Hope v. Cavallo

• Decision Date: 20 September 1972
• Citation: 316 A.2d 407,163 Conn. 576
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Kevin HOPE et al. v. Frank CAVALLO et al.

Page 407

316 A.2d 407

163 Conn. 576

Kevin HOPE et al. v. Frank CAVALLO et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Sept. 20, 1972.

David M. Reilly, Jr., New Haven, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Philip R. Shiff, New Haven, with whom was Alan H. W. Shiff, New Haven, for appellees (defendants).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and COTTER, SHAPIRO, LOISELLE and maCDONALD, JJ.

COTTER, Associate Justice.

This is an action in two counts, to recover damages for personal injuries and property damage alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiffs as the result of a collision involving a motor vehicle owned and operated by the plaintiff Bernard M. Hope which had stopped for a red light and was struck in the rear by a two-and-one-half-ton cargo truck operated by the defendant Frank Cavallo. At the time of the accident Cavallo was acting in the scope of and in the course of his employment with the Connecticut Air National Guard. The plaintiffs brought suit in the first count against the state of Connecticut and against Frank Cavallo individually in the second count of the complaint.

The defendant Cavallo filed a special defense to the second count of the complaint, alleging that at the time of the collision he was operating a vehicle in the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment by the Connecticut Air National Guard, so that he was immune from liability as provided by § 4-165 of the General Statutes. ¹ The plaintiffs demurred to the defendant Cavallo's special defense, claiming, inter alia, that § 4-165 violated article 1, § 1 of the Connecticut Constitution because it grants a special privilege to a set of men to act negligently without liability. The court overruled the demurrer.

The defendant state of Connecticut demurred to the plaintiffs' original complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to state a case of action against it because they did not allege that the vehicle operated by the defendant Cavallo was owned and insured by the state as required by § 52-556 of the General Statutes. ² The plaintiffs thereafter amended their complaint and alleged that the vehicle operated by Cavallo was owned by the state of Connecticut. The state denied ownership of the vehicle and moved for summary judgment, claiming that at the time of the alleged collision the truck in question was owned by the United States of America and merely on loan to the state. ³ The court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, stating that a question of law existed as to the ownership of the truck. The defendants then moved, pursuant to Practice Book § 306, that the court make a finding that the vehicle in question was not owned by the state as required by General Statutes § 52-556. The plaintiffs in response thereto thereupon filed an amendment to their complaint. They made the first count of the complaint, concerning the state of Connecticut, more specific by adding, inter alia, the allegations that the vehicle driven by Frank Cavallo was owned by the state of Connecticut, in that the state at the time of the accident, through the Connecticut Air National Guard, had the exclusive control and possession of it under the provisions of Air National Guard Regulation No. 67-1; that the state had a special ownership in the vehicle as bailee at the time of the collision; and that the state had specifically insured the vehicle under the definition in its insurance policy defining the term 'owned automobile.' The trial court found that as a matter of law the state did not own the vehicle and that there could be no liability on the part of the state under § 52-556.

Motions for judgment in favor of the defendant Frank Cavallo and the defendant state of Connecticut were granted. The plaintiffs appealed from the judgment rendered in favor of the defendants and argue that the state owned the vehicle in question as required by § 52-556 of the General Statutes, and that § 4-165 of the General Statutes is unconstitutional.

The plaintiffs assigned error, inter alia, in the failure of the trial court to conclude that § 52-556 permitted an action against the state of Connecticut.

Whether § 52-556 is to be applied in this case turns on the construction given to the word 'owned' as used in the statute. Primarily we are concerned only with the word 'owned' as used in § 52-556. That word, used as an adjective, is defined as 'held as one's own possession.' Webster, Third New International Dictionary. Although we are concerned only with the word 'owned' as found in the statute, we note that the courts, in numerous instances, have had occasion to construe the word 'owner' as related to motor vehicles. The word 'owner' is found in numerous statutes and has no commonly approved usage or fixed meaning, 'but must be interpreted in its context and according to the circumstances in which it is used.' Warren v. Borawski, 130 Conn. 676, 679, 37 A.2d 364, 365; Brown v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 92 Conn. 252, 254, 102 A. 573; 62 Am.Jur.2d, Property, § 32.

In the Brown case, supra, which held that one may be the 'owner' of a motor vehicle within the meaning of a statute although another has the strict legal title, the court stated: 'The words of a statute are to be interpreted in their natural and usual meaning unless the context indicates that a different meaning was intended. By our statute words and phrases are to be construed according to the commonly plain usage of language.' It is significant that at the time Brown was decided the same language contained in General Statutes § 1-1 was also part of our statutory law. Rev. 1902, § 1.

It is agreed that the truck in question was the 'property' of the United States and that it was 'issued' by the United States to the National Guard; that the truck was under the jurisdiction of the Connecticut Air National Guard State Military Department. The term 'owner' is one of general application and includes one having an interest other than the full legal and beneficial title. Coyle v. Swanson, 345 Mass. 126, 128, 185 N.E.2d 741. The word owner is one of flexible meaning, and it varies from an absolute proprietary interest to a mere possessory right. Animal Rescue League of Boston v. Assessors of Bourne, 310 Mass. 330, 333, 37 N.E.2d 1019. It is not a technical term and, thus, is not confined to a person who has the absolute right in a chattel, but also applies to a person who has possession and control thereof. State v. Mitchell, 150 Me. 396, 397, 113 A.2d 618; Brown v. New Haven Taxicab Co., supra; Camp v. Rogers, 44 Conn. 291, 298; see Loewenberg v. Wallace, 147 Conn. 689, 694, 166 A.2d 150. The term is broad enough to cover a tenant for years, a tenant for life, and a remainderman. 63 Am.Jur.2d, Property, § 32.

This court has held that one may be the 'owner' of a motor vehicle within the meaning of a statute although another has strict legal title; and that the word 'owner' in the motor vehicle law in effect at the time, which provided that no suit could be had for injuries to a car unless the owner registered it, referred to any person having an interest in the property even under a special title. Brown v. New Haven Taxicab Co., supra, 92 Conn. 254, 102 A. 573. In other cases we have held that '(t)he word owner . . . includes both the legal and equitable owner, and any one having an interest in the automobile under a special title.' Kaufman v. Hegeman Transfer & Lighterage Terminal, Inc., 100 Conn. 114, 120, 123 A. 16, 18; Marciel v. Berman, 104 Conn. 165, 168, 169, 132 A. 397. A bailee may have a general and a bailor a special ownership in the subject of the bailment. Brown v. New Haven Taxicab Co., supra; 2 Hale, Bailments, p. 56. In Camp v. Rogers, 44 Conn. 291, 298, we held that the term 'owner' as used in the statute meant the person in control of the vehicle at the time and not necessarily the actual owner; and this court stated that 'any person hiring a carriage is, for the time for which he takes it, in a certain sense its owner. He has a special property in it.' In that case a man who had hired a carriage collided with another vehicle, through his own negligence, and injured the plaintiff's son. The statute in effect at the time required, in the situation that existed, the payment of treble damages to the injured party by the owner of a negligently driven vehicle. The court held that the statute intended by the word 'owner' not the literal and technical owner, but the person in possession and control of the vehicle; and that the owner of a vehicle means the person in control of the vehicle either mediately or immediately and not necessarily the actual owner. The court added that this meaning was the more probable in a statute providing a remedy against one who 'shall drive against another vehicle and injure its owner.' It is clear that the word 'owner' is not restricted to one who has the legal or rightful title whether the possessor or not. This is especially so where the word is applied to motor vehicles. Brown v. New Haven Taxicab Co., supra; Camp v. Rogers, supra; see also Burakowski v. Grustas, 134 Conn. 205, 56 A.2d 461. The United States Court of Appeals for the eighth circuit, in citing Camp v. Rogers, supra, stated that when the word owner is applied to motor vehicles its plain and reasonable meaning includes not only absolute estates but also estates that are less than absolute. Powell v. Home Indemnity Co., 343 F.2d 856, 859, 860 (8th Cir.).

The state of Connecticut had exclusive possession and control of the vehicle at the time of the accident; it was issued to the state by the United States government and there is nothing to indicate that the United States intended to retain possession or control of the property. This court has refused to grant immunity from the requirements of a local building code to an owner of an equity of redemption where the United States government held the purchase money mortgage, and thus the technical legal title; and the government would...