Holtzclaw v. State
| Decision Date | 19 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | A23A0348 |
| Parties | HOLTZCLAW v. THE STATE |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Following a jury trial, Benjamin Holtzclaw was convicted of aggravated assault on a peace officer; fleeing or attempting to elude law enforcement; aggressive driving; speeding; and operating a vehicle without proof of insurance or a tag. He now appeals from the denial of his amended motion for new trial, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney's failure to file a general demurrer challenging the aggravated assault and fleeing counts. Finding no error we affirm.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979), the evidence at trial showed that, one evening in November 2018, police attempted to stop the car Holtzclaw was driving for speeding. Instead of stopping, however, Holtzclaw fled, instigating a high speed chase. Members of the Dawson County Sheriff's Office pursued Holtzclaw and called Georgia State Patrol (GSP) and the Hall County Sheriff's Office for assistance. When the GSP troopers joined the pursuit, they were in uniform and driving marked patrol cars with their lights and sirens activated. Throughout the chase, Holtzclaw swerved in and out of his lane and traveled in excess of 90 miles per hour through neighborhoods as he attempted to escape.
With one trooper directly behind him, Holtzclaw began braking aggressively, causing the trooper's vehicle to collide with his rear bumper. As the trooper pulled next to the driver's side of Holtzclaw's car, Holtzclaw braked aggressively again, violently steered his car to the left, and rammed the trooper's car, forcing him to veer off the road. A second trooper then struck Holtzclaw's car, spinning it before it ultimately came to a stop.
Holtzclaw was indicted for aggravated assault on a peace officer for striking the first trooper's vehicle; fleeing or attempting to elude police; aggressive driving; speeding; no proof of insurance; and no tag. At trial, the responding officers recounted the events of the chase as described above. Each of the GSP vehicles recorded the chase on dash cameras, and these recordings were admitted into evidence and played for the jury. The videos showed Holtzclaw brake aggressively several times and ram his car into the first trooper's car. Holtzclaw did not testify, and during closing argument, trial counsel advised the jury that the only issue in dispute was the aggravated assault charge. The jury convicted Holtzclaw on all counts.[1]
Thereafter, Holtzclaw filed a series of motions for new trial, arguing, as is relevant to this appeal, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to file a general demurrer challenging the aggravated assault and fleeing counts. Following a hearing, at which trial counsel testified, the trial court denied the motion. Holtzclaw now appeals, raising these same issues.
"To succeed on a claim that counsel was constitutionally ineffective, [Holtzclaw] must show both that his attorney's performance was deficient, and that he was prejudiced as a result." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Green v. State, 302 Ga. 816, 817 (2) (809 S.E.2d 738) (2018); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674) (1984). Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel involve mixed questions of law and fact, and we will affirm a trial court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous. Green, 302 Ga. at 818 (2). We conclude that Holtzclaw cannot meet his burden to show that counsel's performance was deficient.
Before we turn to the specific charges, we first set out the relevant law regarding general demurrers. "The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that criminal defendants shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them." (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Smith v. Hardrick, 266 Ga. 54 (1) (464 S.E.2d 198) (1995). When the indictment fails to meet this standard, it is subject to a general demurrer.
A general demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the substance of the indictment, and asks whether it is capable of supporting a conviction. An indictment is void to the extent it fails to allege all of the essential elements of the charged crime. To that end, an indictment is subject to a general demurrer if the accused could admit each and every fact alleged in the indictment and still be innocent of any crime. If, on the other hand, the admission of the facts alleged in the indictment leads to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty of the charged crime, the indictment is sufficient.
(Punctuation omitted.) Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423, 442-443 (5) (b) (883 S.E.2d 317) (2023), citing Budhani v. State, 306 Ga. 315, 319 (1) (a) (830 S.E.2d 195) (2019). In other words, Jackson v. State, 301 Ga. 137, 141 (1) (800 S.E.2d 356) (2017); see also Smith, 266 Ga. at 54 (1) (). With these standards in mind, we consider whether the aggravated assault and fleeing or attempting to elude charges were subject to a general demurrer.
Holtzclaw contends that the indictment was subject to a general demurrer because it alleged that the assault occurred by hitting the trooper's vehicle, but aggravated assault is a crime against a person, not property. He argues that the State's failure to allege that the trooper was in the vehicle at the time means he could admit the conduct and still be innocent of the charges; thus the indictment is fatally defective and counsel should have filed a demurrer. We are not persuaded that counsel's performance was deficient in this regard.
Under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), "[a] person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he . . . assaults [w]ith any . . . instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury[.]" The penalties increase when the victim is a peace officer. OCGA § 16-5-21 (c) (1) (B). Additionally, "[a] person commits the offense of simple assault when he . . . [c]ommits an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury." OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2) (2017).
Here, the indictment charged that Holtzclaw "did knowingly assault a peace officer . . . while said peace officer was engaged in the performance of his official duties, said assault being with a motor vehicle, an instrument, which when used offensively against a person is likely to result in serious bodily injury, by hitting said officer's vehicle, in violation of OCGA § 16-5-21[.]"
The indictment was sufficient to withstand a general demurrer. First, the language in the indictment tracked the statutory language, and Holtzclaw concedes that the indictment pled the essential elements of the offense. See Stapleton v. State, 362 Ga.App. 740, 742-743 (1) (a) (869 S.E.2d 83) (2021) (); see also State v. Wyatt, 295 Ga. 257, 260 (2) (759 S.E.2d 500) (2014) ("[A]n indictment couched in the language of the statute alleged to have been violated is not subject to a general demurrer.") (citation and punctuation omitted). Instead, Holtzclaw rests his argument on the failure to allege that the trooper was in the vehicle at the time of the assault. That argument is more appropriately considered as a special demurrer.
In contrast to a general demurrer, a special demurrer merely objects to the form of an indictment and seeks more information or greater specificity about the offense charged.... [A]n allegation that an indictment was deficient because it did not contain all the essential elements of the crime is, in essence, a special demurrer seeking greater specificity.
(Citation omitted.) State v. Wilson, 318 Ga.App. 88, 92 (1) (a) (732 S.E.2d 330) (2012); see also Everhart v. State, 337 Ga.App. 348, 354 (3) (a) (786 S.E.2d 866) (2016). But Holtzclaw has not argued that counsel should have filed a special demurrer and thus has waived that argument. State v. Owens, 312 Ga. 212, 221 (4) (b) (862 S.E.2d 125) (2021) ().
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