State Of Ala. v. Jones
| Decision Date | 09 October 2009 |
| Docket Number | CR-08-1030. |
| Parties | STATE of Alabamav.Glenda LaFaye JONES. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
[35 So.3d 644 646]
Troy King, atty. gen., and James B. Prude, asst. atty. gen., for appellant.
Thomas Jefferson Deen III, Mobile, for appellee.
Glenda LaFaye Jones was indicted for first-degree theft, a violation of § 13A-8-3, Ala.Code 1975. The trial court dismissed the indictment on the grounds that Jones was denied her constitutional right to a speedy trial. Pursuant to Rule 15.7, Ala. R.Crim. P., the State appeals the trial court's judgment dismissing Jones's indictment.
On April 20, 2006, Jones was arrested on charges of first-degree theft stemming from her involvement in an alleged embezzlement scheme in which more than $200,000 was stolen from her former place of employment, the Mobile Gas Service Corporation. Jones was indicted on the same charges more than two years later-on June 27, 2008. On October 8, 2008, Jones filed a motion to dismiss her indictment on the grounds that she had been denied a speedy trial. The trial court held a motion hearing on January 15, 2009; it granted Jones's motion on April 3, 2009. This appeal ensued.
Ex parte Heard, 999 So.2d 978, 980 (Ala.2003), citing Ex parte Key, 890 So.2d 1056, 1059 (Ala.2003).
In determining whether a defendant has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, we apply the test established by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), in which the following four factors are considered: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.
In Ex parte Walker, 928 So.2d 259, 263 (Ala.2005), the Alabama Supreme Court stated:
A. Length of the delay. Jones was arrested on April 20, 2006, and indicted on June 27, 2008; her trial was set to take place on November 4, 2008. The delay in this case was over 30 months.
Ex parte Walker, 928 So.2d at 263-64.
In the instant case, the more than 30-month delay was presumptively prejudicial. See State v. Van Wooten, 952 So.2d 1176 (Ala.Crim.App.2006) (); State v. Stovall, 947 So.2d 1149 (Ala.Crim.App.2006) (); Vincent v. State, 607 So.2d 1290 (Ala.Crim.App.1992) (). Cf. State v. Johnson, 900 So.2d 482 (Ala.Crim.App.2004) (); Payne v. State, 683 So.2d 440 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) ().
B. Reasons for delay. The State conducted extensive investigation of the alleged embezzlement before indicting Jones on a charge of first-degree theft. The following dates, taken from the timeline created by the State, are helpful in analyzing this factor: 1
“ February 10, 2004-[District attorney] subpoena issued to University of Alabama for [Jones's] school records. [District attorney] subpoena issued to Spring Hill College for [Jones's] school records.
“ February 12, 2004-[District attorney] subpoena and Court Order submitted to all 3 credit bureaus for [Jones's] credit history.
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