Home Builders of Greater St. Louis v. State

Decision Date28 May 2002
Docket NumberNo. SC 83863.,SC 83863.
Citation75 S.W.3d 267
PartiesHOME BUILDERS ASSOCIATION OF GREATER ST. LOUIS, Respondent, v. STATE of Missouri, et al., Appellants.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Curtis F. Thompson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for Appellants.

James B. Deutsch, Marc H. Ellinger, Jefferson City, for Respondent.

LAURA DENVIR STITH, Judge.

In 2000, the Missouri General Assembly adopted "An Act To repeal [51 specified sections] ... relating to property ownership, and to enact in lieu thereof seventy new sections relating to the same subject, with penalty provisions...." ("SB 894"). Home Builders Association of Greater St. Louis, Inc. ("Home Builders") sought to have SB 894 declared unconstitutional as violating article III, sections 21 and 23 of the Missouri Constitution, which require that the original purpose of a bill not be changed, that the bill have a single subject and that the subject be clearly expressed in its title. The trial court granted summary judgment to Home Builders on all three constitutional grounds. The State appeals. Finding that SB 894 violates the "clear title" requirement of article III, section 23, this Court affirms without reaching the other arguments raised.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

As originally introduced SB 894 consisted of fifteen pages amending chapter 141, RSMo, which concerns "Delinquent Taxes—First Class Counties and St. Louis City." It was entitled, "An Act to repeal sections 141.220, 141.540, 141.570, 141.700, 141.710, 141.720, 141.730, 141.740, 141.750, 141.760, 141.765, 141.770, 141.800, RSMo 1994, relating to property ownership, and to enact in lieu thereof thirteen new sections relating to the same subject" (emphasis added). Its provisions amended sections of chapter 141 relating to the land tax collection law concerning sheriff's sales in certain first class counties; establishing a commission for the management, sale, and other disposition of the tax delinquent lands in certain home rule cities; and making other changes to city land trust commissions.

Before it was enacted into law, SB 894 grew from 15 to 90 pages and grew from 13 amendments to a single chapter of Missouri's statutes into 70 amendments to the following 15 chapters of Missouri's statutes:

Chapter 32—State Department of Revenue

Chapter 53—County Assessors

Chapter 64—County Planning-Zoning-Recreation-Natural Streams & Waterways

Chapter 67—Political Subdivisions, Miscellaneous Powers

Chapter 71—Provisions Relative to all Cities and Towns

Chapter 82—Constitutional Charter Cities

Chapter 135—Tax Relief

Chapter 137—Assessment and Levy of Property Taxes

Chapter 139—Payment and Collection of Current Taxes

Chapter 140—Collection of Delinquent Taxes Generally

Chapter 141—Delinquent Taxes—First Class Counties and St. Louis City

Chapter 178—Special Schools and Instruction and Special Districts

Chapter 381—Title Insurance Law

Chapter 393—Gas, Electric, Water, Heating and Sewer Companies

Chapter 620—Department of Economic Development

As a result of the addition of these numerous amendments, the title of the bill was accordingly changed to:

An Act To repeal sections 53.135, 64.342, 67.547, 67.700, 71.285, 82.817, 140.110, 141.220, 141.540, 141.610, 178.870, 381.011, 381.021, 381.041, 381.051, 381.061, 381.081, 381.091, 381.101, 381.111, 381.121, 381.131, 381.141, 381.151, 381.161, 381.171, 381.181, 381.191, 381.201, 381.211, 381.221 and 381.241, RSMo 1994, sections 32.105, 32.110, 64.725, 67.582, 135.403, 135.484, 135.766, 137.073, 139.053, 140.160, 381.031, 381.231, 381.410, 381.412, 393.705, 393.715 and 620.1039, RSMo Supp.1999, section 141.550 as enacted by house bills nos. 977 and 1608 of the second regular session of the eighty-ninth general assembly, section 141.550 as enacted by senate bill no. 778 of the second regular session of the eighty-ninth general assembly, relating to property ownership, and to enact in lieu thereof seventy new sections relating to the same subject, with penalty provisions, and an effective date for certain sections.

(emphasis added).

Home Builders then filed this declaratory judgment action.

I. "CLEAR TITLE" ANALYSIS

Article III, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution requires that "No bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title ..." (emphasis added). As this Court has noted when addressing procedural challenges to legislative enactments such as this:

An act of the legislature carries a strong presumption of constitutionality. Hammerschmidt v. Boone County, 877 S.W.2d 98, 102 (Mo. banc.1994). This Court resolves all doubts in favor of the procedural and substantive validity of legislative acts. Id. Attacks against legislative action founded on constitutionally imposed procedural limitations are not favored. Id. An act of the legislature must clearly and undoubtedly violate a constitutional procedural limitation before this Court will hold it unconstitutional. Id.

Carmack v. Dir., Missouri Dept. of Agriculture, 945 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Mo. banc 1997).

On the other hand, this Court must invalidate legislation if, after resolving all doubts in favor of the enactment, the bill clearly violates the requirement of article III, section 23 that a bill's subject be clearly expressed in its title. This follows from the purpose of the "clear title" requirement, which is "to prevent fraudulent, misleading, and improper legislation, by providing that the title should indicate in a general way the kind of legislation that [is] being enacted." Fust v. Attorney General for the State of Mo., 947 S.W.2d 424, 429 (Mo. banc 1997). Requiring bill titles to be clear is thus a way of keeping "individual members of the legislature and the public fairly apprised of the subject matter of pending laws." St. Louis Health Care Network v. State, 968 S.W.2d 145, 147 (Mo. banc 1998).

Titles to legislative enactments may violate article III's "clear title" requirement in two ways. Most often, a title is attacked on the basis that it is so restrictive and underinclusive that some of the provisions of the bill fall outside its scope. Missouri State Medical Ass'n. v. Missouri Dept. of Health, 39 S.W.3d 837, 841 (Mo. banc 2001); National Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Director of the Dep't. of Natural Resources, 964 S.W.2d 818, 820-21 (Mo. banc 1998); Fust, 947 S.W.2d at 428. But, conversely, a title may be unclear because the subject it expresses is so broad and amorphous in scope that it fails to give notice of its content, which "effectively renders the single subject requirement meaningless or obscures the actual subject of the legislation." Drury v. City of Cape Girardeau, 66 S.W.3d 733, 739 (Mo. banc 2002), citing, St. Louis Health Care Network, 968 S.W.2d at 147. Compare, C.C. Dillon Co. v. City of Eureka, 12 S.W.3d 322, 329 (Mo. banc 2000); Missouri State Medical Ass'n, 39 S.W.3d at 841; Corvera Abatement Techs., Inc. v. Air Conservation Comm'n., 973 S.W.2d 851, 861-862 (Mo. banc 1998) (validating titles that are broad but still adequate to give notice).

Home Builders argues that the title to SB 894 violates the latter aspect of the "clear title" provision in that the title "relating to property ownership," as used in SB 894, is fatally vague and amorphous because it can relate to every kind of property that has or could be owned by any kind of entity. In fact, it argues, the term "property ownership" as used here is so broad that it could refer to almost any act the legislature passes.

In support, Home Builders notes that titles that are so broad and amorphous as to violate the "clear title" provision of Missouri's Constitution will also often violate the "single subject" provision of article III, section 23 as well. It analogizes the open-ended nature of the title "relating to property ownership" to the title "relating to certain incorporated and non-incorporated entities" that this Court invalidated in St. Louis Health Care Network. In that case, the Court held the title "relating to certain incorporated and non-incorporated entities" was "a textbook example of a broad and amorphous title" because it could describe any legislation affecting in any way businesses, charities, civic organizations, governments and government agencies. In other words, "most, if not all, legislation passed by the General Assembly." 968 S.W.2d at 148.

Although not a "clear title" case, this Court applied a similar analysis in Carmack, holding that the title "relating to economic development" violated the "single subject" provision because the bill's contents did not in fact relate merely to programs of the department of economic development or to some other single subject, but swept "within its meaning any direct or indirect benefit that flows to the state's economy." 945 S.W.2d at 960.1

While not deciding this case based on the challenge to the single subject requirement of article III, section 23, this Court agrees with Home Builders that the title "relating to property ownership," as used in SB 894, raises concerns similar to those raised in St. Louis Health Care Network and discussed in Carmack and so fails the "clear title" requirement because the phrase "relating to property ownership" could describe most, if not all, legislation passed by the General Assembly. This title fails to give notice of the actual content or subject of the bill.

Because the purpose of the "clear title" provision is to apprise legislators and the public of the subject matter of pending laws, St. Louis Health Care Network, 968 S.W.2d at 147, this Court must interpret the phrase "relating to property ownership" according to its common and ordinary meaning. Id. Accord, Corvera Abatement Techs., Inc., 973 S.W.2d at 861. "Property" is commonly defined to include: "something that is or may be owned or possessed;" "a piece of real estate;" "a valuable right or interest primarily a source or element of wealth;" "something to which a person...

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4 cases
  • Calzone v. Interim Comm'r of Dep't of Elementary & Secondary Educ.
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • October 1, 2019
    ...at 148-49 (applying a single subject analysis to determine a violation of the clear title requirement); Home Builders Ass'n of Greater St. Louis v. State , 75 S.W.3d 267, 270 n.1 (Mo. banc 2002) (analogizing single subject cases with a clear title challenge and recognizing this Court’s disc......
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    • Missouri Supreme Court
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    ...147. Typically, challenges assert the title fails to encompass all provisions and, thus, is underinclusive. Home Builders Ass'n of Greater St. Louis v. State , 75 S.W.3d 267, 270 (Mo. banc 2002). In this analysis, words are accorded their common and ordinary meaning. Id. at 271. "The test f......
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