Horton v. Marston

• Decision Date: 04 April 1967
• Citation: 352 Mass. 322,225 N.E.2d 311
• Parties: Dorothy M. HORTON v. Dana M. MARSTON.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 311

225 N.E.2d 311

352 Mass. 322

Dorothy M. HORTON v. Dana M. MARSTON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Barnstable.

Argued March 7, 1967.

Decided April 4, 1967.

Philip M. Boudreau, Hyannis, for plaintiff.

Arthur J. McLaughlin, Concord, for defendant.

Before WILKINS, C.J., and WHITTEMORE, CUTTER, SPIEGEL and REARDON, JJ.

WHITTEMORE, Justice.

The report to the Appellate Division from the First District Court of Barnstable sets out evidence tending to show the following facts: On September 4, 1962, the plaintiff signed a written lease with Dana M. Marston for cottage No. 2 in Marston's development of rental cottages. The lease was to run until the end of May, 1963. The cottage was rented with all furnishings except bed linen, including an apartment-sized gas stove. The plaintiff moved in on September 4, 1962, and used the stove from that date. It was at least ten years old. On May 8, 1963, when the plaintiff sought to light a burner on the top of the gas stove (one of three she had extinguished five to seven minutes earlier, leaving a fourth top burner and the oven ignited) an explosion occurred injuring the plaintiff. This was the first time the plaintiff had used all four top burners and the oven at the same time.

The trial judge found, with support in the evidence, including expert testimony, that 'the oven * * * was insulated in a defective manner.' As a result, either because much of the available oxygen had been used or because the air over the stove had become overheated, the flame of the fourth burner had been extinguished. The wall cabinets and side cabinets were 'too close to the burner, closer than allowed by law.' The combined effect of the defects was an accumulation of gas that exploded when the plaintiff struck a match.

The trial judge made a finding for the plaintiff, having found that the stove was not in a suitable condition for use. He ruled that there was a breach of an implied agreement that the house and its appointments were in a suitable condition for occupancy. The Appellate Division reversed the finding and held that it was error not to have ruled that the evidence required a finding for the defendant. The defendant does not contend that the defects did not exist at the time of the letting.

Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 350, 31 N.E. 286, 16 L.R.A. 51, was an action by a landlord to recover for the rent of a furnished dwelling leased for the summer season. The tenant successfully defended on the ground of a breach of an implied warranty that the dwelling was fit for the intended use, the house having been infested with bugs. This court said, in respect of the renting of a dwelling for a short term ('a few days or a few weeks or months'): 'Its fitness for immediate use of a particular kind, as indicated by its appointments, is a far more important element entering into the contract than when there is a mere lease of real estate. One who lets for a short term a house provided with all furnishings and appointments for immediate residence may be supposed to contract in reference to a well-understood purpose of the hirer to use it as a habitation. An important part of what the hirer pays for is the opportunity to enjoy it without delay, and without the expense of preparing it for use. * * * It would be unreasonable to hold, under such circumstances, that the landlord does not impliedly agree that what he is letting is a house suitable for occupation in its condition at the time.'

In Hacker v. Nitschke, 310 Mass. 754, 756, 39 N.E.2d 644, 646, 139 A.L.R. 257, where a beach cottage was rented for four weeks, the principle was extended to apply to an action of tort by the tenant to recover for injuries caused by a defective ladder included in the furnishings. The court noted the general rule that a landlord is not liable for defects existing at the time of letting unless they are hidden and known to the landlord and he fails to warn the tenant. The court said that the Ingalls case is a departure from the general rule and 'should be confined within narrow limits,' but that the authority of the case has not been doubted in this Commonwealth. In Ackarey v. Carbonaro, 320 Mass. 537, 539--540, 70 N.E.2d 418, a tenant recovered in tort for consequential damages resulting from injuries to the tenant's child. The Ingalls principle was applied to the structural condition of a piazza rail of a beach house rented furnished for a week. Davenport v. Squibb, 320 Mass. 629, 632, 70 N.E.2d 793, an action for rent, was decided on another ground, but the court recognized that the Ingalls case rule would apply to a three and one-half months summer rental of a furnished house.

Littlehale v. Osgood, 161 Mass. 340, 343, 37 N.E. 375, 377, was an action of tort based on false representations that the house was in a good sanitary condition. The Ingalls case issue was not raised at the trial, and this court said, '(W)e have no occasion to consider whether the doctrine * * * would apply when a house is rented for a year.'

In Young v. Povich, 121 Me. 141, 143--145, 116 A. 26, 29 A.L.R. 48, cited by this court in the Davenport case (320 Mass. at 632, 70 N.E.2d 793), a tenant recovered an advance payment of rent on the ground that the furnished summer cottage, rented for eight months, was unsuitable for occupancy because of bedbugs. The court, citing the Ingalls case, said that the issue should not turn on a ruling that more than a certain number of months would be a 'long term' and hence subject to the general rule rather than to the Ingalls case exception. 'We think that the phrase 'for a temporary purpose' instead of the phrase 'for a short term,' * * * would more definitely present the question of fact * * *.' The Maine court indicated that in its view the circumstances of each case should be determinative.

The Appellate Division and the defendant emphasize the statements in certain cases that the Ingalls case is 'limited * * * very carefully to its particular facts' (Bolieau v. Traiser, 253 Mass. 346, 349, 148 N.E. 809, 810); that it is a 'somewhat limited exception' (Chelefou v. Springfield Inst. for Sav., 297 Mass. 236, 239, 8 N.E.2d 769); and that it 'should be confined within narrow limits' (Hacker case, supra, 310 Mass. at 756, 39 N.E.2d at 646; accord Legere v. Asselta, 342 Mass....