Hospital Authority of City of St. Marys v. Eason
| Decision Date | 08 September 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 23526,23526 |
| Citation | 222 Ga. 536,150 S.E.2d 812 |
| Parties | HOSPITAL AUTHORITY OF the CITY OF ST. MARYS v. Jessee EASON, Administrator. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The evidence was insufficient to raise an issue as to the defendant hospital's liability for its patient's injuries, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur being inapplicable and there being no other evidentiary basis for such liability.
2. In view of 1, above, it is not necessary to rule on the other assignments of error.
Bennet, Gilbert, Gilbert & Whittle, Wallace E. Harrell, Brunswick, for appellant.
Nathan, Hutto & Lee, J. S. Hutto, Brunswick, for appellee.
A suit by a patient, claiming that he was burned as the result of negligence of a hospital, brought about the rulings complained of here. The action was filed by James Eason against Hospital Authority of the City of St. Marys, Camden County, Georgia, known as The Gilman Hospital, in the Superior Court of Camden County. Following the trial the patient died and his administrator was substituted as a party. After a verdict and judgment in favor of the patient, the hospital moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or new trial. Upon the denial of this motion it appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed. Hospital Authority of the City of St. Marys v. Eason, 113 Ga.App. 401, 148 S.E.2d 499.
The hospital, in its application for certiorari, assigned as error the following rulings made by the Court of Appeals: (1) that the evidence supported the verdict and hence the trial court properly denied the hospital's motion above referred to; (2) that the trial court's charge on res ipsa loquitur was authorized; (3) that the charge was not erroneous in failing to instruct as to the duty of the patient to exercise ordinary care for his own safety or as to comparative negligence; and (4) that the hospital waived its right to insist on a mistrial on account of remarks by the patient's counsel in his closing argument to the jury.
The patient's petition alleged, in substance, that he was admitted as a patient to the hospital; that he had a speech impediment, was paralyzed, and could not safely remove a pipe from his mouth; that the hospital knew of his condition; that an unidentified hospital attendant lit his pipe and negligently left him alone while he was smoking it in bed; that, due to his condition as aforesaid, the pipe fell from his mouth; and that the pipe set fire to his bed causing him to be burned.
The hospital denied the material allegations of the petition, except for the plaintiff's status as a patient.
The evidence produced upon the trial was essentially that which follows.
The plaintiff, about two days before the fire, was admitted as a pay patient to the hospital and was placed in a room without another occupant. He was hospitalized for a heart condition, and was paralyzed on his right side and vocally. The testimony was in conflict as to whether he could hold his pipe without assistance. Upon his admission the hospital was notified of his condition and that he could not safely be left alone while smoking in bed. Instructions were given by the hospital to the nurses that he was not to be left alone while doing so.
About the time of admission his family provided a pipe, tobacco and matches for his smoking. The patient used these while nurses on general duty were with him and while company was in his room during visiting hours.
When not thus in use the pipe, tobacco and matches were removed from him and placed on the night stand of the unoccupied bed. The patient was confined to his bed, with raised guardrails, and could not get out and walk across the room to obtain such articles. His bed was equipped with a bed light.
At about noon on the day the fire occurred, a minister's visit, during authorized hours, was terminated by a nurse announcing that she had to bathe the patient. She removed the pipe from the patient's mouth and placed it on the night stand of the bed across the room as the minister left.
About five to ten minutes before the fire, two hospital attendants went into the patient's room for a short time to leave some ice. They testified that no one else was in the room, and one of them testified that when they left the door was open and some unidentified visitors were standing in the hall between the door of his room and that of an adjoining one. This was during visiting hours. There was no testimony, however, that anyone except hospital employees was in his room between the time of the minister's departure and the fire. Likewise, there was no testimony that there was not anyone except hospital employees in his room during that period.
The fire was observed about 2:50 p.m. by a visitor in a room across the hall. That visitor and hospital personnel immediately rushed into the room, tossed flaming sheets out into the hall, and extinguished the flames that had ignited portions of the patient's pajamas. While in this room two nurses observed upon the floor, at an unspecified location, the patient's pipe and a box of matches. Upon being asked if the pipe was lit one testified, 'I don't remember, I picked it up, it wasn't hot, it didn't burn me at the time.' No description of the pipe was given. The matches were not 'Gilman Hospital matches, which were provided by it to those desiring them.
The patient sustained severe burns from the fire.
He did not testify at the trial and relied in the main upon cross examination of the hospital personnel for facts to establish negligence by the hospital.
As to this issue it is well established that a hospital owes a duty to a pay patient to exercise such reasonable care in looking after and protecting the patient as his condition, known to the hospital through its agents and servants charged with the duty of looking after and supervising him, may require; but the hospital is not an insurer of the patient's safety. 26 Am.Jur. 595-596, Hospitals and Asylums, § 14; 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 8(3), p. 349. See for collection of Georgia cases, 12A Ga.Digest Hospitals k7, p. 239.
Here, the claim of negligence is predicated upon some hospital employee lighting the pipe and then leaving the patient unattended while smoking it, notwithstanding the hospital's knowledge of the patient's condition and the danger of leaving him unattended when smoking. It is not contended that the hospital should have...
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