Padmanabhan v. City of Cambridge
| Decision Date | 22 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 20-P-47,20-P-47 |
| Parties | Bharanidharan PADMANABHAN v. CITY OF CAMBRIDGE & others. |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
Bharanidharan Padmanabhan, pro se.
Rebecca A. Cobbs for the city of Cambridge & others.
Mark P. Sutliff, Assistant Attorney General, for Judyann Bigby & others.
Present: Green, C.J., Shin, & Hand, JJ.
Following the death of one of his patients, the plaintiff, Dr. Bharanidharan Padmanabhan, was summarily suspended by his employer, defendant Cambridge Health Alliance (CHA). When further investigation led to the termination of his employment, Padmanabhan filed a sprawling fifty-six-page complaint asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants. After removal of the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts and remand to the Superior Court, a Superior Court judge dismissed Padmanabhan's amended complaint on statute of limitations grounds.2 Padmanabhan appeals from the judgment of dismissal.3
We conclude that, though many of Padmanabhan's claims were properly dismissed, three claims, based on separate injuries flowing from acts within the limitations period, survive.4 We accordingly vacate a portion of the judgment.5
Background. We summarize the facts alleged in the amended complaint which, for purposes of our review of the defendants’ motions to dismiss, we accept as true, construing all reasonable inferences from those facts in Padmanabhan's favor. See Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636, 888 N.E.2d 879 (2008).
Beginning in 2007, Padmanabhan worked as a neurologist at Whidden Memorial Hospital (Whidden), which is operated by CHA.6 While there, from approximately 2008 through 2010, Padmanabhan voiced concerns regarding the radiology department, chief among them that radiologists appeared not to be reading some scans and instead issuing generic reports.
On November 4, 2010, the chief of medicine informed Padmanabhan of the death of one of his recently discharged patients. As the death appeared to have been caused by an overdose, the chief of medicine asked for details about Padmanabhan's treatment of his other chronic pain patients.
On November 9, 2010, CHA's medical executive committee summarily suspended Padmanabhan's medical privileges and recommended permanent termination of those privileges, on the stated ground of "[p]rescribing to a known addict." Padmanabhan was informed of this decision two days later, when he received a hand-delivered letter advising him of his summary suspension and the medical executive committee's recommendation that he be terminated. He was then escorted out of the hospital.7 As required by law, see G. L. c. 111, § 53B, CHA filed a report with the board of registration in medicine (board) advising it of the decision. On December 15, two board employees began an investigation of Padmanabhan.
Padmanabhan, meanwhile, retained counsel and challenged his suspension at a CHA fair hearing. The hearing resulted in a February 2011 report issued by the fair hearing committee that was, at least in part, favorable to Padmanabhan.8 CHA nevertheless determined in March 2011 that Padmanabhan's suspension should remain in place pending further investigation.
To that end, CHA formed an investigative committee and retained an external organization, The Greeley Company, to provide an independent report. The resulting report was delivered in July of 2011. Shortly thereafter, the investigative committee released its own report, which was substantially similar to the fair hearing findings.
Frustrated by CHA's lack of conclusive action, in August of 2011, Padmanabhan unsuccessfully sought in the Superior Court an injunction ordering CHA to issue a final determination as to his privileges.
On September 6, 2011, Padmanabhan filed a complaint against CHA with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD).9
On October 28, 2011, CHA filed a second report with the board, as well as with the National Practitioners Data Bank (NPDB).10 This report was notably different from the original November 9, 2010 report: the allegation of "[p]rescribing to a known addict" was absent and, furthermore, the report incorrectly stated that Padmanabhan had "voluntarily resigned" his position.
On November 11, 2011, Padmanabhan received what claimed to be another termination letter from CHA, stating that notwithstanding his 2010 suspension of privileges and pay, his last day of employment had been October 28, 2011.
Throughout the following years, the board investigation continued. On January 29, 2013, Padmanabhan was the subject of a hearing before the board's complaint committee, which commissioned its own independent expert report on the matter. Ultimately, on May 28, 2014, the complaint committee issued a "Statement of Allegations" and commenced formal disciplinary proceedings against Padmanabhan. By complaint filed in the Superior Court on October 17, 2014, Padmanabhan commenced the present action.11
Discussion. 1. Statute of limitations. The parties do not dispute that a three-year statute of limitations applies to all of Padmanabhan's various claims.12 As Padmanabhan's initial complaint was filed on October 17, 2014, his claims must have accrued on or after October 17, 2011, to be viable.
Even reading all inferences in Padmanabhan's favor, much of the alleged harmful conduct occurred prior to the limitations period. This includes the crucial series of events leading up to and culminating in the suspension of his privileges on November 9, 2010. Nevertheless, Padmanabhan argues that any such pre-October 17, 2011 conduct is fair game because it was part of a "continuing violation" that lasted into the limitations period.
The Supreme Judicial Court has developed the continuing violation doctrine in recognition of the reality "that some claims of discrimination involve a series of related events that have to be viewed in their totality in order to assess adequately their discriminatory nature and impact."13 Cuddyer v. Stop & Shop Supermkt. Co., 434 Mass. 521, 531, 750 N.E.2d 928 (2001). Because that totality may include events outside the limitations period, the doctrine allows a plaintiff to recover for untimely harmful conduct by proving that "(1) at least one discriminatory act occurred within the [applicable] limitations period; (2) the alleged timely discriminatory acts have a substantial relationship to the alleged untimely discriminatory acts ... [and] (3) earlier violations outside the [applicable] limitations period did not trigger ... [the plaintiff's] ‘awareness and duty’ to assert ... [the plaintiff's] rights." Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 441 Mass. 632, 643, 808 N.E.2d 257 (2004).
Even assuming Padmanabhan can prove the first two elements, the third is fatal to any assertion of a continuing violation. On September 6, 2011, Padmanabhan filed a complaint with the MCAD, the substance of which largely tracks his allegations in the case at bar. There can be no question that the earlier alleged violations triggered an awareness and duty for Padmanabhan to assert his rights; he did precisely that by filing his complaint with the MCAD. As the motion judge correctly ruled, any conduct predating September 6, 2011, cannot constitute a continuing violation, and Padmanabhan's claims based on that conduct remain barred by the statute of limitations.14
Padmanabhan's failure to prove a continuing violation, however, does not bar him from recovering for harms that occurred within the three-year limitations period. The amended complaint, when read in the light most favorable to Padmanabhan, alleges wrongful conduct that occurred after October 17, 2011, most notably that CHA provided a false report to the board and the NPDB on October 28, 2011.15 To the extent that Padmanabhan's claims are grounded in such conduct, they are not barred by the statute of limitations, and it was error to dismiss them on that ground.
2. Alternative grounds for dismissal. Having determined that at least some of Padmanabhan's claims were timely, we turn to the alternative grounds for dismissal advanced by the defendants. In doing so we observe that we may affirm the dismissal based on "any ground apparent on the record that supports the result reached in the lower court." Gabbidon v. King, 414 Mass. 685, 686, 610 N.E.2d 321 (1993). After careful consideration, we conclude that dismissal was proper as to (1) the board members and board staff defendants and claims related only to them, because they are entitled to quasi judicial absolute immunity for their acts taken in connection with the disciplinary proceedings against Padmanabhan; (2) certain other defendants, because the amended complaint contains insufficient allegations to support claims against them; (3) Padmanabhan's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and (4) Padmanabhan's request for a declaration that the Attorney General should not be allowed to represent certain defendants, because the dismissal of his claims against all such defendants renders the request moot. We discuss each in turn.
a. Quasi judicial immunity. "It is a principle lying at the foundation of our jurisprudence, too well settled to require discussion, that every judge, whether of a higher or lower court, is exempt from liability to an action for any judgment or decision rendered in the exercise of jurisdiction vested in him by law." Allard v. Estes, 292 Mass. 187, 189-190, 197 N.E. 884 (1935). Because a judge "should act upon his own free, [unbiased] convictions, uninfluenced by any apprehension of consequences," this judicial absolute immunity "is essential to impartial decision-making and to engendering public trust in the judiciary."
Matter of the Enforcement of a Subpoena, 463 Mass. 162, 171, 972 N.E.2d 1022 (2012), quoting ...
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