Hook v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 18 April 2006
• Docket Number: No. 03-4207.,03-4207.
• Citation: 444 F.3d 830
• Parties: Robert VAN HOOK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Carl S. ANDERSON, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

444 F.3d 830

Robert VAN HOOK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Carl S. ANDERSON, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 03-4207.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: December 6, 2005.

Decided and Filed: April 18, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

ARGUED:

James D. Owen, Columbus, Ohio, Keith A. Yeazel, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Stephen E. Maher, Attorney General's Office of Ohio, Capital Crimes Section, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.

ON BRIEF:

James D. Owen, Columbus, Ohio, Keith A. Yeazel, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Stephen E. Maher, Attorney General's Office of Ohio, Capital Crimes Section, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.

Before: MERRITT, MARTIN, and MOORE, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

MERRITT, Circuit Judge.

This is a habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after petitioner, Robert Van Hook, was convicted by a three-judge panel of capital murder and aggravated robbery. We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand on the ground that Van Hook's constitutional rights were infringed when Cincinnati police started an interrogation anew with Van Hook after he had requested legal counsel in clear violation of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). The police bungled an otherwise strong case. As a result of this violation, Van Hook's subsequent incriminating statements and confession should have been suppressed.

We will briefly recount the facts of the brutal murder that led to Van Hook's arrest. Petitioner Robert Van Hook went to a Cincinnati bar largely patronized by male homosexuals in February 1985. While there, he drank and talked with David Self. The two left together and Self told the bartender that they were planning to go to Self's apartment. Once at the apartment, and after Self approached Van Hook in a sexual manner, Van Hook strangled Self into unconsciousness. Van Hook then took a knife from the kitchen, diabolically stabbed Self so that Self's internal organs were visible and then placed several items in the victim's body. He stole several items from Self's apartment and smeared his bloody fingerprints in an attempt to destroy any evidence. He then went to a friend's house, but eventually left town for Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, where he was arrested two months later. While in custody at the Florida jail, Van Hook made a full and graphic confession, which included an admission to the killing of David Self as well as to the robbery. See State v. Van Hook, 39 Ohio St.3d 256, 530 N.E.2d 883 (1988). The events at the Florida jail that led to the confession will be discussed in detail below.

Van Hook has never denied killing Self, but he maintains he did so in a rage precipitated by the sexual advances of Self and as the result of a severe borderline personality disorder that caused him to lack the requisite intent to make him guilty of aggravated murder or eligible for the death penalty. Temporary insanity was the basis for Van Hook's defense at trial. The state maintains that Van Hook left the bar with the intention of robbing Self. The three-judge panel that tried Van Hook rejected his defense and convicted him. He was later sentenced to death. After direct and post-conviction review by the Ohio courts and denial of the writ by the district court, Van Hook appealed to our Court, raising multiple issues, only one of which will be discussed herein.

I.

Our decision to reverse the district court and issue the writ is based on the failure to suppress Van Hook's incriminating statements after police improperly reinitiated contact with him after he had requested counsel. The district court rendered its initial decision on this issue in response to Van Hook's motion for partial summary judgment. Van Hook v. Anderson, No. C-1-94-269 (S.D.Ohio Mar.28, 2002). It reaffirmed this decision without substantial further discussion in its final order dated August 7, 2003, from which Van Hook appeals.¹

It is well-settled that once having expressed a desire to law enforcement officials to consult an attorney, an accused is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); Abela v. Martin, 380 F.3d 915, 925 (6th Cir.2004) (noting that Edwards establishes a bright-line rule to cease interrogation once an accused's Miranda right to counsel is invoked). In Edwards, the Supreme Court established a bright-line rule that once a suspect is in custody and invokes the right to counsel, law enforcement may not further interrogate him until counsel has been made available, or unless the suspect initiates further conversations or exchanges with the police. The Supreme Court has broadly defined interrogation as any exchange between police and a suspect in custody reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 n. 7, 302, n. 8, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). Supreme Court cases decided subsequent to Edwards confirm the paramount importance of a defendant's right not to be questioned without counsel after invocation of rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). See Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (purpose of the rule formulated in Edwards is to prevent police "badgering or overreaching — explicit or subtle, deliberate or unintentional"); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988) (holding that police may not question a defendant about any unrelated crimes after invocation of the right to counsel, even if such crimes are the subject of a separate investigation); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 152, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990) (holding that after invocation of the right to counsel, police may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991) (noting that the Edwards rule is designed to "prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights"). Therefore, under Edwards, initiation of conversation is permissible only when, "without influence by the authorities, the suspect shows a willingness and a desire to talk generally about his case." United States v. Whaley, 13 F.3d 963, 967 (6th Cir.1994) (emphasis added). The determination of whether an Edwards initiation has occurred is a legal issue. Id. at 968. The state bears the burden of proving that a defendant "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to silence and counsel." Abela, 380 F.3d at 928; United States v. Bentley, 726 F.2d 1124, 1126 (6th Cir.1984).

The Edwards rule finds its genesis in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), where the Supreme Court held that the police must advise a suspect of his right to counsel and, "[i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." Id. at 474, 86 S.Ct. 1602. In Edwards, a Fifth Amendment case, the Court explained that "it is inconsistent with Miranda and its progeny for authorities, at their instance, to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to counsel." Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880. In Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986), the Court extended the Edwards rule to the Sixth Amendment context.

If the police subsequently initiate an encounter in the absence of counsel, and there has been no break in custody, the suspect's statements are presumed involuntary and therefore inadmissible as substantive evidence at trial, even where the suspect executes a waiver and his statements would be considered voluntary under traditional standards. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. at 177, 111 S.Ct. 2204. Police officers may not continue to question a suspect despite his request for counsel "in the hope that [he] might be induced to say something casting retrospective doubt on his initial statement that he wished to speak through an attorney or not at all." Smith, 469 U.S. at 99, 105 S.Ct. 490 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This prohibition applies to all officers, not just those present when the suspect invoked his right to counsel. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 687-88, 108 S.Ct. 2093 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

Based on this line of authority, Van Hook filed a motion to suppress all statements he had made to law enforcement subsequent to his arrest, including the taped confession he made to the Cincinnati police in the Florida jail. At the suppression hearing, it was established that Van Hook was given his Miranda rights by a Florida detective after he was arrested and in custody at the Florida jail. It was established at the hearing that Van Hook asked for an attorney, whereupon the Florida police ceased asking him questions because they believed he "didn't want to say anything without an attorney." Upon their arrival at the Florida jail later that day, the two Cincinnati detectives knew that Van Hook had invoked his right to counsel and that the Florida detectives had therefore ceased questioning him. Transcript of Suppression Hearing at 15-16, Ohio v. Van Hook, No. B-851389/C-850565 (Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton County, June 17, 1985).

The conversation between the Cincinnati detectives and Van Hook began by discussing extradition procedures and informing Van Hook that they intended to return to Cincinnati with him the next day — proper topics of discussion with a defendant who has requested, but not yet consulted, counsel. However, the conversation did not end there. Detective Davis of the Cincinnati homicide squad testified at the suppression hearing:

[W]e advised [Van Hook] we had a lot to talk to him about. I...