Hougland v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., Inc.
| Decision Date | 25 February 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 69662,69662 |
| Citation | 939 S.W.2d 31 |
| Parties | Sharon HOUGLAND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PULITZER PUBLISHING CO., INC., Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Steven N. May, St. Louis, for plaintiff-appellant.
Brown & James, P.C., Russell F. Watters, T. Michael Ward, St. Louis, for defendant-respondent.
Sharon Hougland (Hougland) appeals the trial court's entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict after a judgment of $44,500 was entered against Pulitzer Publishing Co., Inc. (Pulitzer) for personal injuries Hougland sustained after being struck by a vehicle driven by David Carron (Carron), a newspaper distributor delivering newspapers printed by Pulitzer. We affirm.
At approximately 4:30 a.m. on October 2, 1992, Hougland was jogging and was struck by a van driven by Carron. Hougland suffered serious permanent injuries as a result of the accident. At the time of the accident, Carron was delivering the St. Louis Post Dispatch which is a newspaper printed by Pulitzer.
Hougland filed suit against Carron and his partner, and against Pulitzer. In her petition, Hougland alleged that Carron's negligence was the proximate cause of her injuries. Additionally, Hougland alleged Carron's negligent actions were within the scope and course of his employment for Pulitzer and as a result, Pulitzer should be held liable for Carron's negligence.
After a settlement was negotiated with Carron and his partner, Hougland dismissed them as defendants from the cause of action. A trial proceeded against Pulitzer as the remaining defendant. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Hougland and against Pulitzer finding that Hougland's damages totalled $210,000. The jury assessed Hougland's fault at 55 percent and Pulitzer's fault at 45 percent for the accident. After considering Hougland's $50,000 settlement with Carron and his partner and the comparative fault assessed against Hougland by the jury, the trial court entered judgment in the amount of $44,500 in favor of Hougland and against Pulitzer.
Pulitzer filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, a new trial. Although the trial court denied Pulitzer's motion for new trial, it sustained Pulitzer's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court found that the undisputed material facts at trial established as a matter of law that Carron was an independent contractor and not an employee of Pulitzer when he was delivering newspapers. Thereafter, the trial court set aside the judgment entered on the jury verdict and entered judgment, non obstante verdicto, in favor of Pulitzer and against Hougland. This appeal followed.
In her only point on appeal, Hougland argues the trial court erred by sustaining Pulitzer's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Hougland asserts that whether or not Carron was an employee of Pulitzer or an independent contractor was a fact issue for determination by the jury and not a matter of law for the trial court to decide. Hougland contends that she produced substantial evidence at trial from which the jury may have concluded that an employer-employee relationship existed.
We will affirm the entry of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict if the defendant was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Thieme v. Tour-Toiseshell, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 795, 796 (Mo.App. E.D.1994). When the facts are undisputed, the trial court may declare as a matter of law that one is or is not an independent contractor. Williamson v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 265 S.W.2d 354, 359 (Mo.1954). There is no issue of fact for the jury to decide "if the 'facts' alleged to be in dispute are actually differing opinions of the parties of the legal effect of documents or actions which determine their respective rights." Roberts Fertilizer, Inc. v. Steinmeier, 748 S.W.2d 883, 887 (Mo.App. W.D.1988). Interpretation of provisions within a contract is a matter of law for the trial court to decide, not a factual issue for resolution by the jury. Smith v. Inter-County Tel. Co., 559 S.W.2d 518, 525 (Mo. banc 1977), overruled on other grounds by Matteuzzi v. Columbus Partnership, L.P., 866 S.W.2d 128, 132 (Mo. banc 1993).
Hougland's theory of recovery at trial was based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, if an employee commits negligent acts or omissions within the scope of his employment, his employer is liable for the damages. Wilson v. St. Louis Area Council, Boy Scouts, 845 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Mo.App. E.D.1992). Only if a master-servant relationship exists between the parties does the doctrine of respondeat superior act to impose liability on an employer. Id. To determine if respondeat superior applies, it must be determined if the person sought to be charged as master had the right or power to control and direct the physical conduct of the other while working. Id. If there is no right to control, there is no liability because no master-servant relationship exists. Id.
If there is no right to control, the person contracted to perform the work is an independent contractor. "An independent contractor is one who contracts with another to do something for him but is neither controlled by the other nor subject to the other's control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking." Tom Lange Co. v. Cleaning by House Beautiful, 793 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Mo.App. E.D.1990). Someone who contracts for the services of an independent contractor is generally not responsible for the wrongs committed by an independent contractor. Id.
The services provided by Carron for Pulitzer were governed by two documents--the "St. Louis Post Dispatch Home Delivery Service Agreement" and the "Carrier Performance Standards" document (documents). These documents were admitted into evidence at trial. The transcript filed with this Court reflects the testimony of three witnesses regarding these documents--Carron, Edward Bricker and Bernard Andrews.
Like Carron, Edward Bricker is a newspaper carrier contracted with Pulitzer. In addition, he is president of the St. Louis Post Dispatch Carriers Association. Bernard Andrews is the circulation manager at the St. Louis Post Dispatch. This Court's review of the transcript reveals that none of these witnesses' testimony disputed or called into question the terms of the two documents under which Carron provided services to Pulitzer.
Because nothing in the documents that governed Carron's work for Pulitzer was refuted by any witness, the determination of the relationship between Carron and Pulitzer is based solely on the interpretation of those documents. Because interpretation of contract provisions is a matter of law for the trial court to decide, not a factual issue for resolution by the jury, this issue was purely a matter of law for the trial court to decide by interpreting the two documents. Therefore, the status of the relationship between Carron and Pulitzer was not an issue for the jury to decide. Accordingly, we will affirm the entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict if the trial court was correct in determining that Carron was an independent contractor contracted to perform newspaper delivery services for Pulitzer.
Although Hougland cites various cases in other jurisdictions, we are constrained by Skidmore v. Haggard, 341 Mo. 837, 110 S.W.2d 726 (1937) in which the Supreme Court of Missouri held that a newspaper carrier, under a similar contract and responsible for similar duties to those of Carron, was an independent contractor. The facts in Skidmore reveal its similarities to the case at bar.
In Skidmore, Emory Skidmore (Skidmore) sued Troy Haggard (Haggard) and the Kansas City Star Company (the Star) after he was injured in an automobile accident with Haggard while Haggard delivered newspapers under contract with the Star. Id. at 727, 732. At the close of the evidence, the trial court gave the jury a peremptory instruction to find for the Star. Id. at 727. The jury then returned a verdict against Haggard alone for $5,000. Id. The main issue presented on appeal by Skidmore was whether the trial court's peremptory instruction to find for the Star was error. Id.
The Star contended that no jury case was made against it...
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