Hoober v. State

• Decision Date: 03 February 1887
• Citation: 81 Ala. 51,1 So. 574
• Parties: HOOBER v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

1 So. 574

81 Ala. 51

HOOBER v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 3, 1887

Appeal from circuit court, Lowndes county.

Indictment for arson.

The appellant, Elizabeth Hoober, being on trial under an indictment for arson, alleged to have been committed in setting fire in the night-time to the dwelling- of one Mattie A. Reid, the said Mattie A. Reid, who was the prosecutrix and a witness for the state, was asked by the solicitor if on the morning after the fire, the appellant made any confessions to her. Before answering the question directly the witness said that early on the morning after the fire she went into the cook-room, where appellant was kindling a fire preparatory to breakfast, and said to appellant, "Get a knife, and go with me to the smoke-house to get some meat for breakfast;" that, when they reached the smoke-house door, appellant went in to get the meat, and the witness remaining outside, after the appellant entered, closed the door, and locked it, and remarked to appellant: "Now, I reckon you will tell me something about burning the house; I believe you know all about it." The appellant, by her counsel, then objected to the witness answering the question, on the ground that, under these circumstances, the confession of appellant was not voluntary. The court overruled the objection, and allowed the question to be asked, and the appellant excepted. Thereupon the witness, in answer to the question, testified that appellant replied: "I burned it, but Aunt Ann Clark told me to do it, and I would not have done it if she had not told me to do it." The appellant's counsel then moved to exclude said answer from the jury, on the ground that said confession was not voluntary. The court refused this motion, and appellant excepted.

One Robertson, a witness for the state, testified that on the morning after the burning, about 9 or 10 o'clock, he went to the smokehouse door, unlocked it, and asked the appellant if she set fire to the house, and that appellant replied that she did, and further said: "Aunt Ann told me to get the things ready, and, if she [Ann] didn't come back, to set the house on fire." Appellant moved to exclude from the jury what the witness testified appellant had said, because the same was not voluntary. The court overruled the motion, and appellant excepted.

The evidence showed that the appellant was a colored girl of 17 or 18 years of age, well grown, and that she was the servant of the witness Mattie A. Reid, and of weak mental capacity, and humble, docile disposition; and there was evidence tending to show that said Mattie A. Reid had on several occasions whipped appellant. The corpus delicti was established, and there was other evidence, besides the alleged confession, tending to connect the appellant with the offense. The rulings of the court below allowing the evidence of the alleged confession to go to the jury are here assigned as error.

T. N. McClellan, Atty. Gen., for the State.

SOMERVILLE J.

The confessions made by the defendant to the prosecutrix were, in our opinion, improperly admitted in evidence. Under the facts appearing in the record, they must be considered as having been obtained through the duress of imprisonment, which operated to extort the confessions from the defendant, and to thus render them involuntary. It is true that it is no objection to the admission of confessions that they are made while a prisoner is under lawful arrest, being in the custody of an officer of the law, in the absence of any promises, inducements, or threats. And it is not entirely settled that confessions made by one in a state of illegal imprisonment, without more, are to be deemed involuntary upon the ground that the necessary inference is that they were produced by the duress of such imprisonment. On this point the authorities are divided. 1 Greenl. Ev. (14th Ed.) § 230; Balbo v. People, 19 Hun, 424; Rex v. Thornton, 1 Moody, Cr. Cas. 27. All the authorities agree, however, that confessions, and even admissions, extorted by duress, cannot be put in evidence against a defendant. 2 Best, Ev. § 551; 1 Whart. Crim. Ev. (8th Ed.) § 661; Tilley v. Damon, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 247; Foss v. Hildreth, 10 Allen, 76; 1 Bish. Crim. Proc. (3d Ed.) § 1237.

The defendant in this case is shown to have been a colored girl, 17 or 18 years of age, in the service of the prosecutrix, who was her mistress. She is shown, moreover, to have been locked up in an outhouse by the prosecutrix, the latter at the time making this declaration: "Now, I reckon you will tell me something about burning the house; I believe you know all about it." The effect of this declaration was naturally to create a hope in the mind of the defendant that she might be released from confinement by making a confession, and a corresponding fear that, unless such confession was made, her imprisonment would be continued; in other words, that such confessions might "bring temporal good, or avert temporal evil." As said by Mr. Bishop: "It does not matter whether the expected benefit is some specific thing promised, or an undefined clemency pictured to the hope without favor and without promise, or any other appreciable advantages of a temporal nature." 1 Bish. Crim. Proc. (3d Ed.) § 1223. That this was the tendency of the circumstances surrounding the prisoner we can have no doubt, due regard being had to her age, and her relation towards the prosecutrix, as servant and mistress, which was one of dominion and authority. Young v. State, 68 Ala. 569; Redd v. State, 69 Ala. 255; Sampson v. State, 54 Ala. 241; 2 Best, Ev. § 551.

The first confessions made being regarded as under duress, those subsequently made to the witness Robertson were presumptively inadmissible also, there being nothing to rebut the prevailing probability that the same influence which operated to extort the first confessions operated also to produce the second.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded. In the mean while the prisoner will be kept in proper custody until discharged by due course of law.

NOTE.

CONFESSIONS-WHEN ADMISSIBLE. A confession, to be admissible in evidence, must have been voluntarily made, Hopt v. Territory, 4 S.Ct. Rep. 202, and 9 P. 407, 5 P. 565; Com. v. Preece, (Mass.) 5 N.E. Rep. 494; Heldt v. State, (Neb.) 30 N.W. 626; People v. Barker, (Mich.) 27 N.W. 539; Yates v. State, (Ark.) 1 S.W. Rep. 65; not induced by threats, People v. McCallam, (N. Y.) 9 N.E. Rep. 502; People v. Druse, (N. Y.) 8 N.E. Rep. 733; People v. Mondon, Id. 496; Com. v. Preece, supra; State v. Sopher, (Iowa,) 30 N.W. 917; Heldt v. State, (Neb.) Id. 626; People v. Barker, (Mich.) 27 N.W. 539; Yates v. State, (Ark.) 1 S.W. Rep. 65; by promise of immunity from prosecution, People v. McCallam, (N. Y.) 9 N.E. Rep. 502; People v. Druse, (N. Y.) 8 N.E. Rep. 733; People v. Mondon, Id. 496; or other promise or hope connected with the subject of the charge, held out by a person having authority in the matter, Com. v. Preece, supra; State v. Sopher, (Iowa,) 30 N.W. 917; Heldt v. State, (Neb.) Id. 626; People v. Barker, (Mich.) 27 N.W. 539; People v. Wolcott, (Mich.) 17 N.W. 78.

Mere advice to tell the truth, where there is neither threat nor inducement, is not sufficient to exclude it, People v. McCallam, (N. Y.) 9 N.E. Rep. 502; Com. v. Preece, (Mass.) 5 N.E. Rep. 494; Heldt v. State, (Neb.) 30 N.W. 626; Rice v. State, (Tex.) 3 S.W. -; and evidence of threats made after the confession is clearly inadmissible, Kollenberger v. People, (Colo.) 11 P. 101.

The remark of the officer that the accused "might as well own up, as they had enough to convict her,...