Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Briggs, 72353
Decision Date | 31 July 1990 |
Docket Number | No. 72353,72353 |
Citation | 793 S.W.2d 862 |
Parties | SHELTER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent, v. Ronald and Patricia BRIGGS, et al., Appellants. |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
James P. Leonard, St. Louis, for appellants.
Duane E. Schreimann, Gerald E. Roark, Jefferson City, for respondent.
This cause was transferred after opinion by the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District that we might decide whether a tort claimant who was made party defendant to the insurer's separately filed declaratory judgment action has standing to appeal from a judgment adverse to the insured when the insured did not pursue an appeal. Determining the cause as on original appeal, Mo. Const. art. V, § 10, we answer this question in the affirmative and retransfer to the court of appeals with instructions.
The cause arises from the collision of two boats on the Lake of the Ozarks on July 4, 1986, resulting in the death of Angela Briggs, a minor, and serious injury to Brandy Briggs, also a minor. One of the boats involved was operated by Thomas Stegeman, who was named defendant to a wrongful death action filed by Ronald and Patricia Briggs, parents of Angela Briggs, and a tort action brought on behalf of Brandy Briggs by her mother, Kathy Briggs. Stegeman, a named insured under two insurance policies issued by respondent Shelter Mutual Insurance Company (Shelter), demanded that Shelter settle claims and defend the resulting lawsuits. Shelter asserting Stegeman's insurance was limited to another boat not involved in the collision, denied coverage and brought this declaratory judgment action to determine the extent of coverage, naming as defendants Stegeman and all boat passengers involved in the collision (including Ronald, Patricia and Brandy Briggs) who were deemed to have potential claims against Stegeman. The trial court, in accordance with a jury finding, ruled the boat in question was not covered by Shelter insurance, and Ronald, Patricia and Brandy Briggs appealed from the judgment, though Stegeman, who was the insurance claimant, did not appeal. 1 Shelter moved to dismiss the appeal, contending that appellants lacked standing and were not aggrieved parties within the meaning of § 512.020, RSMo 1986. The Court of Appeals, Western District granted the motion, declaring a want of standing, but contrary to that determination we find appellants have standing, and we order that the appeal be retransferred to the court of appeals for disposition of the remaining issues.
Central to the resolution of this question is the construction of § 512.020, which provides:
Any party to a suit aggrieved by any judgment of any trial court in any civil cause from which an appeal is not prohibited by the constitution, nor clearly limited in special statutory proceedings, may take his appeal to a court having appellate jurisdiction ... from any final judgment in the case.
(Emphasis added.) A party is "aggrieved" within the meaning of the statute when the judgment operates prejudicially and directly on his personal or property rights or interests and such effect is immediate and not merely a possible remote consequence. Harris v. Union Electric Co., 685 S.W.2d 607, 611 (Mo.App.1985).
In a similar context, the court of appeals had occasion to construe the term "aggrieved" in Horace Mann Insurance Co. v. Riley, 716 S.W.2d 820 (Mo.App.1986). There the insurer brought a declaratory judgment action against Riley, the putative insured, and the local school district, Riley's co-defendant in the underlying action for personal injuries. The trial court ruled in favor of the insurance company, and though Riley and the underlying plaintiff did not appeal, his co-defendant school district filed a notice of appeal. The court of appeals, dismissing the appeal for lack of standing, held the school district was not aggrieved, thus rejecting its argument that if the school district and Riley were found to be joint tortfeasors and the judgment against Riley was uncollectable, the school district might be held responsible for an amount disproportionate to its liability. Id. at 822. The court found this possibility too remote for the school district to be denominated an aggrieved party. Id.
We find Horace Mann distinguishable principally because the co-defendant seeking to appeal had not yet filed a claim for contribution against the putative insured, but in the case sub judice, the appellants have lawsuits pending in circuit court seeking money damages from the putative insured and have thus taken affirmative steps to pursue their claims against Stegeman. To the extent that Horace Mann conflicts with the instant decision, it is no longer to be followed.
Shelter also relies heavily upon State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Allen, 744 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. banc 1988), which is readily...
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