Hood Rubber Co. v. Comm'r of Corp.

• Decision Date: 12 September 1929
• Citation: 167 N.E. 670,268 Mass. 355
• Parties: HOOD RUBBER CO. v. COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS AND TAXATION.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

268 Mass. 355

167 N.E. 670

HOOD RUBBER CO.

v.COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS AND TAXATION.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Sept. 12, 1929.

Exceptions to Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County; Sanderson, Judge.

Petition for a writ of mandamus by the Hood Rubber Company, to be directed to Henry F. Long, as Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, to require respondent to certify that tax due was less than that paid by petitioner. Petition dismissed, and petitioner excepts. Exceptions overruled.H. C. Haskell, of Watertown, and C. C. Gammons, of Boston, for petitioner.

R. A. Cutter, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

RUGG, C. J.

The petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to certify to the state treasurer, in accordance with G. L. c. 63, § 36, that the excise tax due from it, measured in part by its net income for 1922, is less than the amount paid by it for that year, to the end that repayment of the difference may be made to it.

The controversy arises out of conflicting contentions as to the meaning of G. L. c. 63, § 36, whereby is regulated the adjustment of the corporation excise tax with reference to the net income on which the federal government bases its tax on the same corporation. Said section 36 is in these words: ‘If the assessment made by the federal government is based upon a net income greater or less than the net income returned by said corporation, or if an additional assessment is at any time made on the ground that the net income was incorrectly returned in the first instance, or if, after the tax as assessed is paid to the federal government, any part of such tax is refunded, the corporation, within ten days after the receipt of such notice of said fact, shall make return on oath to the commissioner of the amount by which the net income originally returned differs from the net income on which the tax was computed by the federal government upon the latest determination by it of the proper tax, and of the facts giving rise to the difference. If upon such facts an additional tax is due the commonwealth, the commissioner shall assess the additional tax, and the corporation shall, within thirty days after receipt of notice from the commissioner of the amount thereof, pay such additional tax. If upon said facts a less tax is due the commonwealth than that paid by the corporation, the state treasurer shall, upon certification of the commissioner, repay within thirty days such difference without any further statutory appropriation therefor.’

The facts of the case at bar are such that the decision hinges upon the question whether the words ‘net income returned’ in the first clause of that section mean the ‘net income returned’ by the petitioner in its return made to the federal government, or the ‘net income returned’ by the petitioner in its return to the authorities of this commonwealth. The meaning is not perfectly clear. Therefore resort may be had to permissible sources for resolving the ambiguity. The clause in which the quoted words are found is followed immediately by an alternative clause wherein occur the words ‘net income * * * returned.’ Confessedly in that clause the words refer to the return made to the federal government and cannot refer to the return made to the authorities of this commonwealth. When words are used in one place in a statute with a plain meaning, commonly they are employed in other parts of the same statute with the same meaning, unless countervailing reasons require a different interpretation. Resort may be had to this principle to clear away a doubt as to the meaning to be attributed to a particular word or phrase. Bay State Street Railway v. Woburn, 232 Mass. 201, 203, 122 N. E. 268;Marcus v. Board of Street Commissioners, 252 Mass. 331, 334, 335, 147 N. E. 866, and cases there collected. See Ridgeway v. Munkittrick, 1 Dr. & War. 84, 93; Watson v. Haggitt, [1928] A. C. 127. The application of this principle shows that the words ‘net income returned’ at their earliest occurrence in section 36 mean the net income returned to the federal government and not that returned to the state government. By the same reasoning the words ‘net income originally returned’ occurring later in the same sentence also refer to the return made to the federal and not to the state authorities.

[3] Said section 36 first is found in our corporation excise law in St. 1919, c. 355, § 5, in substantially the same words. Said chapter 355 was based in part upon the report of the joint special committee on taxation of 1919, being Senate Document No. 313. The subject-matter of said section 36 and of said section 5 was dealt with in Appendix C of section 3 of that report. In the draft there submitted for the consideration of the General Court the phraseology is unmistakable to the effect the ‘net income * * * returned’ is that returned to the federal government and not to the state government. This report is significant as indicating the motion of that committee as to the return intended. All of that committee, with a single...