Horsely v. United Ohio Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 27 February 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-262,90-262
• Citation: 567 N.E.2d 1004,58 Ohio St.3d 44
• Parties: HORSELY, Appellee, v. UNITED OHIO INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 44

58 Ohio St.3d 44

567 N.E.2d 1004

HORSELY, Appellee, v. UNITED OHIO INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant.

No. 90-262.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Jan. 15, 1991.

Decided Feb. 27, 1991.

Syllabus by the Court

The term "motor vehicle" as employed in R.C. 3937.18 is sufficiently broad to include a motorcycle. Thus, a motor vehicle liability insurance policy contravenes R.C. 3937.18 and the public policy of this state when it contains an exclusion from uninsured motorist coverage of those damages relating to the ownership or operation of motor vehicles having fewer than four wheels.

On July 19, 1986, Carolyn S. Horsely was fatally injured in an accident while she was a passenger on a motorcycle. The motorcycle was owned and operated by Melvin Williams. Williams did not have a liability insurance policy at the time of the accident. Horsely, however, did have an effective liability insurance contract with the appellant, United Ohio Insurance Company. Appellee, James W. Horsely, decedent's son, filed a claim for benefits pursuant to the uninsured motorist provisions under his mother's policy issued by appellant. Appellant denied the claim, based on an exclusion from uninsured motorist coverage for any motor vehicle "having less than four wheels." ¹

Appellee filed a complaint, individually and as administrator of the estate, claiming damages for pain and suffering, and wrongful death, pursuant to the uninsured motorist coverage of the decedent's policy. The trial court granted appellant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the provision excluding vehicles having fewer than four wheels from the definition of "uninsured motor vehicle" does not violate any announced public policy or any purpose stated in R.C. 3937.18. The trial court went on to find that the exclusion is clear, unambiguous and not susceptible to more than one meaning.

The court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in appellant's favor. The appellate court ruled that the exclusion violated both the public policy of this state and R.C. 3937.18 because it excluded from coverage damage caused by uninsured two-wheel vehicles.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Joseph L. Hale, Portsmouth, for appellee.

Gary W. Hammond, Columbus, for appellant.

ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, Justice.

The issue presented in this case is whether an exclusion from uninsured motorist coverage for motorcycles violates R.C. 3937.18 and, thus, in turn, also violates the public policy of this state. As this question involves one of statutory interpretation, we begin our analysis with the language of the statute. R.C. 3937.18 provides in pertinent part:

"(A) No automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless both of the following are provided:

"(1) Uninsured motorist coverage, which shall be in an amount of coverage equivalent to the automobile liability or motor vehicle liability coverage and shall provide protection for bodily injury or death * * * for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, resulting therefrom[.]" (Emphasis added.)

From the very face of R.C. 3937.18, no motor vehicle insurance policy shall be delivered or issued in the state of Ohio with respect to any motor vehicle unless the policy includes uninsured motorist coverage. Moreover, said coverage shall provide protection for those persons legally entitled to recover from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles. The statute expressly states that it is applicable to motor vehicles.

The law in Ohio is that "[a]ny contractual restriction on the coverage mandated by R.C. 3937.18 must comply with the purpose of this statute. * * *" Ady v. West American Ins. Co. (1982), 63 Ohio St.2d 593, 23 O.O.3d 495, 433 N.E.2d 547, syllabus. In order to conclude that the exclusion in the present case complies with the purpose of R.C. 3937.18, one must determine that a motorcycle does not constitute a "motor vehicle" under the statute. Stated otherwise, if a motorcycle is indeed a motor vehicle, then R.C. 3937.18 is applicable to motorcycles. As such, a policy exclusion for motorcycles violates the mandates of R.C. 3937.18, and does not comport with the purpose of the statute. Thus, the question in the instant case becomes whether a motorcycle is a "motor vehicle" under the clear language of R.C. 3937.18.

We answer this question in the affirmative, and reach the inescapable conclusion that a motorcycle is indeed a motor vehicle. Although Ohio case law supports this determination, we find more compelling support from the definition of a "motor vehicle" as provided by the General Assembly. R.C. 4501.01(B) defines a "motor vehicle" as follows:

" 'Motor vehicle' means any vehicle, including manufactured homes and recreational vehicles, propelled or drawn by power other than muscular power or power collected from overhead electric trolley wires, except motorized bicycles, road rollers, traction engines, power shovels, power cranes, and other equipment used in construction work and not designed for or employed in general highway transportation * * *." (Emphasis added.)

The statute goes on to list other exceptions to the definition of a "motor vehicle," but does not list motorcycles as one of the exceptions. ² Rather, from the definition contained in R.C. 4501.01, it is quite clear that the term "motor vehicle" is sufficiently broad to include a motorcycle. A motorcycle is "any vehicle * * * drawn or propelled by power other than muscular power. * * * " This court can discern no valid reason for not accepting this definition of a "motor vehicle" provided by the General Assembly. Moreover, it defies common sense to suggest that the General Assembly would define a "motor vehicle" in one chapter of the Revised Code (4501.01 et seq.), and then assign a different meaning to that same term in yet another chapter of the Revised Code (3937.01 et seq.). Absent a legislative intent to the contrary, we decline to formulate our own definition of "motor vehicle" when the General Assembly has already spoken as to how that term should be defined.

As noted earlier, Ohio case law also supports our conclusion that a motorcycle is indeed a "motor vehicle" as the latter term is defined. In Jirousek v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1971), 27 Ohio St.2d 62, 63, 56 O.O.2d 34, 35, 271 N.E.2d 866, 868, this court stated that "we agree with plaintiff's hypothesis that an automobile is a motor vehicle and that a motorcycle is a motor vehicle * * *." In a case involving a similar issue regarding snowmobiles, we unanimously held that "[a] snowmobile is a 'motor vehicle' within the meaning of R.C. 3937.18." Metropolitan Property & Liability Ins. Co. v. Kott (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 114, 16 O.O.3d 139, 403 N.E.2d 985, at the syllabus. It would be incongruous to hold that a snowmobile is a motor vehicle, while finding that a motorcycle is somehow not a motor vehicle.

The courts of appeals are likewise in agreement with our disposition of the issue. In Langston v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. (1977), 56 Ohio App.2d 17, 20, 10 O.O.3d 24, 26, 381 N.E.2d 209, 211, Justice Holmes (then Judge Holmes of the Tenth Appellate District) inst...