Bulloch County Hospital Authority v. Fowler

• Decision Date: 30 June 1971
• Docket Number: Nos. 1,Nos. 45637-45640,2,3,s. 45637-45640,s. 1
• Citation: 183 S.E.2d 586,124 Ga.App. 242
• Parties: BULLOCH COUNTY HOSPITAL AUTHORITY v. Mrs. C. M. FOWLER. Mrs. C. M. FOWLER v. BULLOCH COUNTY HOSPITAL AUTHORITY. John MOONEY, Jr. v. Mrs. C. M. FOWLER. Mrs. C. M. FOWLER v. John MOONEY, Jr
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 586

183 S.E.2d 586

124 Ga.App. 242

BULLOCH COUNTY HOSPITAL AUTHORITY v. Mrs. C. M. FOWLER.

Mrs. C. M. FOWLER v. BULLOCH COUNTY HOSPITAL AUTHORITY.

John MOONEY, Jr. v. Mrs. C. M. FOWLER.

Mrs. C. M. FOWLER v. John MOONEY, Jr.

Nos. 45637-45640.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division Nos. 1, 2, 3.

June 30, 1971.

Rehearing Denied July 14 and July 16, 1971.

Certiorari Denied Sept. 8, 1971.

Syllabus by the Court

1. (a) A petition or complaint brought under provisions of the Civil Practice Act should be brief, containing a short and plain statement of the claim upon which relief can be granted.

(b) A motion to dismiss a complaint will not lie unless it appears as a matter of law, or beyond doubt, that the plaintiff cannot, by competent evidence, demonstrate that he is entitled to relief thereunder.

2. In an action for wrongful death the status or size of a plaintiff's family is not germane to the action.

3. (a) Where a widow sues for the wrongful death of her husband the measure of damages is the 'full value of his life,' and the jury is not to be limited in its finding to the gross sum that he would have earned to the end of his life, had he lived, reduced to its present cash value.

(b) However, the measure of damages does not include any allowance for the loss of a husband's providing for the wants and needs of his family.

(c) Nor does it include a recovery for the mental suffering, grief or wounded feelings of the wife and children, or for a solatium.

4. Proper rulings were made by the trial court upon objections to discovery interrogatories.

Mrs. C. M. Fowler brought suit against Bulloch County Hospital Authority and Dr. John Mooney, Jr., seeking recovery for the wrongful death of her husband. She alleged, inter alia, that her husband suffered a heart attack while at the place of business of W. T. Spradley in Statesboro on the afternoon of March 9, 1969.

Mr. Spradley took Fowler home in an automobile and upon arrival at approximately 5:20 o'clock he was pale, in a cold sweat, dizzy and staggering, complaining of a severe pain in his chest. Plaintiff immediately called Dr. Mooney, related these matters to him and was instructed by the doctor to take her husband at once to the emergency room of the hospital, saying that he was then leaving his office and would meet her there. With the assistance of Mr. Spradley plaintiff got her husband into an automobile and took him to the hospital, arriving at the emergency room at about 5:30. Dr. Mooney had not yet arrived, but plaintiff informed personnel of the hospital that she had called him and was expecting him to arrive momentarily The husband was placed on a couch in the emergency room, awaiting the doctor's arrival. After the passage of some time a nurse led plaintiff and Mr. Spradley, who were assisting the husband, to a room where he was placed on a bed, and his blood pressure was taken. The nurse directed that the husband be moved to another room. A wheel chair was obtained and he was moved.

Plaintiff urged the nurse to call Dr. Mooney and ask him to come at once, but efforts to reach him were unavailing. Mr. Spradley then asked that another doctor be called, but this was not done because of a rule or understanding between the doctors of that community and the hospital (of which plaintiff was unaware) the when one doctor had been called or engaged by a patient no other would be summoned, unless by that doctor himself, or at his direction. Noticing that her husband was turning blue, pounding his chest and gasping for breath, plaintiff asked the nurse whether oxygen should not be provided to him, but none was provided. Dr. Mooney finally came in some time after 6:30 and upon seeing the husband's condition directed that he be placed in the intensive care unit immediately, but before he could be moved the husband went into a grand mal seizure and his heart action stopped. Dr. Mooney administered oxygen and adrenalin directly into the heart in an effort to get the heart action started again, but to no avail.

Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Mooney had stopped at a drug store after leaving his office and had engaged in conversation with a friend for about an hour before coming to the hospital, knowing full well that her husband was in urgent need of emergency attention.

The husband was 40 years of age, and had retired in 1965 from the U.S. Navy after 23 years of service, with the rank of Chief Petty Officer, entitling him to a retirement income of $300 per month, and that at the time of his death he was engaged in business as a barber, earning approximately $150 per week, with a potential of increased earnings.

Other allegations, some of which defendants seek to have stricken, will be dealt with in the opinion.

The motions to dismiss were denied. Some of the motions to strike were sustained, while others were denied. Rulings on objections to discovery interrogatories were made. Each of the defendants appeals and plaintiff cross appeals, and between them error is enumerated on all rulings made by the court.

Robert S. Lanier, Allen, Edenfield, Brown & Franklin, B. Avant Edenfield, Statesboro, for Hospital Authority.

Neville & Neville, W. J. Neville, Johnston & Brannen, Sam L. Brannen, Statesboro, for Mooney.

Alton D. Kitchings, Savannah, for Fowler.

PER CURIAM.

1. It is urged that the lengthy complaint (nineteen paragraphs and numerous subparagraphs on twelve pages of foolscap) wholly fails to comply with the provisions of Code Ann. § 81A-108(a). It must Looking to the merits of the motion, it is observed that while no malpractice by the doctor is alleged as to the treatment actually afforded plaintiff's husband, and negligence does not appear from the mere fact that there was a failure to effect a recovery by the husband, for the doctor is not an insurer or a warrantor that his professional skill and efforts will effect a cure, Lake v. Baccus, 59 Ga.App. 656(1), 2 S.E.2d 121, and he is not obliged to bring to the practice of his profession the utmost skill, and is not responsible for a mistake of judgment if he applies the reasonable care and skill which the law requires, yet if there has been an error of judgment so gross as to be inconsistent with that degree of care and skill, he may be liable for such damages as may be shown to flow therefrom. Bryan v. Grace, 63 Ga.App. 373, 11 S.E.2d 241. The unfavorable result raises no unfavorable presumption against the doctor. Branch v. Anderson, 47 Ga.App. 858, 860, 171 S.E. 771. But, having accepted employment for treating the husband it became the doctor's duty to use reasonable care and diligence in affording him attention and treatment. Cf. Norton v. Hamilton, 92 Ga.App. 727, 731, 89 S.E.2d 809. If it should appear that the husband died from a heart condition the course of which the doctor could not, by use of reasonable care and skill, have changed, the doctor should not be held for damages. Branch v. Anderson, 47 Ga.App. 858, 171 S.E. 771, supra. 'It is a general rule as well settled as anything in the law of negligence that a man is responsible for such consequences of his fault as are natural and probable, and might therefore be seen by ordinary forecast, but if his fault happens to concur with something extraordinary, and therefore not likely to be foreseen, he will not be answerable for the extraordinary result.' Corley v. Cobb County, 21 Ga.App. 219, 223, 93 S.E. 1015, 1016. And see Sweat v. Foster, 28 Ga.App. 360, 111 S.E. 66; Georgia Northern R. Co. v. Ingram, 114 Ga. 639, 40 S.E. 708.

be conceded that the complaint is not a 'short and plain statement of the claim,' particularly when we consider the form prescribed in § 81A-309 in connection with § 81A-108(a). The trial judge might well have stricken the complaint, granting leave to replead in accordance with these provisions of the Civil Practice Act, but he did not. ¹

The doctor's relationship to the hospital is that of an independent contractor, and he is not to be held for the negligence, if any, of the hospital. Black v. Fischer, 30 Ga.App. 109, 117 S.E. 103; Timmons v. Fulton Bag and Cotton Mills, 45 Ga.App. 670, 166 S.E. 40. For the same reason the hospital is not to be held for negligence, if any, of the doctor. Jeter v. Davis-Fischer Sanitarium Co., 28 Ga.App. 708, 113 S.E. 29.

There was no concert of action. The actions of the doctor and of the hospital were mutually independent. They were not joint tortfeasors. Separate verdicts will be required. Schneider v. City Council of Augusta, 118 Ga. 610, 45 S.E. 459. Howe v. Bradstreet Co., 135 Ga. 564, 69 S.E. 1082; Vaughn v. Burnette, 211 Ga. 206, 84 S.E.2d 568; City of Albany v. Brown, 17 Ga.App. 707, 88 S.E. 215; Key v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 18 Ga.App. 472, 89 S.E. 593; United Cigar Stores Co. v. Georgia Ry. & Power Co., 27 Ga.App. 198(2), 107 S.E. 781; Armstrong v. Southern Ry. Co., 29 Ga.App. 418, 116 S.E. 31; Scott v. Edwards, 50 Ga.App. 373, 178 S.E. 175. And see Brooks v. Ashburn, 9 Ga. 297(3); Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Brown, 113 Ga. 414(2), 38 S.E. 989, 84 Am.St.Rep. 250. Prior to the adoption of the Civil Practice Act they could not have been joined in one action The standard of care required of a hospital is clearly stated in Emory University v. Shadburn, 47 Ga.App. 643, 171 S.E. 192, affirmed in 180 Ga. 595, 180 S.E. 137; Hospital Authority of City of St. Marys v. Eason, 222 Ga. 536, 539, 150 S.E.2d 812.

but it is now permissible under Code Ann. § 81A-118, 81A-120, 81A-310.

In any event, and without any consideration of the numerous conclusions of the pleader or of allegations which could not be supported by admissible evidence, we conclude, construing the appropriate allegations in favor of the pleader, as we must do, that it cannot be said that beyond doubt the plaintiff cannot, within the framework of her complaint, demonstrate by competent evidence that she has a claim upon which relief can be granted. Denial of the motions to dismiss was proper. Harper v....