Horwath v. City of East Palo Alto

• Decision Date: 28 July 1989
• Docket Number: No. A040661,A040661
• Citation: 212 Cal.App.3d 766,261 Cal.Rptr. 108
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Joseph S. HORWATH et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF EAST PALO ALTO et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 108

261 Cal.Rptr. 108

212 Cal.App.3d 766

Joseph S. HORWATH et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF EAST PALO ALTO et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. A040661.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

July 28, 1989.

David A. Self, Douglas Y. Dang, Self, Dang & Wah, Oakland, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Tesfaye W. Tsadik, Stuckey & Johnson, Oakland, for defendants and respondents.

ANDERSON, Presiding Justice.

We decide in this opinion that the City of East Palo Alto's (City) failure to comply fully with statutory requirements governing preparation of an impartial analysis of a proposed ballot measure does not invalidate the subsequently enacted rent control ordinance or its rent rollback provision. Accordingly, the appellants, ¹ certain owners of rental property in East Palo Alto, are not entitled to a writ of mandate commanding respondents City and its Rent Stabilization Board (Board) to refrain from enforcing the ordinance and the rollback.

I. Factual Background

A. Rent Stabilization Ordinances

In May 1984 the East Palo Alto City Council adopted the Rent Stabilization and Eviction for Good Cause Ordinance (Ordinance No. 17-83). Its stated purpose was "to protect residential tenants in the City from unreasonable rent increases by discouraging speculation in rental property and stabilizing rent increases; to protect tenants from arbitrary, discriminatory or retaliatory evictions; and at the same time to assure landlords both a fair return and rental income sufficient to cover costs of maintenance and operating expenses as well as the costs of capital improvements to their rental properties." (Ord. No. 17-83, § 3.) By its terms Ordinance No. 17-83 expired April 30, 1986. (Ord. No. 17-83, § 20.)

The ordinance created the Board to administer the rent control scheme (Ord. No. 17-83, § 6) and established a base rent ceiling ² for each rental unit to function as a reference point for future rent adjustments. Further, the ordinance permitted an annual general adjustment (AGA) tied to the residential rental component of the "Consumer Price Index." ³ (Ord. No. 17-83, § 11.A.) The ordinance directed the Board to compute the AGA in May; landlords were to receive notice of adjustments no later than June 15, 1984, and June 30 of each subsequent year. (Ibid.) A landlord could then collect or charge the adjusted rent after giving each tenant 30 days' advance notice. (Ibid.) Apparently, there were AGA increases of 9 percent and 8 percent for 1984 and 1985 respectively.

In January 1986 the City Council voted to submit an amended version of Ordinance No. 17-83 to the voters at the upcoming general municipal election. The written proposal discussed at the January meeting defined base rent as "the lawful rent actually due and payable on April 1, 1983 plus the 9% general adjustment for 1984 and 8% general adjustment for 1985." (Original emphasis.) However, the minutes indicate that the amended ordinance as adopted (referred to as "Measure A" on the ballot) set the base rent as the rent in effect on April 1, 1985, thereby reflecting the 1984 (9 percent) but not the 1985 (8 percent) increase. Thus, the new base rent resulted in an 8 percent rent rollback.

The voter information pamphlet distributed prior to the April 1986 election contained a "Summery [sic ] of Measure A," signed by Robert W. Johnson, city attorney, as well as an "Impartial Analysis of Measure A," signed by Robert Johnson, city attorney, by Testaye W. Tsadik. These materials did not discuss the rent rollback; the voter pamphlet did not include the actual text of Measure A, but voters could request a copy by mail. The voters adopted Measure A in April 1986. On April 28, the Board informed all landlords that commencing May 1, rents would be rolled back to the April 1, 1985, level.

B. Appellants' Lawsuit

On January 28, 1987, appellants petitioned for a writ of mandate and sought declaratory and monetary relief, all in connection with the respondents' enforcement of the rent rollback. In particular, the petition asked for a writ commanding respondents to (1) refrain from enforcing Measure A in its entirety, as well as its rent rollback clause; (2) restore the 1985 AGA and (3) recalculate the AGA for 1986 and all future years. Appellants asserted that the ordinance as enacted was invalid because the city attorney did not explain Measure A's impact on existing law (i.e., the rollback) as required by the California Elections Code. ⁴

Respondents demurred to the complaint, arguing with respect to the mandamus petition that the statute of limitations set forth in section 5025, ⁵ in addition to the equitable principle of laches, barred that claim. The court overruled the demurrer to the mandamus action, explaining its decision as follows: "The purpose of that statute ... is to prevent the distribution of election materials that are misleading.... [p] [T]he gravamen of his complaint in the first cause of action is that you've impaired his right to vote by failing to give ... the electorate sufficient information on which to exercise their right to vote, and it isn't 5025 that's going to bar an action for that impairment.... [p] Certainly, the valid argument or explanation that's required to be set forth by the city attorney ... gave absolutely no guidance to any voter in East Palo Alto of what was involved in this particular provision, so we're somewhere south of 5025. [p] You can't rely on 5025 ... when an action is brought because you've gone ahead, and by virtue of the failure to comply, enacted an ordinance that allegedly takes without due compensation from the people who do business in your city...."

The writ petition proceeded to hearing, respondents again contending section 5025 and laches compelled denial of the writ. Respondents submitted written materials which included declarations from civic leaders stating that they discussed the rent rollback at numerous community meetings. The chairman of the Board declared that he and others distributed a leaflet advertising the rollback to "almost all residential homes, public places like the supermarket and civic places in East Palo Alto." This time a judge in a different department decided against appellants, ruling they were "just too late" and further holding that section 5025 controlled.

II. Section 5025 Does Not Apply

At the outset we resolve any misperceptions there may be about whether the city attorney met his responsibilities under section 5011. Clearly, by omitting any discussion of the rollback, the city attorney failed to prepare an impartial analysis of Measure A within the meaning of section 5011.

Also, as a preliminary matter and because both rulings in this litigation centered on the applicability of section 5025, we clarify that section 5025 by its terms only governs preelection activities. Its purpose is to facilitate timely correction of preelection ballot errors by allowing a complaining voter to amend or delete offending materials, a remedy which appellants did not, and perhaps could not, seek. ⁶

Having passed the section 5025 hurdle, appellants would have us declare the election void as hopelessly riddled with the effects of misleading official ballot materials. Although we, too, are somewhere south of section 5025, that somewhere leads nowhere because the section 5011 violation will not, without more, sustain appellants' petition. ⁷

III. Discussion

Although several causes of action alleged in the complaint attack the substance of Measure A, the action before us instead challenges the fairness of the election process itself. Appellants' attempt to use the vehicle of prohibitory mandamus ⁸ to contest the election on the theory that the enacting process was so infected by official misinformation about a vital element of the rent control legislation that the legislation must be invalidated.

In order to prevail in their request for extraordinary relief, appellants would have to convince us (1) they have no adequate legal remedy and (2) Measure A is unconstitutional and, thus, the City has a duty to halt its enforcement.

We begin our discussion by exploring the scope of traditional mechanisms for contesting elections to discern how appellants' complaint fits within this scheme, and conclude there is no statutory basis in California for challenging an election on the grounds urged here. Next, we turn to appellants' argument that the lawmaking defects here attained constitutional dimensions, thereby entitling them to extraordinary relief to halt enforcement of the unlawful ordinance. We reject this claim.

A. There is No Statutory Basis for Attacking the Postelection Effects of the Ballot Materials

The election contest provisions set forth in section 20021 et seq. allow an elector of a given city or county to challenge an election held therein on six specified grounds. ⁹ The main purpose of these provisions is "to ascertain the will of the people and to make certain that mistake or fraud has not frustrated the public volition." (Enterprise Residents etc. Committee v. Brennan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 767, 774, 151 Cal.Rptr. 1, 587 P.2d 658.) Courts have applied these provisions to candidate as well as ballot measure elections, and to special as well as general elections. (Canales v. City of Alviso (1970) 3 Cal.3d 118, 129, 89 Cal.Rptr. 601, 474 P.2d 417; Anderson v. County of Santa Barbara (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 780, 786, 128 Cal.Rptr. 707). But they confine their inquiry to the matters prescribed in the provisions enumerating the grounds of contest. (Maddux v. Walthall (1903) 141 Cal. 412, 415, 74 P. 1026 [citing precedessor of § 20021]; see also Williams v. McClellan (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 138, 143-144, 259 P.2d 12 [complaint which does not allege any of the enumerated causes does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action].)

The cause designated in subdivision (c) of section 20021 and, in particular, the "other offense against the elective...