Horton v. Golden Animal Hosp.

• Decision Date: 21 April 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93CA0536,93CA0536
• Citation: 879 P.2d 459
• Parties: Lawrence D. HORTON, Petitioner, v. GOLDEN ANIMAL HOSPITAL and Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority, and The Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado, Respondents. . III
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

Page 459

879 P.2d 459

Lawrence D. HORTON, Petitioner, v. GOLDEN ANIMAL HOSPITAL and Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority, and The Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado, Respondents.

No. 93CA0536.

Colorado Court of Appeals Div. III.

April 21, 1994.

Rehearing Denied May 19, 1994.

Certiorari Granted Sept. 12, 1994.

Eley & Eley, Craig C. Eley, Denver, for petitioner.

Paul Tochtrop, Douglas A. Thomas, Denver, for respondents Golden Animal Hosp. and Colorado Compensation Ins. Authority.

No appearance for respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office.

Opinion by Judge DAVIDSON.

In this workers' compensation proceeding, the sole issue on review is whether the Industrial Claim Appeals Panel erred in reducing the permanent disability award of claimant, Lawrence D. Horton, under the statute governing compensation of permanently disabled minors, § 8-42-102(4), C.R.S. (1993 Cum.Supp.). We set aside the order.

The relevant facts are undisputed. Claimant suffered an admitted work injury to his head in November 1983, when he was 18 years old. As a result of the injury, a shunt was implanted in the base of claimant's skull to allow excess spinal fluid to be drained away from the brain. Claimant continues to suffer from shunt blockages, which are potentially life threatening.

Claimant reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) in March 1987, when he was 21 years old. For reasons undisclosed by the record, a hearing on permanent disability benefits was not held until August 1992, more than five years after the claimant had reached MMI. The ALJ found that claimant was 5% permanently impaired and granted a lump sum award of $11,968.32, based on the maximum permanent partial disability rate in effect in March 1987, when claimant reached MMI.

Claimant contested this computation, contending that the award should be based on the maximum rate in effect in August 1992, at the time of the administrative hearing. The ALJ agreed and issued a corrected order increasing the lump sum award to $32,411.35. On review, the Panel set aside the ALJ's corrected order and reinstated the ALJ's original order.

Claimant argues that the Panel erred in ordering the original order reinstated. We agree.

In recognition of the special compensation needs of injured minors, see Mills v. Guido's, 800 P.2d 1370 (Colo.App.1990), § 8-42-102(4) provides that compensation benefits for permanently disabled minors shall be computed at the "maximum rate of compensation payable ... at the time of the determination of such permanency."

The Panel construed the phrase "at the time of the determination of such permanency" to mean "the date upon which permanent disability is 'determinable.' " The Panel reasoned that this interpretation was consistent with the overall statutory scheme in that the date of maximum medical improvement is generally the point at which temporary benefits cease and the extent of permanent disability is assessed and permanent disability is awarded. See Allee v. Contractors, Inc., 783 P.2d 273 (Colo.1989); Reynolds v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 794 P.2d 1080 (Colo.App.1990).

We disagree with the Panel's analysis.

In construing a statute, words and phrases must be given effect according to their plain and ordinary meaning. Husson v. Meeker, 812 P.2d 731 (Colo.App.1991). If the statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court must rely on principles of statutory construction, taking into account the nature of the problem addressed by the legislation and the consequences of a particular construction. Section 2-4-201(1)(c), C.R.S. (1980 Repl.Vol. 1B); Eckhardt v. Village Inn, 826 P.2d 855 (Colo.1992).

In our view, the phrase "at the time of the determination of such permanency" refers to the date on which permanent disability is adjudicated. The word "determine" means to decide, to adjudicate, to come to a decision, to decide upon an investigation, or to perform a judicial act. City of Colorado Springs v. Timberlane Associates, 783 P.2d 287 (Colo.1989).

The phrase "at the time of the determination of such permanency" was part of the original predecessor statute to § 8-42-102(4), see Colo.Sess.Laws 1943, ch. 132, at 419, and this language has remained unchanged since its adoption in 1943, despite numerous amendments and changes to other provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act.

Furthermore, the phrase "at the time of the determination of such permanency" pre-dates any statutory reference to maximum medical improvement, which latter term did not appear in the Workers' Compensation Act until it was codified in 1991 at Colo.Sess.Laws 1991, ch. 219, §§ 8-40-201(11.5) & 8-42-107(8) at 1293 and 1309. See also Allee v. Contractors, Inc., supra (fn. 6). Hence, we agree with claimant that, since "maximum medical improvement" did not exist in the relevant law in 1943 when the phrase at issue was first adopted, the General Assembly could not have intended for a "determination" of permanent disability to be linked to the date of maximum medical improvement.

Significantly, the statute in question was never included under the statutory provisions governing permanent disability benefits. Rather, from the time of its adoption in 1943, § 8-42-102(4) has been codified under that section of the Act which establishes the proper basis for computing compensation, entitled, "Basis of compensation--wages defined--average weekly wage."

Section 8-42-102(4) was adopted as an express exception to the general rule requiring benefits to be computed based on a claimant's actual earnings. In enacting that exception, the obvious intent of the General Assembly was to provide additional protection for permanently disabled minors by insuring that their benefits would be computed at the "maximum rate payable" irrespective of the disabled minor's actual earnings. Mills v. Guido's, supra; see also De Jiacomo v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 817 P.2d 552 (Colo.App.1991). Consistent with this purpose, the General Assembly could reasonably establish the "maximum rate" as the rate in effect on the date that an injured minor's...