Horton v. State

• Docket Number: CR-20-0502
• Decision Date: 11 March 2022
• Parties: Jonathan Horton v. State of Alabama
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

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Jonathan Horton v. State of Alabama

No. CR-20-0502

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

March 11, 2022

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court (CC-20-882)

MCCOOL, JUDGE.

Jonathan Horton appeals his conviction for third-degree domestic violence. See § 13A-6-132, Ala. Code 1975. Horton was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment; that sentence was suspended, and Horton was ordered to serve 24 months of unsupervised probation.

Facts and Procedural History

On August 24, 2016, a warrant was issued in the Jefferson District Court authorizing Horton's arrest on a charge of domestic violence by strangulation or suffocation. See § 13A-6-138, Ala. Code 1975. On April 7 2017, Horton learned of the warrant and turned himself in at the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office. Later that day Horton was brought before the district court for his initial appearance, and he was released on bond the next day. On July 27, 2017, the district court issued an order indicating that Horton had waived his right to a preliminary hearing and that the case was being bound over to the grand jury. The grand jury subsequently indicted Horton, but, "due to a clerical error in the District Attorney's Office" (R. 5), Horton was not indicted until March 6, 2020.

On March 25, 2020, Horton filed in the Jefferson Circuit Court a motion to dismiss the indictment. In support of that motion Horton argued that an analysis of the factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), indicated that the State had deprived him of the right to a speedy trial enshrined in both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 6, of the Alabama Constitution of 1901. The circuit court held a hearing on Horton's motion, where the parties stipulated to certain undisputed facts. In addition, the circuit court heard testimony from Horton and accepted a letter from Horton's wife, and the State did not dispute any of the factual allegations in Horton's testimony or in his wife's letter. Following that hearing, the circuit court denied Horton's motion and, in support of its ruling, stated that it had "analyzed and applied the factors necessary to determine if [Horton's] constitutional right to a speedy trial ha[d] been violated." (C. 14.)

On March 1, 2021, Horton pleaded guilty to third-degree domestic violence after reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss based on speedy-trial grounds. Horton subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal.

Discussion

On appeal, Horton reasserts his claim that the circuit court should have dismissed the indictment because, he says, the State violated his right to a speedy trial. We review this claim de novo because the relevant facts are undisputed and because the only question to be decided is a question of law. State v. Pylant, 214 So.3d 392, 394 (Ala.Crim.App.2016).

"In determining whether a defendant has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, we apply the test established by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), in which the following four factors are considered: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.

"In Ex parte Walker, 928 So.2d 259, 263 (Ala. 2005), the Alabama Supreme Court stated:

"' "A single factor is not necessarily determinative, because this is a 'balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defense are weighed.'" Ex parte Clopton, 656 So.2d [1243] at 1245 [(Ala. 1985)] (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530).' "

State v. Jones, 35 So.3d 644, 646 (Ala.Crim.App.2009).

I. Length of the Delay

" 'In Doggett v. United States, the United States Supreme Court explained that the first factor -- length of delay -- "is actually a double enquiry." 505 U.S. 647, 651, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). The first inquiry under this factor is whether the length of the delay is" 'presumptively prejudicial.'" 505 U.S. at 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31, 92 S.Ct. 2182). A finding that the length of delay is presumptively prejudicial "triggers" an examination of the remaining three Barker factors. 505 U.S. at 652 n.1, 112 S.Ct. 2686 ("[A]s the term is used in this threshold context, 'presumptive prejudice' does not necessarily indicate a statistical probability of prejudice; it simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry."). See also Roberson v. State, 864 So.2d 379, 394 (Ala.Crim.App.2002).

" 'In Alabama, "[t]he length of delay is measured from the date of the indictment or the date of the issuance of an arrest warrant -- whichever is earlier -- to the date of the trial." Roberson, 864 So.2d at 394.' "

Wilson v. State, 329 So.3d 71, 77 (Ala.Crim.App.2020) (quoting Ex parte Walker, 928 So.2d 259, 263-64 (Ala. 2005)). In a case where the defendant pleads guilty, the "trial" date is the date he or she pleads guilty. See Wilson, 329 So.3d at 77; and Ex parte Walker, 928 So.2d 259, 264 (Ala. 2005) (both calculating the length of the delay up to the date the defendant pleaded guilty).

In this case, the length of the delay is measured from August 24, 2016 -- the date the arrest warrant was issued -- to March 1, 2021 -- the date Horton pleaded guilty. Thus, the length of the delay was 54 months.^[1] The State concedes that such a delay is presumptively prejudicial (State's brief, p. 16), and that concession is supported by Alabama caselaw. See Ex parte Walker, 928 So.2d at 264 (holding that a 50-month delay was presumptively prejudicial). Therefore, because the delay in this case is presumptively prejudicial, that delay is sufficient to trigger an examination of the remaining Barker factors. Wilson, 329 So.3d at 77.

II. Reason for the Delay

" 'The State has the burden of justifying the delay. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182; Steeley v. City of Gadsden, 533 So.2d 671, 680 (Ala.Crim.App.1988). Barker recognizes three categories of reasons for delay: (1) deliberate delay, (2) negligent delay, and (3) justified delay. 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Courts assign different weight to different reasons for delay. Deliberate delay is "weighted heavily" against the State. 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Deliberate delay includes an "attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense" or" 'to gain some tactical advantage over (defendants) or to harass them.'" 407 U.S. at 531 & n.32, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971)). Negligent delay is weighted less heavily against the State than is deliberate delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182; Ex parte Carrell, 565 So.2d [104, ] 108 [(Ala. 1990)]. Justified delay --which includes such occurrences as missing witnesses or delay for which the defendant is primarily responsible -- is not weighted against the State. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182; Zumbado v. State, 615 So.2d 1223, 1234 (Ala.Crim.App.1993) (" 'Delays occasioned by the defendant or on his behalf are excluded from the length of delay and are heavily counted against the defendant in applying the balancing test of Barker.' ") (quoting McCallum v. State, 407 So.2d 865, 868 (Ala.Crim.App.1981)).' "

Wilson, 329 So.3d at 77-78 (quoting Ex parte Walker, 928 So.2d at 265).

In this case, it is undisputed that the State negligently delayed prosecuting Horton's case "due to a clerical error in the District Attorney's Office." However, Horton concedes that not all of the 54-month delay was attributable to the State's negligence. Instead, Horton contends that the State's negligence did not arise until July 27, 2017 -- the date his case was bound over to the grand jury. (Horton's brief, p. 14.) Therefore, only the delay from July 27, 2017, to March 1, 2021 -- a delay of 43 months -- is attributable to the State's negligence. The fact that the State negligently delayed Horton's case for 43 months weighs against the State, but it "does not weigh as heavily as it would have had the delay been found to be ... intentional." State v. White, 962 So.2d 897, 902 (Ala.Crim.App.2006) (delay of 42 months).

III. Horton's Assertion of His Right to a Speedy Trial

" 'An accused does not waive the right to a speedy trial simply by failing to assert it. Barker, 407 U.S. at 528, 92, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Even so, courts applying the Barker factors are to consider in the weighing process whether and when the accused asserts the right to a speedy trial, 407 U.S. at 528-29, 92 S.Ct. 2182, and not every assertion of the right to a speedy trial is weighted equally. Compare Kelley v. State, 568 So.2d 405, 410 (Ala.Crim.App.1990) ("Repeated requests for a speedy trial weigh heavily in favor of an accused."), with Clancy v. State, 886 So.2d 166, 172 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) (weighting third factor against an accused who asserted his right to a speedy trial two weeks before trial, and stating:" 'The fact that the appellant did not assert his right to a speedy trial sooner "tends to suggest that he either acquiesced in the delays or suffered only minimal prejudice prior to that date."' ") (quoting Benefield v. State, 726 So.2d 286, 291 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), additional citations omitted), and Brown v. State, 392 So.2d 1248, 1254 (Ala.Crim.App.1980) (no speedy-trial violation where defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial three days before trial).' "

Wilson, 329 So.3d at 79 (quoting Ex parte Walker, 928 So.2d at 265-66).

Horton's arrest occurred on April 7, 2017, but he did not assert his right to a speedy trial until March 25, 2020 -- almost three years later. Despite that lengthy delay, Horton contends that he asserted his right to a...