Horihan v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest

• Decision Date: 21 October 1997
• Docket Number: No. 1:97-CV-434.,1:97-CV-434.
• Citation: 979 F.Supp. 1073
• Parties: Ruth HORIHAN and Mel Horihan, Plaintiffs, v. HARTFORD INSURANCE CO. OF THE MIDWEST, Clarendon National Insurance Co., and Delta Bus Lines, Inc., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

979 F.Supp. 1073

Ruth HORIHAN and Mel Horihan, Plaintiffs, v. HARTFORD INSURANCE CO. OF THE MIDWEST, Clarendon National Insurance Co., and Delta Bus Lines, Inc., Defendants.

No. 1:97-CV-434.

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Beaumont Division.

October 21, 1997.

John Werner of Reaud, Morgan & Quinn, Beaumont, TX, for plaintiffs.

Richard E. Griffin and Frank G. Vlahakos, of Jackson & Walker, LLP, Houston, TX, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING HARTFORD'S MOTION TO TRANSFER

SCHELL, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the court on Defendant Hartford Insurance Co.'s Motion to Transfer filed on August 25, 1997. Plaintiffs filed a response on September 26, 1997. Upon consideration of the motion, response, and applicable law, the court is of the opinion that the motion should be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

This lawsuit arises from an automobile accident on U.S. Highway 61, near Shelby, Mississippi, which occurred on August 27, 1995. Plaintiff Ruth Horihan was a passenger on a bus involved in the collision and allegedly suffered significant personal injuries.¹ Plaintiffs claim this bus was owned and operated by Defendant Delta Bus Lines ("Delta"). Pls.' Cmplt. at 2. As a result of this accident, Plaintiffs filed the present lawsuit on August 1, 1997, in the Eastern District of Texas, Beaumont Division. Plaintiffs assert that subject matter jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

In their Original Complaint ("Complaint,") Plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to benefits owed to them by Defendants pursuant to certain insurance policies. Id. at 3. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to benefits (1) as beneficiaries under their insurance policy with Hartford Insurance Company of the Midwest ("Hartford,") and (2) as beneficiaries to an "underinsured motorist insurance policy purchased by defendant(s) Delta Bus Lines, Inc. and/or Clarendon Insurance Company." Id. Plaintiffs allege that venue is properly laid in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because "the Eastern District of Texas is a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred, and is a district in which Defendants regularly transact business."² Id. at 1.

Plaintiffs are both residents of Evansville, Indiana. Id. In support of their assertion that venue is proper in this court, Plaintiffs allege that Hartford is a Connecticut corporation that does business in Beaumont, Texas, and has an agent for receiving service of process in Houston, Texas. Id. Plaintiffs further allege that Clarendon National Insurance Company ("Clarendon") has its principal place of business in New York, New York, does business in Beaumont, Texas, and has an agent for receiving service of process in Dallas, Texas. Further, Plaintiffs claim that Delta is a Mississippi corporation, has an agent for receiving service of process in Greenville, Mississippi, and "from time to time [does] business in Beaumont, Jefferson County, Texas." Id.

After Plaintiffs filed their Complaint, Hartford responded by filing the instant motion. Subsequently, Plaintiffs settled their claims against Clarendon and Delta. Only Hartford remains as a defendant in this lawsuit. In support of its motion, Hartford first argues that this court should transfer this case to the Northern District of Mississippi, Delta Division, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Hartford contends that venue is not proper in this court under any provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) because (1) all defendants do not reside in the State of Texas and (2) a substantial part of the events giving rise to this lawsuit did not occur in this district. In the alternative, Hartford argues that this court should transfer this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the statutory version of the common law doctrine forum non conveniens. In their response, Plaintiffs argue (1) that § 1406(a) does not allow for transfer in this case because venue is proper as to Hartford, the only remaining defendant, and (2) that the interests of justice weigh against transfer under § 1404(a).

II. ANALYSIS

A. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)

Section 1406(a) provides: "The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Thus, the initial inquiry under § 1406(a) is whether venue is proper in the Eastern District of Texas, Beaumont Division. If venue is properly laid in this court, then transfer pursuant to § 1406(a) is not permissible. See Id. If venue is not proper, however, then the court must decide whether to dismiss this lawsuit or transfer it to the Northern District of Mississippi, Delta Division.

1. Improper Venue

The general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a), governs the present suit because jurisdiction is founded solely on the basis of diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). Pursuant to § 1391(a), venue is proper:

only in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.

Id. The district in which proper venue lies "is determined at the time the complaint is filed and is not affected by a subsequent change of parties." Sidco Indus., Inc. v. Wimar Tahoe Corp., 768 F.Supp. 1343, 1346 (D.Or.1991); see also Exxon Corp. v. F.T.C., 588 F.2d 895, 899 (3rd Cir.1978); Concord Labs, Inc., v. Ballard Medical Products, 701 F.Supp. 272, 277 (D.N.H.1988); Proler Steel Corp. v. Luria Bros. & Co., 225 F.Supp. 412, 413 (S.D.Tex.1964). Thus, venue is proper in this court only if the requirements of at least one provision of § 1391(a) were present at the time Plaintiffs filed their Complaint.

a. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1)

Hartford first contends that venue is not proper in this court under § 1391(a)(1) because Delta does not reside in Texas. Plaintiffs counter that whether Delta resides in Texas is not material to the issue of whether venue lies in this court because Delta is no longer a party to this lawsuit. Pls.' Resp. to Def's Mtn. at 2. Because subsequent changes in the parties do not affect venue, however, the fact that Delta does not remain as a party to this lawsuit is immaterial to the determination of whether this case is properly before this court. See, e.g., Sidco, 768 F.Supp. at 1346. Accordingly, venue is proper in this court under § 1391(a)(1) only if all three defendants originally parties to this suit were Texas residents at the time Plaintiffs filed their Complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1).

For purposes of determining venue, a corporate defendant "shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). If the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in a state which has more than one judicial district, the corporation is deemed to reside "in any district in that State within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State" or, if no such district exists, the corporation is deemed "to reside in the district within which it has the most significant contacts." Id. In the present case, only the residence of Delta in Texas has been contested. Therefore, the court must determine whether Delta is subject to personal jurisdiction in the State of Texas.

A plaintiff may serve a nonresident defendant pursuant to a state's long-arm statute. FED.R.CIV.P. 4(e). When jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, a federal court can "exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, provided state law confers such jurisdiction and its exercise comports with due process under the Constitution." Interfirst Bank Clifton v. Fernandez, 844 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir.1988); see also Kervin v. Red River Ski Area, Inc., 711 F.Supp. 1383, 1386 (E.D.Tex.1989). The Texas long-arm statute confers jurisdiction no further than the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment will allow. Id. (citing Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia S.A., 638 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex. 1982)), rev'd on other grounds, 466 U.S. 408, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984) (hereinafter "Helicopteros"). Thus, the court will limit its consideration of whether personal jurisdiction over Delta would be proper in Texas to the requirements of federal due process.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs a State's power to confer jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 413-14, 104 S.Ct. at 1871-72. Due Process is "satisfied when in personam jurisdiction is asserted over a nonresident corporate defendant that has certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, the due process analysis is two fold: (1) the defendant must have minimum contacts with the forum State and (2) the court's exercise of jurisdiction must comply with notions of fair play and substantial justice. See Id.

A defendant's minimum contacts with a forum State "may support either `specific' or `general' jurisdiction." Fernandez, 844 F.2d at 283. Specific jurisdiction governs jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in suits "arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum." Id. (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n....