Richardson v. School Bd. of I. S. D. No. 271
| Decision Date | 03 August 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 44034,44034 |
| Parties | , 6 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 181, 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8760 Samuel L. RICHARDSON, Human Rights Commissioner, Complainant-Respondent, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF I.S.D. NO. 271, Respondent-Petitioner. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Writs of prohibition are issued to prevent inferior courts or tribunals from exercising judicial or quasi-judicial power not authorized by law which will result in injury for which there is no adequate remedy.
2. Minn.St. c. 363 of the human rights act is construed to permit class actions by the commissioner of human rights. Such construction permits fulfillment of the legislative purpose set out in the statute as amended.
3. The Minnesota statute permits initiation of actions before the Human Rights Commission not only by the aggrieved person, but also specifically authorizes the commissioner to initiate such actions.
4. Violations may be established in a class action brought by the commissioner of human rights but enforcement can be only on an individual case-by-case basis for those persons within the class.
5. Class actions commenced by the commissioner can only include those persons whose rights accrue within the statutory period of limitations for the filing of complaints under the statute.
Kingsley D. Holman, Bloomington, for respondent-petitioner.
Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Curtis Forslund, Sol. Gen., Gary C. Reiter, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for complainant-respondent.
Peter S. Popovich, and Ivars J. Krafts, St. Paul, for amicus curiae.
Heard and considered en banc.
Independent School District No. 271, respondent below, seeks a writ of prohibition prohibiting the commissioner of human rights and a hearing examiner of the Department of Human Rights from proceeding with a hearing on an alleged violation of our human rights act, Minn.St. c. 363, and including in said hearing a class of persons who have not filed complaints with the commissioner within the 6-month period provided by the statute of limitations. The parties stipulate that only one person has filed a complaint. The writ of prohibition is discharged in part and made absolute in part.
Respondent school district had a policy requiring all pregnant teachers to resign at the fifth month of pregnancy. On April 2, 1971, Mrs. Peggy Samuelson, charging party in the initial proceedings, tendered her resignation as a result of her pregnancy, the voluntariness of said resignation not being before us at this time. The Minnesota Department of Human Rights has promulgated guidelines, effective June 22, 1971, regarding sex discrimination under our act, which had been amended in 1969 to prohibit discriminatory practices because of sex. The guidelines specifically made it an unfair discriminatory practice for an employer to deny pregnant females maternity leave of absence. On September 13, 1971, within the 6-month statutory period of limitations, 1 Mrs. Samuelson filed a charge with the commissioner alleging discriminatory practices by the respondent school district.
Following investigation, the commissioner on July 13, 1972, issued a complaint against respondent school district which included the complaint of the charging party, Mrs. Samuelson, and also included the following classes of persons: (a) Female employees in full or part-time service to respondent who were denied maternity leave from and after June 6, 1969; 2 (b) female employees in full or part-time service to respondent who were denied maternity leave prior to June 6, 1969, but who sought or were returned to full or part-time employment from and after June 6, 1969.
The writ sought by the school district seeks to exclude these last two classifications from consideration in whole or in part at the hearing on the charge filed by Mrs. Samuelson. The record does indicate that at some time, the exact date not being disclosed, following the filing of Mrs. Samuelson's charge, the school board changed its policy with reference to maternity leave to conform with the guidelines issued by the Department of Human Rights.
1. Our court has repeatedly held that a writ of prohibition is an extraordinary writ issuing out of this court to prevent inferior courts or tribunals from exceeding their jurisdiction. The grounds for issuance of the writ are generally stated as follows: (1) The inferior court or tribunal is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power; (2) the exercise of such power is unauthorized by law; and (3) it will result in injury for which there is no other adequate remedy. State v. Hartman, 261 Minn. 314, 112 N.W.2d 340 (1961).
There is no dispute raised by the parties as to the first element. However, the school district does assert that the commissioner lacks jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter because (a) a class action may not be maintained under Minn.St. c. 363; (b) the parties, other than Mrs. Samuelson, have not complied with the statutory prerequisite of filing a charge within 6 months of the violation pursuant to Minn.St. 363.06, subd. 3; and (c) the guidelines of the commissioner relating to discrimination based on sex could not have retroactive effect. The parties agree that if the commissioner has no right to bring a class action, the writ should be made absolute.
2. The instant case presents the first attempt by this court to determine the commissioner's right to commence class actions. While there is an absence of both Minnesota and foreign case law on point, 3 there is sufficient statutory language to infer that this right is within the policy objectives outlined in § 363.12, subd. 1. 4
Discriminatory practices are a fact of life. While they may apply on an individual basis, their effect is much broader and generally involve a class of persons outside of the particular individual. 5 It seems unreasonable to interpret the appropriate legislation which has as its purpose eliminating discriminatory practices as requiring the commissioner to wait for individual complaints and proceed on a case-by-case basis. We cannot, therefore, agree with the school district's view that elimination of discriminatory practices can be accomplished without the aid of class suits. Rather, c. 363 vests in the commissioner authority to formulate a coherent program, something he could not accomplish if he had to rely on individual grievances. 6
On such a close question of statutory interpretation, we must rely on the dictates of § 363.11, which states that the provisions of c. 363 are to be liberally construed to accomplish the purposes of the state act which are set out in § 363.12, and which include the public policy of securing equal employment opportunity. Moreover, to construe Minn.St.1971, § 363.071, subd. 2, as denying the right of the commissioner to obtain relief for a class of persons affected by discriminatory practices simply because that provision refers to a 'charging party,' disregards the mandates of other statutes within this chapter previously mentioned and evidences a strict interpretation to which we cannot adhere. 7
3. Pursuanrt to the applicable statutes, there are two methods of instituting an action before the Department of Human Rights. The first contemplates the filing of a charge by an 'aggrieved person' pursuant to Minn.St. 363.06, subd. 1, which charge blossoms into a filed complaint issued by the commissioner if he determines that probable cause exists to credit the allegations contained in the charge. Minn.St.1971, § 363.06, subd. 4(2). The second method provides for a commissioner-initiated complaint based on reasonable cause to believe that a person is engaging in an unfair discriminatory practice. §§ 363.05, subd. 1(9), and 363.06, subd. 2. 8
Of the many states which have established departments or commissions of this type in an effort to eliminate and prevent discrimination, only about 10 states provide statutory procedures whereby the antidiscrimination agency itself may initiate the action, 9 as may be done in Minnesota. While it has been suggested that the underlying rationale of such procedure is uncertainty that private individuals can be relied on to file the necessary complaint due to the time and expense involved and their fear of reprisals, 10 we believe this view to be overly restrictive. The 1967 amendments to c. 363 which allow the commissioner to file his own complaint were obviously intended to bolster the previously ineffectual state act dealing with discriminatory practices. 11 ] The act now allows the commissioner of human rights to issue complaints against persons engaging in discriminatory practices regardless of whether a charge is filed by a 'charging party.' Minn.St.1971, §§ 363.05, subd. 1(9), and 363.06, subd. 2. Therefore, the commissioner may seek a cease and desist order from the agency on his own initiative. § 363.071, subd. 2. This remedy in itself seeks relief for a class of individuals who have been the object of discriminatory practices. By close analogy, the commissioner has the alternative ofseeking relief for a defined class of similarly situated persons by issuing a complaint in their behalf. While the instant case presents a factual situation wherein the defined class is represented by a 'representative party,' this is not a necessary prerequisite under the statute.
4. While class actions are maintainable pursuant to Minn.St.1971, §§ 363.05, subd. 1(9), 363.06, subd. 2, and 363.071, subd. 2, by necessity, enforcement can only be on an individual case-by-case method. If the hearing examiner in this case were to determine that the school district has engaged in an unfair discriminatory practice, he would promulgate relief accordingly. Thereafter, any party wishing to be included in the previously defined class would be required to make an appearance before the commissioner and prove that she did indeed fall within the limitations of the class as defined...
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