Hopkins v. Duo-Fast Corp.
Decision Date | 28 January 1993 |
Docket Number | DUO-FAST,No. 18372,18372 |
Citation | 123 Idaho 205,846 P.2d 207 |
Parties | Steven L. HOPKINS and Cheryl Hopkins, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.CORPORATION, an Illinois corporation; Duo-Fast Corporation, Northwest Sales and Service Division, an Illinois corporation in good standing in the State of Idaho, Defendants-Respondents. Boise, September 1992 Term |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Howard & Owens, Coeur d'Alene, for plaintiffs-appellants. Kenneth B. Howard, Jr., argued.
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, Boise, for defendants-respondents. Donald J. Farley, argued.
ON REHEARING
Before and after his injury, plaintiff Steven Hopkins worked for Northwest Building Systems ("Northwest"), a manufacturer of modular homes. While at work reviewing a sheet of building specifications, Hopkins was struck in the left eye by a three inch nail and was permanently injured. At the time of this incident, a co-worker was nearby, operating a pneumatic nail gun, which was manufactured by Duo-Fast. 1 Duo-Fast provided Northwest with nail guns and in exchange Northwest purchased all of its nails and other fasteners from Duo-Fast.
Plaintiffs brought a product liability action against Duo-Fast, alleging defects in the nails and nail guns manufactured by Duo-Fast. The plaintiffs' theory at trial was that the nail gun which injured Steven Hopkins should have been provided with a safety device known as a "drop-off," that drop-offs were not provided by Duo-Fast as standard equipment on all of its nail guns, and that some of the nails manufactured by Duo-Fast for the nail guns were of a dimension that would allow them to escape from the guns in tandem. Without the drop-off attachment, when one nail was fired another nail might also be fired from the nail gun on a different trajectory. The gun used by the co-worker did not have a drop-off attachment.
During the trial, the defendants' expert, Bookwalter, modified what had been his earlier testimony in deposition, as the result of determining during the course of direct examination of plaintiffs' witness that he had been provided erroneous information as to the size of the nail head used in the nail gun in question. Bookwalter had been provided the nail head dimension by the defendants based upon information the defendants had provided in the course of discovery to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs objected to this revised testimony; after inquiry, the court permitted the testimony.
An additional defense expert witness, Dr. Blotter, had had his deposition taken approximately two weeks prior to the commencement of the trial by the plaintiffs, had described the testing and analysis performed by him at that deposition, and rendered an opinion. Subsequent to this deposition, and prior to his testimony, Dr. Blotter performed additional tests and analysis which changed his testimony to the effect that the nail gun did not generate the velocity required for the accident to have occurred as described by the plaintiffs.
Defense counsel informed plaintiffs' counsel of this contemplated change in testimony the morning that Dr. Blotter was to testify. Plaintiffs' counsel timely objected to the testimony which after inquiry was permitted over plaintiffs' objection.
After both parties presented lay and expert testimony, a jury returned a verdict for Duo-Fast. The jury determined that Duo-Fast did not manufacture an unreasonably dangerous or defective product, and that no warranties had been breached by Duo-Fast.
The issues framed by the plaintiff on appeal with which we must deal are as follows:
1. Did the trial court err in permitting testimony of defendants' experts where:
(a) the defendants' expert deposition testimony was based on information concerning product condition provided by the defendant to the defendants' expert and where the defendant divulged, for the first time at trial, that the information upon which its expert relied and testified at deposition was in error;
(b) the opinions expressed by the defendants' expert witness at the time of his deposition were changed prior to trial, but no notice was given of the changed testimony to the plaintiffs until the day of testimony at trial of the defendants' expert witness (c) additional tests and analyses were performed after the deposition of the defendants' experts and the results of said tests and analyses were not provided to counsel for plaintiffs until the day of the experts' testimony at trial?
2. Did the trial court err in giving the jury a limiting instruction with regard to the introduction of defendants' safety bulletin, plaintiffs' Exhibit 18?
The testimony of Jeffrey Bookwalter, to which appellants object, was a result of Mr. Bookwalter learning during the course of plaintiffs' examination of its witness that Bookwalter had used a different dimension nail head than Hopkins' witness Mr. Novak. Bookwalter used the dimension supplied by Novak (plaintiffs' witness) rather than that he had used earlier.
After the timely objection of plaintiffs' counsel to the testimony of Bookwalter, the court made inquiry and determined that Mr. Bookwalter had relied upon engineering drawings of the nails, which were supplied by the defendants to the plaintiffs during discovery, and which became, during this trial, Exhibit 8. These engineering drawings were drawings of a nail then in use, but were of a dimension different than that which was in use at the time of the accident, March 4, 1986.
During plaintiffs' case-in-chief, they called Mr. Novak to establish the actual size of the head of the nail in use at the time of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It was during this testimony that Mr. Bookwalter learned for the first time that the information upon which he was relying was improper. Mr. Bookwalter then adjusted his analysis to reflect the evidence introduced by plaintiffs in their case-in-chief, as to the actual nail head dimensions.
The issue, as to the testimony of Dr. Blotter was framed based upon deposition testimony taken approximately two weeks prior to the trial date, and the proffered testimony of Dr. Blotter at the trial.
During the deposition of Dr. Blotter, an expert hired by Duo-Fast, plaintiffs' counsel asked Dr. Blotter whether or not he was going to conduct more tests:
Q. Are there any other opinions that you are going to be expressing in this trial in terms of areas of your evaluation that we haven't already discussed that you can think of?
A. Well, that will depend upon Mr. Farley [opposing counsel] and it will depend on the development of the case. I think if something comes up that needs a technical response as an expert, then I would respond to that request.
....
Q. Dr. Blotter, you can understand I am sure also that I am representing a client and I do not want to be ambushed by new information that comes out ten minutes or two days before trial. You understand that, don't you?
A. Yes, but could I also expect that you would welcome with a welcome hand anything that would add to the truthfulness as to what would happen.
Q. If I had an opportunity to test its truthfulness, yes, but I don't want you to be the sole judge of that. I want to know if you anticipate doing any further work on this [in] advance of trial.
Deposition of Dr. Blotter, 87-88 (taken August 31, 1989).
On the morning of the day that Dr. Blotter testified at trial:
[123 Idaho 208] Farley had, that he might want to do something more. And yet until I asked Mr. Farley this morning, I still wasn't told what it was.
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Smith v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc.
...(Ala.1991) 586 So.2d 861, 863-64; Agostinho v. Fairbanks Clinic Partnership (Alaska 1991), 821 P.2d 714, 716; Hopkins v. Duo-Fast Corp. (1993), 123 Idaho 205, 846 P.2d 207, 214; Benson v. Tennessee Valley Electric Cooperative (Tenn.Ct.App.1993), 868 S.W.2d 630, Lastly, plaintiff contends th......
-
Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., Ltd.
...our inquiry is limited to whether the challenged ruling was an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Hopkins v. Duo-Fast Corp. 123 Idaho 205, 210, 846 P.2d 207, 212 (1993). Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless the ruling is a manifest abuse of ......
- Weygint v. J.R. Simplot Co.
-
Edmunds v. Kraner
...noted that "seasonably" was very imprecise and left considerable discretion to the trial judge. Hopkins v. Duo-Fast Corp., 123 Idaho 205, 213, 846 P.2d 207, 215 (1993) (Bakes, C.J., concurring). This Court has not yet announced a more precise definition of "seasonably." However, as Justice ......