Hotel, Motel, Restaurant, Const. Camp Emp. and Bartenders Union Local 879 v. Thomas

• Decision Date: 02 July 1976
• Docket Number: No. 2703,2703
• Citation: 551 P.2d 942
• Parties: 17 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 727, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 11,078 HOTEL, MOTEL, RESTAURANT, CONSTRUCTION CAMP EMPLOYEES AND BARTENDERS UNION LOCAL 879, Petitioner, v. Neil THOMAS, Executive Director of the Alaska State Commission for Human Rights, and Alaska State Commission for Human Rights, Respondents.
• Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Page 942

551 P.2d 942

17 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 727,

12 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 11,078

HOTEL, MOTEL, RESTAURANT, CONSTRUCTION CAMP EMPLOYEES AND BARTENDERS UNION LOCAL 879, Petitioner, v. Neil THOMAS, Executive Director of the Alaska State

Commission for Human Rights, and Alaska State

Commission for Human Rights, Respondents.

No. 2703.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

July 2, 1976.

James M. Hackett and Rita T. Allee, Fairbanks, for petitioner.

Carolyn E. Jones, Asst. Atty. Gen., Anchorage and Avrum M. Gross, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for respondents.

Before BOOCHEVER, C. J., and RABINOWITZ, CONNOR, ERWIN and BURKE, JJ.

OPINION

RABINOWITZ, Justice.

In February 1975, respondent Thomas, Executive Director of the Alaska State Commission for Human Rights, filed with the Commission a complaint against the Hotel, Motel, Restaurant, Construction Camp Employees and Bartenders Union Local 879 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Union'). The complaint was in the nature of a class action, alleging that the Union had engaged in a pattern and practice of employment discrimination against women in allocation of union jobs. An administrative hearing was scheduled for October 1975, but one week prior to the hearing date the Union filed an action in superior court seeking a writ of prohibition. The Union alleged, among other things, that Executive Director Thomas and the Commission lacked the authority under the relevant statutes to issue an administrative complaint on behalf of a class of persons purportedly victimized by unlawful discrimination. After a hearing, the superior court entered an order granting a writ of prohibition. The superior court ruled that, while Thomas had the authority under AS 18.80.100 to file a complaint in the nature of a class action before the Commission, the matter could not proceed until the Commission had promulgated regulations governing the procedures by which a class action complaint would be administratively adjudicated.

The Union thereafter petitioned this court for review of the superior court's determination that the executive director has the power to file an administrative complaint in the nature of a class action. Inasmuch as this petition raises a controlling question of law which has significant implications for this state's efforts to eradicate illegal discrimination and which warrants prompt resolution, we granted the petition for review. ¹

The authority of the executive director to file a complaint before the Commission is found in AS 18.80.100, which provides:

A person who believes he is aggrieved by any discriminatory conduct prohibited by this chapter may sign and file with the commission a written, verified complaint stating the name and address of the person alleged to have engaged in discriminatory conduct, and the particulars of the discrimination. The executive director may file a complaint in like manner when an alleged discrimination comes to his attention.

A complaint drawn in the nature of a class action, seeking classwide relief, is neither expressly authorized nor explicitly forbidden by AS 18.80.100. The Union argues that this silence evidences an intent on the part of the legislature to limit the power of the director to initiate only complaints based on specific individual grievances. Other statutory provisions are stressed as further evidence of this intent. As an alternative to seeking an administrative remedy, AS 22.10.020(c) permits an individual who is aggrieved by illegal discrimination, prohibited by Title 18, Chapter 80, to file suit in superior court for relief. AS 22.10.020(c) further provides that the action may be maintained individually or '. . . on behalf of a class consisting of all persons who are aggrieved or injured by the act, practice, or policy giving rise to the action.' Although the Commission enjoys a limited right under AS 18.80.145(a) to intervene in a private class action brought pursuant to AS 22.10.020(c), the executive director does not have statutory authority to initiate a class action in the superior court. ² From this the Union infers that Alaska's legislature intended to deny the executive director the right to bring a classwide complaint to the Commission for administrative resolution.

We do not find this argument persuasive. Considered in isolation, the relevant statutory grant of authority, AS 18.80.100, equally supports the inference that a class action complaint is available and the inference that it is not. Thus, AS 18.80.100 presents a classic instance of statutory ambiguity. In such cases we have said that the intention of the legislature must be determined by construing the provision in question with reference to the purpose of the entire legislative enactment. ³ The objective of Title 18, Chapter 80, is the elimination and prevention of discrimination, in many facets of our society, where such discrimination is based on race, religion, color, national origin, sex, age, marital status, pregnancy or parenthood. More particularly, AS 18.80.200 provides:

(a) It is determined and declared as a matter of legislative finding that discrimination against an inhabitant of the state because of race, religion, color, national origin, age, sex, marital status changes in marital status, pregnancy or parenthood is a matter of public concern and that such discrimination not only threatens the rights and privileges of the inhabitants of the state but also menaces the institutions of the state and threatens peace, order, health, safety and general welfare of the state and its inhabitants.

(b) Therefore, it is the policy of the state and the purpose of this chapter to eliminate and prevent discrimination in employment, in credit and financing practices, in places of public accommodation, in the sale, lease, or rental of real property because of race, religion, color, national origin, sex, age, marital status, changes in marital status, pregnancy or parenthood. . . .

In order to effectuate this purpose, the legislature established by Title 18, Chapter 80, a State Commission for Human Rights ⁴ and authorized the appointment of an executive director. ⁵ The Commission and its director are charged with broad responsibilities to study and report on the problems of discrimination, ⁶ to receive and investigate complaints of illegal discrimination from individuals, ⁷ to eliminate alleged discriminatory practices by informal methods of conference and conciliation when possible ⁸ and, when not, to hold an administrative hearing, ⁹ and ultimately to issue a remedial order when allegations of discrimination are proven. ¹⁰ In addition, the legislature has seen fit to give the executive director authority to activate the administrative machinery on his own initiative, by filing a formal complaint, when evidence of unlawful discrimination comes to his attention. Clearly the legislature intended the Commission to be more than a simple complaint-taking bureau; the statutory scheme constitutes a mandate to the agency to seek out and eradicate discrimination in employment, in credit and financing practices, in places of public accommodations, and in the sale, lease, or rental of real property.

The Union further relies upon certain episodes in the legislative history of Title 18, Chapter 80, particularly statutory amendments enacted in 1965 at the request of the governor to bring Alaska's law 'into conformity' with federal civil rights legislation. The Union argues by analogy that because the federal administrative agency, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, lacks the authority to issue administrative complaints in the nature of a class action, the legislature of this state must have intended to deny Alaska's Commission that enforcement power.

We find this analogy unpersuasive. A cursory comparison reveals that the antidiscrimination legislation enacted in Alaska is not substantially similar to comparable federal laws. ¹¹ In a series of political compromises, Congress limited the adjudicatory and coercive enforcement of the EEOC powers in favor of reliance on private citizen action as the primary mechanism for ensuring compliance with federal laws. ¹² At the administrative level the EEOC is relegated to 'conference, conciliation and persuasion' in order to resolve complaints of employment discrimination. ¹³ By contrast, Alaska's State Commission for Human Rights is endowed with a full panoply of administrative powers, including the authority to investigate complaints, to hold hearings, to issue remedial orders and to obtain judicial enforcement of those orders in superior court. It is apparent that the more limited role of the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is of dubious assistance in ascertaining the scope of the powers conferred by the legislature on the Alaska State Commission for Human Rights.

Considerably more helpful are the decisions of several state courts bearing on this question. Minnesota has enacted antidiscrimination legislation and charged an administrative agency with its enforcement. The act contains statutory language quite similar to AS 18.80.100. ¹⁴ In Richardson v. I. S. D. No. 271, 297 Minn. 91, 210 N.W.2d 911 (1973), the Supreme Court of that state held that the state's Human Rights Commissioner had the authority to file an administrative complaint in the nature of a class action. The Minnesota court found this interpretation compelled by that state's strong public policy against racial and sexual discrimination, and the broad statutory responsibility entrusted to the Commission to eradicate those evils. As did the superior court below, we find the reasoning of the majority opinion in that decision persuasive.

Maryland also has an antidiscrimination statute which, in language similar to AS 18.80.100, authorizes the agency to initiate its own administrative complaint. ¹⁵ In Ferguson v. United Parcel Service, 7 F.E.P. Cases 411 (Md.Cir.Ct.), aff'd, 270 Md. 202, 311 A.2d 220 (1973), cert. denied sub nom. ...