Hoogasian v. Regional Transp. Authority

• Citation: 317 N.E.2d 534,58 Ill.2d 117
• Decision Date: 27 September 1974
• Docket Number: No. 46794,46794
• Parties: Jack HOOGASIAN et al., Appellees, v. REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY et al., Appellants.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 534

317 N.E.2d 534

58 Ill.2d 117

Jack HOOGASIAN et al., Appellees, v. REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY et al., Appellants.

No. 46794.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 27, 1974.

Appeal Dismissed Nov. 11, 1974. See 95 S.Ct. 298.

Richard Curry, Corp. Counsel, and Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago (William R. Quinlan, Daniel Pascale, and Robert Retke, Asst. Corp. Counsel, and Don H. Reuben, Lawrence Gunnels, Leo K. Wykell, James C. Munson, and Keith C. McDole, Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.

Jack Hoogasian, State's Atty., Waukegan, for appellees.

UNDERWOOD, Chief Justice.

The Regional Transportation Authority Act (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973 Supp. (Feb. 1974), ch. 111 2/3, par. 701.01 et seq.) providing for a regional transportation authority to furnish public transportation services, facilities and funding in the six northeastern counties of Cook, Du Page, Kane, Lake, McHenry and Will became effective December 12, 1973. Pursuant to that act, a special referendum election was held in the six affected counties on March 19, 1974, at which a majority of electors properly marking ballots on the proposition voted in favor of creation of the Authority. On May 3 plaintiffs filed this suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Regional Transit Authority (RTA) and other defendants on the grounds that the Act and the referendum election were invalid. The Lake County circuit court on June 17 denied the RTA's motion to dismiss and entered a preliminary injunction order restraining defendants from exercising any powers or duties under the Act upon a finding that the referendum ballot was improper. We allowed a direct appeal from those orders pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 302(b) Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 110A, § 302(b) in view of the public importance of the matters presented. That appeal was consolidated with RTA's direct appeal from a subsequent order of the trial court granting a permanent injunction in the same cause. We heard oral argument in late June and announced our judgment shortly thereafter for reasons to be stated in a subsequent opinion. This is that opinion.

Before turning to the specific issues presented for our consideration, we deem it appropriate to briefly review the content and scope of the Regional Transportation Authority Act. The purpose of the Act as stated in section 1.02(b) is 'to provide for, aid and assist public transportation in the northeastern area of the State without impairing the overall quality of existing public transportation by providing for the creation of a single authority responsive to the people and elected officials of the area and with the power and competence to provide and facilitate public transportation which is attractive and economical to users, comprehensive, coordinated among its various elements, economical, safe, efficient and coordinated with area and State plans.' (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973 Supp., ch. 111 2/3, par. 701.02.) The Act is a comprehensive one, setting forth in detail the RTA's powers and limitations thereof in such matters as purchase, acquisition and maintenance of facilities; the nature of services to be provided; the level and nature of fares to be charged; coordination and interrelationship of transportation services and programs with State and Federal agencies, other transit authorities and various other governing bodies and units of government; employee welfare and labor relations procedures; finances and the like. In the matter of finances, the RTA is empowered, Inter alia, to apply for, receive and expend grants, loans and other funds from the State and Federal governments (par. 704.02); to raise revenue for the operation of the authority by the imposition of a tax on persons engaged in the sale of motor fuel, and compensating use tax and a motor vehicle parking tax under certain conditions (par. 704.03); and to issue and sell specified types of negotiable bonds and notes (par. 704.04).

Plaintiffs' initial contention concerns the form of the proposition presented to the voters at the referendum election. Section 1.04 of the Act provides in pertinent part that 'A regional transportation authority shall be established upon a favorable vote at the referendum held as provided in Section 1.05 of this Act.' (Par. 701.04.) Section 1.05 provides that:

'A special referendum election shall be held at which there shall be submitted to the electors in the metropolitan region the proposition to approve creation of the Authority, which proposition shall be in substantially the following form:

Shall a Regional Transportation Authority be created for Cook, DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry and Will Counties, Illinois?'

The same section goes on to prescribe various details regarding certification of the form of ballot by the State Board of Elections, publication fo notice of the referendum election and of the proposition to be voted upon, the counting of ballots and the certification of the election results by the State Board of Elections. The section concludes with the following paragraph:

'The State Board of Elections shall proclaim and certify the results of the referendum election. If a majority of those electors properly marking ballots on the proposition vote in favor of the creation of the Authority, such Authority shall thereby be established.'

It is uncontroverted that the proposition appearing on the ballot in the March 19, 1974, referendum election was in the precise language specified by section 1.05 of the Act. Nevertheless, plaintiffs contend that the proposition presented was so vague, indefinite, uncertain, unclear, uniformative and broad as to deprive them of property without due process of law in contravention of the State and Federal constitutions. In this regard, plaintiffs argue that the proposition did not provide the voter with any information as to what he was actually voting for or against, since it did not refer to a specific act to be adopted or rejected or to a particular tax or bond issue for acceptance or rejection. An additional argument is made that the proposition was misleading in that it suggested to the voter that he was being asked to either grant or deny authority to enact legislation creating the RTA whereas in fact the legislature had already enacted legislation on the subject.

In response to these contentions, defendants rely on previous decisions of this court in which we have recognized that when the legislature passes a law with a referendum clause in it and such law prescribes the method by which it is to be submitted to a referendum, that method must be followed. (E.g., People ex rel. Sandberg v. Grabs (1940), 373 Ill. 423, 26 N.E.2d 494; People ex rel. Hudson v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Ry. Co. (1935), 360 Ill. 180, 195 N.E. 631; People ex rel. Brady v. LaSalle Street Trust and Savings Bank (1915), 269 Ill. 518, 110 N.E.2d 38.) A provision in such a law which specifies the particular form of ballot to be used in a referendum election will normally take precedence over any other statute which would otherwise be applicable but for the special provision. (People ex rel. Duguay v. New York Central R.R. Co. (1952), 411 Ill. 584, 104 N.E.2d 765; Sanders v. Township of Salem (1944), 385 Ill. 362, 52 N.E.2d 708; Knappenberger v. Hughes (1941), 377 Ill. 126, 35 N.E.2d 317.) Defendants also correctly point out that in the absence of any constitutional or statutory mandate to the contrary, it is not necessary that a ballot set forth the details of the proposition to be voted upon or otherwise serve the function of educating voters on its merits. (People ex rel. Royal v. Cain (1951), 410 Ill. 39, 101 N.E.2d 74; Martin v. Hart (1921), 296 Ill. 149.129 N.E. 693; People ex rel. Schnackenberg v. Czarnecki (1912), 256 Ill. 320, 100 N.E. 283.) Under those circumstances, a ballot is sufficient if it presents the proposition in such a manner that the voter has a clear opportunity to express his choice either for or against it. (People ex rel. Black v. Sullivan (1910), 247 Ill. 176, 93 N.E. 97; People ex rel. Royal v. Cain; Knappenberger v. Hughes.) As this court stated in Martin v. Hart (1921),296 Ill. 149, at 155, 129 N.E. 693, at 695: 'While the ballot must not contradict the petition (setting forth the details of the proposition to be voted upon) nor permit a vote upon a different question, there is no objection to the generality of a ballot, if it directs the attention of the voter to the proposition upon which he is to vote.' Indeed, given the complexity of much modern legislative action designed to provide community facilities the operation of which is dependent upon an affirmative vote in the involved geographical area, it is impossible to devise a summary explanation suitable for ballot use which provides the voter with sufficient facts to make an intelligent choice unless he has familiarized himself with the details of the proposition before coming to the polls.

The foregoing authorities do not, however, provide a complete answer to plaintiffs' contentions. The gist of their argument is that the proposition was so completely uninformative and meaningless that the voter had no idea what he was being asked to vote for or against when confronted with the referendum ballot in the polling place. It is argued in addition that publication of the proposition in advance of the election did nothing to help matters, since the proposition itself in no manner directed the voter either to the Act establishing the Authority or to any other source to which he might look to educate himself on the merits of the proposition prior to the date of the election. In this regard we note that while the Act does provide that the proposition itself be published in advance of the election, it does not prescribe that any additional information be published, and no contention is made that any public notice was in fact given that the proposed regional transportation authority was to be created under the Act which became...