Hooks v. State
| Decision Date | 02 July 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 41102,41102 |
| Citation | 253 Ga. 141,317 S.E.2d 531 |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
| Parties | HOOKS v. The STATE. |
Kenneth D. Feldman, Atlanta, for George Edwin Hooks.
Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Atlanta, Richard E. Hicks, Asst. Dist. Atty. Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., J. Michael Davis, for the State.
George Edwin Hooks appeals from his conviction of the 1982 malice murder of Cynthia M. Driggers, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment. 1
There was evidence adduced at trial which authorized a rational trier of fact to find as follows. The appellant and the victim had spent most of the day of the murder drinking. The two had been involved in some kind of argument over the victim's children, which had placed the appellant in a depressed state. The appellant had previously threatened both friends and his ex-wife in similar situations by pointing a rifle at them, and specifically by placing a rifle in the face of his ex-wife. Within a few minutes before the shooting, the appellant told the victim's mother that he had a loaded gun and was going straight to Hell. The victim here was shot by a high-powered rifle while the rifle was in contact directly with her chin. The appellant was the only one present other than the victim, and had blood on his clothing. The appellant contends that the shooting was an accident, that the victim had grabbed the rifle from his hands, and that the gun had gone off while it was in her hands. However, evidence was introduced that, while the surface of a rifle is a good surface from which to obtain fingerprints, no such fingerprints were found on the rifle. The appellant testified that he had loaded the rifle in his bedroom, but he could not account for the fact that a cartridge was found in the dining room, where the victim was shot. Nor could the appellant explain how the rifle which killed the victim wound up leaning against the side of the wall at the scene of the crime. Neither could the appellant remember or explain how the rifle came to be under the victim's chin or what caused it to fire when in that position.
The evidence authorized the verdict and judgment under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
"We begin with the general rule that in the trial of a crime, evidence of other criminal acts by the defendant is inadmissible as it tends to place the defendant's character into evidence. See [OCGA § 24-2-2]. See also Bacon v. State, 209 Ga. 261 (71 S.E.2d 615) (1952). However, exceptions to the rule have developed over the years so that now there are times that evidence of other crimes committed by the defendant can be admitted for limited purposes.
" State v. Johnson, 246 Ga. 654, 655, 272 S.E.2d 321 (1980). Similar crimes may also show common design, modus operandi, etc., Lyles v. State, 215 Ga. 229, 109 S.E.2d 785 (1959), and malice and motive. Lenear v. State, 239 Ga. 617, 619(3, 4), 238 S.E.2d 407 (1977).
Witness Sehler testified to two prior occasions (one of which being two months and the other only two weeks prior to the present crime) on which the appellant, in an intoxicated state, had come to the witness' residence and threatened the witness and others by pointing a loaded, cocked shotgun at them. This evidence was admissible to show a common course of conduct and state of mind of the appellant in a time frame substantially close to the date on which the murder occurred, i.e., being drunk and in an argumentative state, and threatening persons with a gun.
For the same reason, it was proper to admit the testimony of Ms. Haney, the appellant's ex-wife, to the effect that the appellant had, on three occasions, had an argument with her while intoxicated, during which the appellant had pointed a loaded gun at her. On one occasion he had pointed the gun at her face from a distance of a few inches, and on another occasion, the gun had discharged.
Furthermore, at the conclusion of the testimony of both of these witnesses, the trial judge specifically instructed the jury that the evidence they had given was only "admitted into evidence for the limited purpose of aiding in identification, illustrating the state of mind, plan, motive, intent, and scheme of the accused, if in fact it does to you."
OCGA § 24-9-64 provides that all parties to a criminal proceeding are entitled to a thorough, sifting cross-examination as to the witnesses called against him. "The scope of cross-examination rests largely within the discretion of the trial judge, and his discretion will not be controlled by the reviewing court unless abused." Dampier v. State, 245 Ga. 427, 435(12), 265 S.E.2d...
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...against him.... If a defendant testifies, he may be cross-examined by the prosecution like any other witness.” Hooks v. State, 253 Ga. 141, 143(3), 317 S.E.2d 531 (1984). In this case, the trial court had already determined that evidence of the similar transaction was admissible for a prope......
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...beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder (Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Hooks v. State, 253 Ga. 141(1), 317 S.E.2d 531 (1984)), there was no error in denying the motion for new trial, and since the same standard is applicable to the denial of a m......
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...as to its veracity. "If a defendant testifies, he may be cross-examined by the prosecution like any other witness." Hooks v. State, 253 Ga. 141, 143, 317 S.E.2d 531 (1984). (c) That impeachment may proceed in the following (1) If the defendant in fact had robbed someone or stolen from home ......