on trial." Thompson, supra, 174 Ga.App. at 333, 329 S.E.2d 914.
Evidence that Holt had twice previous to the present incident committed the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol is conduct relevant to the trier of fact's determination of "what amount of [punitive] damages will be sufficient to deter, penalize, or punish the defendant in light of the circumstances of the case." OCGA § 51-12-5.1(d)(2); Thomps...
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