Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Riley

• Decision Date: 12 August 1986
• Docket Number: R-11
• Parties: 35 Ed. Law Rep. 312 HORACE MANN INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent, v. Virgil W. RILEY, Defendant, South HarrisonSchool District, Appellant, and David L. & Janice L. Winn, Defendants. WD 37917.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 820

716 S.W.2d 820

35 Ed. Law Rep. 312

HORACE MANN INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent, v. Virgil W. RILEY, Defendant, South Harrison R-11 School District, Appellant and David L. & Janice L. Winn, Defendants.

WD 37917.

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District.

Aug. 12, 1986.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer

to Supreme Court Denied

Sept. 25, 1986.

R.A. Brown, Jr. of Brown, Douglas & Brown, St. Joseph, for appellant South Harrison R-11 School Dist.

Keith K. Couch of Couch & Pierce, Chartered, Overland Park, Kan., for respondent Horace Mann Ins. Co.

Before LOWENSTEIN, P.J., and MANFORD and GAITAN, JJ.

MANFORD, Judge.

Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss this appeal and challenges appellant's standing to maintain the appeal from summary judgment in favor of respondent. The appeal is dismissed.

The pertinent facts are as follows:

Virgil Riley contracted with the appellant to provide a refereeing crew on September 25, 1981, for a high school football game on appellant's property. A member of Riley's crew, one David Winn, claims that he was injured in that football game as a result of a dangerous condition existing on the football field.

As a result of that injury, two actions have been filed. David Winn and his wife, Janice, have filed suit against appellant and claim that it was negligent in the maintenance of its football field. David Winn also claims that Riley was negligent in permitting the game to be played when he knew the dangerous condition existed on the field.

The second suit is the one involved herein. Riley made demand upon the respondent to provide coverage to him under a homeowner's insurance policy for the action brought by the Winns. The respondent did provide a defense to Riley while reserving its rights on the question of coverage. Respondent then initiated this declaratory judgment action to have the question of coverage resolved. Respondent included as defendants in this suit all parties in the personal injury action initiated by the Winns.

On December 6, 1985, the Honorable Kenneth Lewis sustained respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. On January 10, 1986, appellant filed this Notice of Appeal. Neither Riley nor the Winns appeal from the summary judgment.

On February 5, 1986, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the appeal for the reason that appellant is not an aggrieved party within the meaning of § 512.020, RSMo 1978, and therefore has no standing to maintain an appeal. On February 21, 1986, this court ordered appellant and respondent to brief the issue of whether appellant has standing to maintain this appeal. The parties have complied with said order and this court now takes up the sole issue of appellant's standing, or lack thereof, to maintain this appeal.

The right of appeal shall be as provided by law. Rule 81.01. The statute which governs the right to appeal is § 512.020, RSMo 1978, which states:

Any party to a suit aggrieved by any judgment of any trial court in any civil cause from which an appeal is not prohibited by the constitution, nor clearly limited in special statutory proceedings, may take his appeal to a court having appellate jurisdiction from any final judgment in the case ...

The only issue disputed by the parties as regards standing is whether appellant is aggrieved by the summary judgment denying insurance coverage to Riley.

For the purpose of appeal from a judgment, a party is "aggrieved" when the judgment operates prejudicially and directly on his personal or property rights or interests and such effect is immediate and not merely a possible remote consequence. Harris v. Union Electric Co., 685 S.W.2d 607, 611 (Mo.App.1985), and Hertz Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n., 528 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Mo. banc 1975).

Appellant argues that the summary judgment operates prejudicially and directly upon its pecuniary rights and interests because if appellant and Riley are found to be liable as joint tort-feasors and if the judgment against Riley is uncollectable, then under the rule of joint and several liability appellant may be responsible for an amount which may be...