Holt v. McCastlain, 04-343.
| Decision Date | 20 May 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-343.,04-343. |
| Citation | 182 S.W.3d 112 |
| Parties | Jason HOLT and Jackson Reconstruction, Inc. v. Lona Horn McCASTLAIN, in her official capacity as Prosecuting Attorney of the 23rd Judicial District. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Jeff Rosenzweig, Little Rock, for appellant Jason Holt.
Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP, by: William H. Sutton and T. Michelle Ator, Little Rock, for appellant Jackson Reconstruction, Inc.
Mike Beebe, Att'y Gen., by: C. Joseph Cordi, Jr., Ass't Att'y Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.
On May 22, 2003, an automobile collision occurred in Lonoke County that resulted in the deaths of five occupants of one of the vehicles involved. Appellant Jason Holt was purportedly the driver of the second vehicle. Appellee Lona Horn McCastlain is the prosecuting attorney for the 23rd Judicial District, which includes Lonoke County within its jurisdiction. In the course of her investigation of the accident, Ms. McCastlain issued subpoenas to Jackson Reconstruction, Inc. (Jackson), a company hired by Mr. Holt's defense team that performed an accident reconstruction and prepared a report communicating the results of that reconstruction to Mr. Holt's attorneys. Both Mr. Holt and Jackson moved to quash the subpoenas, and the Lonoke County Circuit Court denied the motions. Mr. Holt and Jackson appeal, asserting that the circuit court erred in denying the motions to quash. We hold that the information subpoenaed by Ms. McCastlain is protected by attorney-client privilege pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Evidence 502, and we reverse the circuit court.
The facts were stipulated at the hearing on the motions to quash the subpoenas. After the accident, Mr. Holt's insurance carrier, State Farm Insurance, hired Sarah Presson of the Huckabay, Munson, Rowlett and Moore law firm (Huckabay) to represent Mr. Holt in civil actions that might potentially arise from the accident. In furtherance of that representation, Ms. Presson and other Huckabay attorneys have had privileged conversations with Mr. Holt. Ms. Presson retained Jackson to assist in the preparation of Mr. Holt's defense by performing a reconstruction of the accident. Ms. Presson provided information to Jackson in order that Jackson could provide assistance, and that information included disclosures made to Ms. Presson and other members of the Huckabay firm by Mr. Holt. All disclosures made by Mr. Holt to his attorneys, and by his attorneys to Jackson, were made with the understanding that Jackson would not disclose its reconstruction report or anything contributing to the report without the express permission of Mr. Holt or one of the attorneys. Mr. Holt directed Ms. Presson to assert all applicable privileges and rights, and Ms. Presson, in turn, directed Jackson to do the same.
In the course of her investigation, Ms. McCastlain issued a subpoena duces tecum to Jackson, demanding a complete copy of the accident reconstruction report. In response to the subpoena, Ms. Presson instructed Jackson to assert attorney-client and attorney work-product privileges on behalf of Mr. Holt and the Huckabay firm. Mr. Holt and Jackson filed a petition for a protective order and a motion to quash the subpoena, asserting privilege and improper service. The subpoena was quashed on the ground of improper service and the circuit court did not address the issue of privilege.
Ms. McCastlain then served another subpoena duces tecum on Jackson. At Mr. Holt's direction, Jackson again asserted both attorney-client and attorney work-product privileges, as well as "all other constitutional protections." At that point Mr. Holt filed the instant lawsuit in the Lonoke County Circuit Court against Ms. McCastlain and Jackson, seeking to intervene to protect his rights and quash the subpoena issued to Jackson. Jackson answered, agreeing that Holt should be allowed to intervene to protect his rights, and Ms. McCastlain moved to dismiss Mr. Holt's complaint. Jackson then also filed a motion to quash the subpoena, again asserting Mr. Holt's privileges, and Jackson also asserted that Ms. McCastlain's actions were an unconstitutional taking of its work product without compensation. Ms. McCastlain responded by issuing a subpoena to Terry Reynolds, the Jackson employee who was involved in performing the reconstruction for Mr. Holt and his attorneys. Mr. Holt and Jackson also moved to quash this subpoena on the same grounds. On March 22, 2004, the circuit court held a hearing on the issues surrounding the prosecutor subpoenas. Mr. Holt's motion to intervene and to quash the second Jackson subpoena had been filed under a separate case number than the first motion to quash that was granted for improper service, so the circuit court first consolidated both cases under one number. After hearing evidence, the circuit court held that the prosecutor's subpoena is an investigatory tool and, as such, is not in itself a civil or criminal cause of action. The circuit court made the following conclusions of law:
The Court holds that the issuance of the subpoena by Ms. McCastlain is not in itself a cause of action but rather merely an investigation. The Court further holds that the prosecutor's subpoena is neither exclusively criminal nor exclusively civil and is not governed either by the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court further holds that invocations of privileges and constitutional rights by Mr. Holt and Jackson do not prohibit or defeat the prosecuting attorney's right to obtain evidence by use of the § 16-43-212 subpoena power. The Court holds that those claims may be made at a later date if either criminal charges or a civil lawsuit are filed against Mr. Holt.
The circuit court then ordered compliance with the subpoenas, denied all relief requested by Mr. Holt and Jackson, and stated that a refusal to provide the report or answer Ms. McCastlain's oral inquiries would subject Jackson and its representative to contempt sanctions. Id.
Mr. Holt appeals, asserting that the report and Terry Reynolds's testimony are protected from subpoena by the attorney-client privilege and the work-product privilege, and that disclosure of the report and testimony would interfere with his federal and state constitutional rights of assistance of counsel and due process, as well as his constitutional protections against self-incrimination and unreasonable searches and seizures. Mr. Holt also argues that the circuit court erred in its determination that privileges and constitutional rights cannot thwart a prosecutor's subpoena.1 Jackson appeals the circuit court's decision, citing two points of error: (1) the circuit erred because the report and testimony are protected by privilege and Mr. Holt's constitutional rights; and (2) the prosecuting attorney does not have the authority to seize valuable property, but even if the authority exists, the prosecutor may not seize that property without compensation for the value of the property.
This appeal presents questions of law pertaining to the interpretation of Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-43-212, in light of Ark. R. Evid. 502, Ark. R. Civ. P. 26, and Ark. R.Crim. P. 18.2, as well as the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and their counterparts in the Arkansas Constitution. Therefore, jurisdiction is proper in this court under Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 1-2(b)(3) and (6) (2004). Questions of law are reviewed de novo by this court. Buckley v. State, 349 Ark. 53, 76 S.W.3d 825 (2002). The trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Ark. R. Civ. P. 52 (2003); Crooked Creek, III, Inc. v. City of Greenwood, 352 Ark. 465, 101 S.W.3d 829 (2003).
Prosecutor McCastlain issued subpoenas pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 16-43-212, which states in part,
(a) The prosecuting attorneys and their deputies may issue subpoenas in all criminal matters they are investigating and may administer oaths for the purpose of taking the testimony of witnesses subpoenaed before them. Such oath when administered by the prosecuting attorney or his deputy shall have the same effect as if administered by the foreman of the grand jury.
Ark.Code Ann. § 16-43-212(a) (Repl.1999).
Mr. Holt and Jackson claim that the report and the testimony of Terry Reynolds, who prepared the report, are privileged under Ark. R. Evid. 502, which states in pertinent part:
(a)(1) A "client" is a person ... who is rendered professional legal services by a lawyer, or who consults with a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal services from him.
* * * *
(3) A "lawyer" is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to be authorized, to engage in the practice of law in any state or nation.
(4) A "representative of the lawyer" is one employed by the lawyer to assist the lawyer in the rendition of professional legal services.
(5) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is made in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication.
(b) General Rule of Privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client (1) between himself ... and his lawyer or his lawyer's representative, (2) between his lawyer and the lawyer's representative....2
(c) Who May Claim the Privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the client.... The person who was the lawyer or the lawyer's representative at the time the communication is presumed to have authority to claim the privilege but only on behalf of the client.
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Vaughn v. State
...304, 239 S.W.3d 467, 474 (2006). Questions involving the interpretation of law will be reviewed de novo. See Holt v. McCastlain , 357 Ark. 455, 460–61, 182 S.W.3d 112, 116 (2004).II.Vaughn alleges two overarching errors in the circuit court's determination that K.H.'s therapy records were p......
-
Craven v. Fulton Sanitation Service, Inc.
...of law, which this court reviews de novo. See Brown v. Pine Bluff Nursing Home, 359 Ark. 471, 199 S.W.3d 45 (2004); Holt v. McCastlain, 357 Ark. 455, 182 S.W.3d 112 (2004). Suffice it to say that Appellant was involved in an automobile accident on March 10, 1999, wherein the vehicle he was ......
-
Schipp v. General Motors Corp.
...attorneys and clients, and that, in turn, promotes the observance of law and administration of justice." Holt v. McCastlain, 357 Ark. 455, 464, 182 S.W.3d 112, 118 (2004). It should be noted that other states have cited the same purpose in recognizing a statement between an insured and an i......
-
Vidos v. State
...attached to a confidential communication under Rule 502 is held by the client, and that privilege may be waived. Holt v. McCastlain, 357 Ark. 455, 182 S.W.3d 112 (2004). Inherent in the idea of waiver of privilege is the understanding that the client is allowing disclosure of something that......
-
MASTERING ESSENTIAL ASPECTS OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, WORK PRODUCT IMMUNITY, AND LAWYERS' ETHICAL DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
...Ct. 2004). [4] Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 68 (Am. Law Inst. 2000). [5] Id. [6] Id. § 70. [7] Holt v. McCastlain, 182 S.W.3d 112, 117 (Ark. 2004); Fiduciary Tr. Int'l of Cal. v. Klein, 216 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61, 67 (Ct. App. 2017); Ctr. Partners, Ltd. v. Growth Head GP, LL......