Hospital Authority of Hall County v. Adams

• Decision Date: 25 November 1964
• Docket Number: No. 1,No. 40740,40740,1
• Citation: 110 Ga.App. 848,140 S.E.2d 139
• Parties: HOSPITAL AUTHORITY OF HALL COUNTY and City of Gainesville v. Mrs. Vera ADAMS
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 139

140 S.E.2d 139

110 Ga.App. 848

HOSPITAL AUTHORITY OF HALL COUNTY and City of Gainesville v. Mrs. Vera ADAMS.

No. 40740.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 1.

Nov. 25, 1964.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 8, 1964 and Dec. 17, 1964.

Syllabus by the Court

1. There being sufficient evidence to authorize a verdict for the plaintiff based upon the negligence of the defendant hospital the trial court did not err in overruling the motion of the defendant for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

2. The charge that 'if the jury finds that Garland Adams met his death as alleged, but that the same was due not to negligence of the defendant but of Garland Adams himself, or if due to the negligence of the defendant, the same could have been discovered by Garland Adams and injury prevented by the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety, the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover', is not subject to the criticisms that it eliminated from the jury's consideration the theory of accident and the defendant hospital's contention that the injury was due to negligence of another, the physician, nor is it subject to the criticisms that it conflicted with the charges given on accident and relating to the alleged negligence of the physician. A charge is not erroneous because it fails to embrace instructions upon another theory of the case. Crawford v. Noles, 90 Ga.App. 315(2), 83 S.E.2d 39; Currie v. State, 153 Ga. 178(1), 111 S.E. 727.

3. The court charged the jury, 'when a complaining party seeks to recover damages for the alleged negligence of an opposite party, the complaining party must prove to your satisfaction under the rules given you in charge that the alleged injury and damage was proximately caused by one or more of the acts of negligence charged against the opposite party in the complaining party's pleading.' Error is assigned on this charge on the ground that it submitted issues of negligence to the jury upon which there was no evidence and on allegations of negligence which did not constitute a legal basis for recovery. 'The charge complained of stated an abstractly correct principle of law which was applicable to this case. Southern Ry. Co. v. Bullock, 42 Ga.App. 495, 498(3), 156 S.E. 456; Chandler v. Pollard, 64 Ga.App. 122, 125(1), 12 S.E.2d 190; Butler v. Kane, 96 Ga.App. 521, 523(1), 100 S.E.2d 598. It was not a charge submitting issues to the jury but merely told the jury what minimum facts with respect to the defendant's negligence the plaintiff would have to prove in order to recover.' Williams v. Vinson, 104 Ga.App. 886, 891(2), 123 S.E.2d 281, 286, 91 A.L.R.2d 889. Cowart v. Gunn, 90 Ga.App. 680, 682(2), 83 S.E.2d 832. Those cases holding that such a charge is error where one or more grounds of negligence alleged do not constitute a legal basis for recovery are cases where demurrers have been sustained to allegations of negligence in the petition (Executive Comm. of Baptist Convention v. Ferguson, 213 Ga. 441, 99 S.E.2d 150) on where, in the case on review, it is held that demurrers interposed to one or more of the allegations of negligence should have been sustained (Central of Ga.Ry. Co. v. Keating, 177 Ga. 345(4b), 170 S.E. 493). It does not appear in the present case that demurrers were interposed to any of the allegations of negligence contained in the petition, and the above cases do not apply.

4. The charge 'that in order for a party to be held liable for negligence, it is not necessary that he should have been able to anticipate the particular consequences which ensued. It is sufficient if in ordinary prudence he might have foreseen some injury would result from his act or omission and that consequences of a generally injurious nature might result,' is in accordance with the decisions of this court stating such principle and is not error. Mitchell v. Schofield's Sons Co., 16 Ga.App. 686, 690, 85 S.E. 978; Ethridge v. Nicholson, 80 Ga.App. 693, 695, 57 S.E.2d 231; Medlock v. Barfield, 90 Ga.App. 759, 761, 84 S.E.2d 113; Emory University v. Lee, 97 Ga.App. 680, 691, 104 S.E.2d 234. While the word 'might' may carry with it connotations of mere possibility rather than probability when a part of pleadings and construed most strongly against the pleader on demurrer and while the rule might be better stated by using the words 'might and ought' or 'could and should' (see Wright v. Southern Ry. Co., 62 Ga.App. 316, 320, 7 S.E.2d 793; Norris v. Macon Terminal Co., 58 Ga.App. 313, 317, 198 S.E. 272, we do not think that the charge as given misled the jury into believing that possibilities rather than probabilities governed the application of this charge to the facts of the case.

5. The amount of the verdict in favor of the plaintiff, while a full one, was authorized by the evidence and was not so excessive as to justify the inference of gross mistake or undue bias.

Troutman, Sams, Schroder & Lockerman, Atlanta, Whelchel, Dunlap & Gignilliat, James A. Dunlap, Sam A. Harben, Jr., Gainesville, for plaintiff in error.

Telford, Wayne & Greer, Joe K. Telford, C. Dent Bostrick, Gainesville, for defendant in error.

F. M. Bird, Trammell Vickery, Atlanta, for party at interest not party to record.

PANNELL, Judge.

Mrs. Vera Adams, as plaintiff, brought an action against the Hospital Authority of Hall County and the City of Gainesville seeking to recover the full value of the life of her husband, Garland Adams, who died as a result of injuries received while a patient in the defendant hospital. Upon the trial of the case, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $115,000. The defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for new trial on the general grounds and four special grounds. All of the special grounds were exceptions to charges of the court except one in which it was contended that the verdict was excessive and was the result of prejudice, bias, or gross mistake. Only headnotes 1 and 5 require elaboration.

Upon the trial of the case, the evidence showed that the plaintiff's husband entered the defendant hospital on September 26, 1962, for examination and treatment, and that while a patient he received a retrograde pyelogram (an examination of the kidneys without an incision by the insertion of an illuminating device in the tube that drains the bladder). He was administered various drugs, prior to this examination and afterward, including sodium penothal, demerol and atropine. While he was still in an apparently sleepy, tired and dazed condition, and still under the influence of said drugs, although able to intelligently respond to questions and in control of his mental faculties, he was carried on a stretcher to the X-ray room in the defendant hospital upon instructions from his physician. He was able to move from his bed to the stretcher to be carried to the X-ray room by inching very slowly on his side and was able to move from the stretcher to the X-ray table in the same manner. There were two technicians in the X-ray room, and they testified that he followed instructions for the taking of the pictures, and that after the pictures were taken he informed them that he was nauseated. They both left the room for four or five minutes, and upon re-entering the room heard groans and one of them thought the patient had gone to the bathroom and was vomiting. They discovered the patient, however, lying on his stomach on the floor behind the X-ray table and...