Horne v. Markham

Decision Date05 December 1973
Docket NumberNo. 43613,43613
Citation288 So.2d 196
PartiesTheodore J. HORNE, Jr., Appellant, v. William MARKHAM, etc., Appellee.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Robert S. Korschun, Miami, for appellant.

Gaylord A. Wood, Jr., Martin Cohen, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

BOYD, Justice.

This cause is before us on appeal from the Circuit Court, Broward County. In its final judgment the trial court, Inter alia: 1) construed Article VII, Section 6, of the Constitution of the State of Florida, F.S.A.; 1 and, 2) passed upon the validity of Section 196.131, Florida Statutes, 1971, F.S.A., 2 giving this Court jurisdiction of the direct appeal under Article V, Section 3(b)(1), of the Constitution of the State of Florida.

The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows:

'This cause was heard by the Court without a jury on February 16, 1973. The facts were stipulated and testimony was offered in augmentation and addendum. From the evidence, it is undisputed that Plaintiff taxpayer received a supplemental notice to renew his application for Homestead Exemption on or about March 21, 1972. Plaintiff inadvertently set aside the renewal application until April, 6, 1972, five (5) days after the April 1 deadline for such filing found in Section 196.131, Florida Statutes, at which time he mailed the application to the Tax Assessor. Plaintiff received notice of the Tax Assessor's disapproval of the late application and was heard by the Board of Tax Adjustment which denied Plaintiff's application.

'Plaintiff's position is that Plaintiff has an absolute right to a Five Thousand Dollar Homestead Exemption and that the Tax Assessor may not deny an application for Homestead Exemption without prior notice and hearing under the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions.

'Plaintiff also alleges that Section 196.131, Florida Statutes, requiring each Homestead applicant to file no later than April 1 is arbitrary and unreasonable, and thereby in conflict with the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions.

'Defendant contends that the disapproval of Plaintiff's application by the Tax Assessor was a mere tentative administrative determination which automatically brings the application before the Board of Tax Adjustment in accordance with Section 196.151, Florida Statutes. Defendant argues that the quasi-judicial hearing which Plaintiff received before the Board of Tax Adjustment satisfied the requirements of the Due Process Clauses.

'Defendant also alleges that the April 1 deadline set by the legislature is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, but is authorized both by the state's police power and by Article VII, Section 6 of the Florida Constitution. He further argues that in accordance with Article VII, Section 6, Plaintiff has no absolute right to Homestead Exemption unless he establishes that right as prescribed by law.'

On the basis of the foregoing facts, the trial court held as follows:

'1. Article VII, Section 6 of the Florida Constitution does not establish an absolute right to a five thousand dollar exemption from taxation, but provides that taxpayers who otherwise qualify shall be granted an exemption only 'upon establishment of right thereto in the manner prescribed by law'.

'2. Plaintiff failed to establish his right to Homestead Exemption for 1972 by failing to file his application by April 1, 1972, as required by Section 196.131, Florida Statutes. Furthermore, Plaintiff failed to offer any legal excuse or justification for his failure to file as required by law.

'3. The April 1 filing deadline in Section 196.131, Florida Statutes, is not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clauses of the Florida or United States Constitutions. Plaintiff failed to establish that such date was in any manner arbitrary or unreasonable. On the other hand, Defendant offered lengthy testimony establishing that the April 1 date was necessary in order to comply with the Tax Assessor's duty to complete the tax roll by July 1 of each year pursuant to Section 194.011, Florida Statutes.

'4. The decision of the Tax Assessor disapproving plaintiff's late application was a tentative administrative decision which did not require prior notice or hearing, and would not have deprived Plaintiff of any right without Due Process of Law, even if the Homestead Exemption from taxation were an absolute right. No homestead application can be denied except by final action of the Board of Tax Adjustment. See Florida Statutes, Section 196.151 (1971).

'5. Plaintiff received adequate notice and opportunity to be heard in a quasijudicial proceeding by the Board of Tax Adjustment before denial of his 1972 Homestead Tax Exemption. Also, Sections 194.032(3) and 196.151, Florida Statutes, accord Plaintiff the right to be accompanied by counsel at said hearing. The requirements of the Due Process Clause must be tailored to the circumstances of the situation and do not require a prior judicial hearing nor even a prior administrative hearing in All situations. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 379 U.S. 254, 264, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1018, 25 L.Ed.2d 287, 297 (1970). Nevertheless, in the instant case Plaintiff was clearly afforded a hearing which comported with the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clauses of the Florida and United States Constitutions.

'6. Plaintiff has no standing to raise the constitutionality of Section 196.011, Florida Statutes 1971, since that Statute does not deal with Homestead Tax Exemptions and Plaintiff was in no way affected by the operation thereof.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Accordingly, the trial court held that plaintiff's 1972 application for homestead exemption had been properly denied by the Board of Tax Adjustment.

It is appellant's position that the trial court erred in holding that neither the action of appellee in this case, nor Sections 196.131(1)(a) and 196.151, Florida Stat utes, F.S.A., deprived appellant of a property interest without due process of law, in contravention of the State and Federal Constitutions. More specifically, appellant argues that the denial of his application for the homestead tax exemption by the appellee, without...

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13 cases
  • Page v. City of Fernandina Beach
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • 15 Junio 1998
    ...statute may be read simply as relieving lessees of the obligation to claim the exemption anew every year. See generally Horne v. Markham, 288 So.2d 196, 198 (Fla.1973); Gamma Phi Chapter of Sigma Chi Building Fund Corp. v. Dade County, 199 So.2d 717, 718-19 (Fla.1967). We reject the City's ......
  • Thomas v. Smith
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • 13 Agosto 2004
    ...of a tax exemption. As the circuit court correctly noted, there is no absolute right to the homestead exemption. See Horne v. Markham, 288 So.2d 196, 199 (Fla.1973). Taxpayers who otherwise qualify for the homestead exemption shall be granted an exemption only "upon establishment of right t......
  • Stranburg v. Pan. Commons L.P., 1D14–1671.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • 8 Abril 2015
    ...conditions such as filing an application in a timely manner. See Zingale v. Powell, 885 So.2d 277, 285 (Fla.2004) ; Horne v. Markham, 288 So.2d 196, 199 (Fla.1973). Under section 196.011(1)(a), Florida Statutes, appellee had to file its renewal application for the tax exemption by March 1, ......
  • Hollywood Jaycees v. State, Dept. of Revenue
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • 20 Noviembre 1974
    ...tax exemption should have been afforded Appellants. See Thorn v. Florida Real Estate Commission (Fla.App), 146 So.2d 907; Horne v. Markham (Fla.1974), 288 So.2d 196; Fuentes v. Shevin (1971), 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556; Bell v. Burson (1970), 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • The loss of homestead through rental.
    • United States
    • Florida Bar Journal Vol. 84 No. 1, January 2010
    • 1 Enero 2010
    ...$50,000.00 and up to $75,000.00, upon establishment of right thereto in the manner prescribed by law...."). (8) See Horne v. Markham, 288 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1973) (holding that Fla. Const. art. VII, [section] 6 does not establish an absolute right to a homestead exemption, but rather, provide......

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