Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Chase

• Decision Date: 26 September 2013
• Docket Number: No. 1D12–2132.,1D12–2132.
• Citation: 121 So.3d 1191
• Parties: HORACE MANN INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Allison CHASE, Individually and as Co–Personal Representative of the Estate of Richard Chase, Deceased, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

121 So.3d 1191

HORACE MANN INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant,

v.Allison CHASE, Individually and as Co–Personal Representative of the Estate of Richard Chase, Deceased, Appellee.

No. 1D12–2132.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

First District.

Sept. 26, 2013.

Kathy Maus and Julius F. Parker, III, of Butler Pappas Weihmuller Katz Craig, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Stephen J. Pajcic, III, and Benjamin E. Richard of Pajcic & Pajcic, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellee.

ROBERTS, J.

This appeal arises from a final judgment that determined waivers of uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM) coverage and UM stacked coverage as well as an owned-but-not-insured vehicle exclusion that were agreed to by the original policyholder, Richard Chase (R. Chase), were not binding when the policyholder became Allison Chase (A.Chase). The appellant, Horace Mann Insurance, argues that the waivers and exclusion were binding on R. Chase's estate as well as A. Chase, both individually and as personal representative of R. Chase's estate. We agree in part.

In 2001, R. Chase purchased the insurance policy at issue, which provided bodily injury liability limits of $100,000/$300,000. R. Chase signed a form in which he selected reduced UM coverage limits of $25,000/$50,000. The UM rejection selection stated:

You are electing not to purchase certain valuable coverage which protects you and your family or you are purchasing uninsured motorist limits less than your bodily injury liability limits when you sign this form.

On the same form, he selected non-stacked UM coverage. The form stated:

Under this form if injury occurs in a vehicle owned or leased by you or any family member who resides with you, this policy will apply only to the extent of coverage (if any) which applies to that vehicle in this policy. If an injury occurs while occupying someone else's vehicle, or you are struck as a pedestrian, you are entitled to select the highest limits of Uninsured Motor Vehicle coverage available on any vehicle for which you are a named insured, insured family member, or insured resident of the named insured's household. This policy will not apply if you select the coverage available under any other policy issued to you or the policy of any other family member who resides with you.

His daughter, A. Chase, was listed as a driver, but not a named insured, on the policy. In 2004, A. Chase became the sole-named insured. R. Chase was issued a new policy in which he was the sole-named insured. In 2007, A. Chase added R. Chase as a listed driver on her policy.

In 2008, an underinsured motorist collided with two motorcycles owned and operated by R. Chase and A. Chase. R. Chase died from his injuries. A. Chase sought to recover damages individually as well as for R. Chase's estate. The trial court determined that because A. Chase did not sign any documentation rejecting higher levels of UM coverage or stacked UM coverage, those waivers did not apply to A. Chase individually or to the estate of R. Chase. Further, the trial court found that, because A. Chase did not sign a form selecting limited UM coverage at the time she became the insured, the policy exclusion for owned-but-not-insured vehicles was not enforceable against A. Chase or R. Chase's estate. The appellant appeals both of these findings.

First, the appellant argues the trial court erred when it found A. Chase's policy was a new policy that did not include reduced UM and non-stacked coverage. A trial court's construction of an insurance policy to determine coverage is a matter of law subject to de novo review. Barnier v. Rainey, 890 So.2d 357, 359 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (“The standard of review governing a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment posing a pure question of law is de novo.”).

There are two statutory sections implicated by the appellant's argument. First, section 627.727(1), Florida Statutes (2008), which applies to UM coverage, provides that UM coverage or higher limits of UM coverage need not be included in any policy that “renews, extends, changes, supersedes, or replaces an existing policy with the same bodily injury liability limits” when the named insured has previously rejected the coverage or selected lower limits. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shaw, 967 So.2d 1011, 1015 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (new rejection of UM coverage not required when policy originally issued to husband and wife was subsequently renewed after divorce in only one spouse's name with no change in bodily injury liability limits); see also Atlanta Cas. Co. v. Evans, 668 So.2d 287, 289 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (new rejection of UM coverage not required when policy originally issued to husband and wife was subsequently renewed after divorce in only one spouse's name with no change in bodily injury liability limits).

Second, section 627.727(9), Florida Statutes (2008), which applies to stacking UM coverage, states, “[i]f this form is signed by a named insured, applicant, or lessee, it shall be conclusively presumed that there was an informed, knowing acceptance of such limitations.” This Court has found that, under subsection nine, unlike under subsection one, the waiver must be personally made by the insured who claims the benefits. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Harrington, 86 So.3d 1274, 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), rev. granted,116...