Hornfischer v. Manatee Cnty. Sheriff's Office

• Decision Date: 08 April 2014
• Docket Number: No. 2D13–374.,2D13–374.
• Citation: 136 So.3d 703
• Parties: Philip HORNFISCHER, Appellant, v. MANATEE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

136 So.3d 703

Philip HORNFISCHER, Appellant,

v.MANATEE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, Appellee.

No. 2D13–374.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Second District.

Feb. 12, 2014.

Rehearing Denied April 8, 2014.

Bill McCabe, Longwood, and Keith A. Mann, Sarasota, for Appellant.

Robert Wayne Evans and Matthew Stefany of Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellee.

WALLACE, Judge.

Philip Hornfischer challenges a final summary judgment entered in favor of his former employer, the Manatee County Sheriff's Office (the MCSO), on Mr. Hornfischer's claim for retaliatory discharge under section 440.205, Florida Statutes (2006). Because the MCSO failed to establish the nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether its discharge of Mr. Hornfischer and his filing of workers' compensation claims were causally related, we reverse the final summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I. THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2000, Mr. Hornfischer was employed by the MCSO as a meat cutter.¹ On November 13, 2006, Mr. Hornfischer was involved in a compensable accident when he accidentally stabbed himself in the abdomen with a knife. A “First Report of Injury or Illness” was timely filed for this accident.

The report lists the employer name as “Manatee County Government, D.B.A.-Office of the County Attorney.” The MCSO was self-insured for workers' compensation purposes. The MCSO participated in a pool of funds for workers' compensation cases run by Manatee County. A third-party administrator, Unisource Administrators, Inc., administered the pool.

After Mr. Hornfischer underwent testing following the stabbing incident, physicians determined that he had medical problems with his hands and arms unrelated to the stabbing. The workers' compensation liaison in the MCSO's human resources department told Mr. Hornfischer to file another claim for the hand and arm problems, and he did. A second “First Report of Injury or Illness” was filed on November 30, 2006, with a date of accident listed as November 28, 2006. The MCSO paid medical expenses and other benefits based on Mr. Hornfischer's claims.

The course of Mr. Hornfischer's treatment and recovery was extended and marked by various difficulties. Ultimately, he was unable to return to work as a meat cutter. The MCSO offered him a different position as a control room operator in the jail. Mr. Hornfischer reported for work in the new position, but, for reasons discussed later in this opinion, he did not assume his new duties. After an administrative hearing, the MCSO notified Mr. Hornfischer that his employment was terminated on May 24, 2007.

In October 2010, Mr. Hornfischer filed an action against the MCSO for retaliatory discharge under section 440.205. The MCSO answered the complaint and alleged that “[Mr. Hornfischer's] termination would have occurred in any event, regardless of his request for workers' compensation benefits.” After the parties had conducted discovery, the MCSO moved for summary judgment on the ground that “[t]here is no genuine issue of material fact to support a causal connection between [the] protected activity and the adverse employment action concerning [Mr. Hornfischer's] termination.” The circuit court granted the motion and entered a final judgment in favor of the MCSO. This appeal followed.

II. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review for an order granting a motion for summary judgment is de novo and requires a two-pronged analysis. Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So.2d 126, 130 (Fla.2000). Summary judgment is proper only if (1) no genuine issue of material fact exists, viewing every possible inference in favor of the party against whom summary judgment has been entered, Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Merrill Lynch Credit Corp., 779 So.2d 396, 398 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), and (2) the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, 760 So.2d at 130. “If the record reflects the existence of any genuine issue of material fact or the possibility of any issue, or if the record raises even the slightest doubt that an issue might exist, summary judgment is improper.” Holland v. Verheul, 583 So.2d 788, 789 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).

III. THE APPLICABLE LAW

Mr. Hornfischer's claim against the MCSO is based on an alleged violation of section 440.205. The statute provides as follows:

No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law.

A claim under the statute has three elements: (1) the employee engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) the adverse action and the employee's protected activity were causally related. Ortega v. Eng'g Sys. Tech., Inc., 30 So.3d 525, 528 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (citing Russell v. KSL Hotel Corp., 887 So.2d 372, 379 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)). In order to establish a claim under section 440.205, the employee's pursuit of workers' compensation need not be the only reason for a discharge. Allan v. SWF Gulf Coast, Inc., 535 So.2d 638, 639 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). “The statute prohibits any discharge ‘by reason of’ an attempt to claim compensation even if there may also be other reasons for the discharge.” Id. In addition, proof of a discharge is not essential to a recovery under the statute. Section 440.205 creates a cause of action for intimidation or coercion even in the absence of a discharge. Chase v. Walgreen Co., 750 So.2d 93, 97–98 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Finally, the employee need not establish a specific retaliatory intent in order to prevail. Allan, 535 So.2d at 639.

In considering employee claims for retaliatory discharge under 440.205, courts use the following framework:

Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by proving the protected activity and the negative employment action are not completely unrelated, the burden then shifts to the employer to proffer a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action. See Russell [v. KSL Hotel Corp.], 887 So.2d [372], 379–80 [Fla. 3d DCA 2004]....

A plaintiff withstands summary adjudication at this stage either by producing sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable finder of fact to conclude the employer's proffered reasons were not what actually motivated its conduct, or that the proffered reasons are not worthy of belief. Corbitt v. Home Depot U.S.A., 589 F.3d 1136, 1162–63 (11th Cir.2009). A trial court should “evaluate whether the plaintiff has demonstrated such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

Ortega, 30 So.3d at 529.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S ANALYSIS

In this case, the trial court summarized its reasons for granting final summary judgment in favor of the MCSO as follows:

V. In the case at bar[,] the Court finds Plaintiff has established elements one and two of a prima facie case. However, the Court also finds Plaintiff has been unable to present any record evidence as to a causal connection between his exercise of protected activity and the adverse employment action by Defendant. In fact, the undisputed evidence has established his workers' compensation benefits were paid and the adverse job action/termination was remote temporally from same. Even assuming that the second filing on 28 November 2006 was the protected activity it too is approximately six months removed from the adverse job action/termination of 22 May 2007.

W. Even if it could be argued Plaintiff had established all three elements for a prima facie case shifting the burden to Defendant; Defendant has provided at least two legitimate, nondiscriminatory policy reasons for the 22 May 2007 termination. Those two legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons were insubordination and neglect of job. As a result Plaintiff must establish via record evidence that both legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons were merely a pretext for Defendant's retaliatory conduct. The Court finds Plaintiff has fallen woefully short of establishing that even one of the reasons for termination was pretextual, let alone both.

On this basis, the trial court concluded that the MCSO had established the nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact and that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

V. DISCUSSION

A.Introduction

After a thorough review of the record, we disagree with the trial court's analysis. The record contains evidence from which one might conclude that the MCSO's stated reasons for discharging Mr. Hornfischer will not withstand critical scrutiny and that the reasons are pretextual. This evidence in the record includes: (1) information indicating that the MCSO's stated reasons for discharging Mr. Hornfischer are questionable; (2) e-mails and other documents circulated among the MCSO's agents reflecting the negative attitude that they displayed toward Mr. Hornfischer and his claims; and (3) the affidavits that Mr. Hornfischer filed in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. We will discuss these three types of evidence separately below.

B.The Questionable Reasons Given for Mr. Hornfischer's Discharge

The MCSO offered two reasons in support of its determination to discharge Mr. Hornfischer. Both of these reasons are subject to question.

The first reason the MCSO offered for Mr. Hornfischer's discharge was his alleged failure to obtain a report from his authorized treating physician concerning his medical condition and fitness to return to work as a control room operator. According to the MCSO, Mr. Hornfischer's alleged failure to obtain this report amounted to neglect of duty warranting his discharge. There are two problems with the neglect of duty charge.

The first problem with the neglect of duty charge stems from the legal conclusion...